


MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

THE SOVIET UNION AND
THE MIDDLE EAST


DS
42
.M6
no. 23
c.2



The
Middle East
Institute

1761 N St., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036



\$1.00

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST

A Summary Record

The 23rd Annual Conference

of

THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

*Washington, D. C.
October 10-11, 1969*

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST

A Summary Record

Program.....	i
Opening Address: John C. Campbell.....	1
Soviet Interests in the Area.....	14
Rapporteur: Daniel Patrick Maley III	
The Soviet Union and Area Disputes.....	20
Rapporteur: Daniel Patrick Maley III	
The USSR and North Africa.....	27
Rapporteur: Harriet L. Raiche	
The USSR and the Arab East.....	32
Rapporteur: Judy Buettner	
The USSR, Turkey and Iran.....	39
Rapporteur: Daniel Patrick Maley III	
Statement on Lebanon: The Honorable Joseph J. Sisco.....	48
Final Comments: The Honorable Parker T. Hart.....	49

PROGRAM

Conference Chairman: Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary of the Department of State

October 10, 1969

Plenary Sessions

Opening Address: John C. Campbell
Senior Research Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

Panel Discussion: "Soviet Interests in the Area"

Richard T. Davies, *Member, Planning and Coordination Staff,*
Department of State

J. C. Hurewitz, *Professor of Government, Columbia University*

Stephen Rosenfeld, *Editorial writer, The Washington Post*

Panel Discussion: "The Soviet Union and Area Disputes"

T. W. Adams, *Professor, Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville*

Malcolm H. Kerr, *Professor and Chairman of Department of Political*
Science, University of California at Los Angeles

Walter B. Smith II, *Political Officer, Arab-Israeli Affairs,*
Department of State

Simultaneous Panel Discussions

Panel A: "The USSR and North Africa"

John F. Root, *Country Director for North Africa, and Ambassador-*
Designate to Ivory Coast

Stuart H. Schaar, *Associate Professor of History, Brooklyn College*

I. William Zartman, *Professor of Politics, New York University*

Panel B: "The USSR and the Arab East"

George T. Ballou, *Vice President, Standard Oil Company of California*

William D. Brewer, *Country Director, Arabian Peninsula States,*
Department of State

Thomas Wolfe, *Senior Staff Member, The RAND Corporation*

DS
42
-ML
no. 23
C-2

Panel C: "The USSR, Turkey and Iran"

Igor N. Belousovitch, *Political analyst and research specialist,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State*

Kemal H. Karpat, *Professor of Middle East Studies, University of
Wisconsin*

Sepehr Zabih, *Associate Professor of Government, Saint Mary's
College, California*

Dinner Session

Address: The Honorable Joseph J. Sisco
*Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
(Address not recorded)*


October 11, 1969

Plenary Session

Address: William R. Polk
*Director, Adlai E. Stevenson Institute of International Affairs,
University of Chicago
(Address not recorded)*

Final Comments

The Honorable Parker T. Hart
President, The Middle East Institute



OPENING ADDRESS

John C. Campbell

This is in the nature of a backgrounder, as our friends of the press call it. I want to talk about Soviet policy and strategy in general from the viewpoint not of the man on the Middle East desk in Moscow, but of the men at the top. They do not have a Middle East policy which exists in isolation from their aims and calculations about the policies towards the United States, China, Germany, the arms race, the situation at home, and so on. I do not propose to describe or define where the Soviets stand on a series of particular issues, but rather to get some sense of their aims, outlook, directions, and how they see the world of today and tomorrow.

We might recall President Nixon's remark, made on several occasions, that we are ending the era of confrontation with the Soviet Union and entering the era of negotiation. And ask ourselves whether it is true generally, and whether it is particularly true for the Middle East. When you look at the apparently impending strategic arms limitation talks and the current four-power and two-power talks about the Middle East, you may think it is all over but the talking. When you look at the recent decisions of the United States and the Soviet Union on new armaments, or count the number of Soviet warships in the Mediterranean, you may reach a different conclusion.

Last December the Academy of Political Science at Columbia University held a conference on "Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East." The original subtitle of that conference was "Must the Cold War Linger?" I listened to all the speeches, including one of my own, to find out if the answer was Yes or No. The conclusion I drew was: Well, maybe. In fact, we do not know. You remember Winston Churchill's phrase about Soviet policy: A riddle wrapped up in a mystery inside an enigma. In practice he found ways of dealing with the Soviet Union, and so has the United States in the past twenty-five years, though there are still plenty of mysteries and puzzles.

The one thing that impresses me in the 50 years of Soviet foreign policy that we now have on the record is that there is no single key to it. And that theories of a consistent strategy for the spread of communism in the world or for the advance of Soviet power, or on some fixed balance between the two, are not going to fit the facts on any particular occasion. I don't want to get into the old controversy about whether these people in the Kremlin are a band of world revolutionaries, who happen to have the power of the Soviet state at their disposal, or are Russian nationalists who find Marxism and Communist parties useful tools for national purposes. I would want to make a few remarks about both sides of this question, that is to say the revolutionary communist aspect of Soviet policy and strategy versus the concept of

One can see many reasons for an active world policy on the part of the Soviet Union, not purely a result of geography, not purely a result of ideology, but because world conditions are what they are; including many opportunities to better the Soviet position in relation to the potential enemies, the United States and now China. At the same time you can see many factors, including very great risks of war, again because of the world conditions being what they are, which limit Soviet advances. Pressures exist outside the Soviet Union and inside it to induce in their leadership a certain element of caution, fear and frustration.

It may be useful for our purposes, in looking at the world as Moscow sees it, to establish a kind of hierarchy of interests and priorities. As I see this, you might describe it as a series of concentric circles. We don't need a chart here, it is a simple enough mathematical picture that you can see as I describe it. At the center of this series of circles there is the first and vital concern of commanders of the regime: the desire for preservation of the power of this particular group of leaders over the Communist Party, the government apparatus, the secret police and the other instruments of control within the Soviet Union. They are supremely vigilant against any development on the international scene as well as at home which would threaten that system. I think that is fairly obvious from what we know of the Soviet Union's history.

The second circle is again perhaps an obvious one, the security of the Soviet Union itself, not just because they see this land and this people and these resources as the base for Soviet power, but also because this is their country. The leaders of the country are patriots, as they see it, and not just manipulators of people and resources for their own personal power. And when they talk about the world communist movement and its interests and so on, those interests are defined in the light of what they think are the specific national interests of the Soviet Union. They will react to world events--whether their decision be something like Brezhnev's doctrine in Eastern Europe, or a break with the Chinese, or some deal with the capitalist enemy--in ways they see as necessary and desirable for the security of the Soviet Union itself.

Here, of course, the primary and elementary concern is physical security. I don't need to embroider that at all. It is expressed in their whole armory of nuclear weapons, offensive and defensive, and of the armed forces which now face China in the East and Europe in the West. In this respect, of course, that they are acting normally in their motives and policies, and their reactions are not very different from our own, since we have the same kind of power position in the world.

And just as there are areas of competition and areas of danger of war on both sides, there are also perhaps some areas of collaboration and some areas of common interest between us. We both face such questions as how far national security can be protected by seeking superiority in existing or future weapons, or how far one can

risk a nuclear war in pushing a particular crisis somewhere in the world toward a showdown. And because these things do have meaning for the Soviet leaders, I think it is possible at least for us to think that they may have a serious interest in some arms limitations, despite all the skepticism based on the record of disarmament negotiations in the past and certainly justified, despite all the conventional wisdom that we have to the effect that political settlements will have to come before disarmament and not the other way around. I think it is still possible that even without basic political settlements in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere, even without a real detente, the Soviet Union may still find it within its international security interest to have some agreed limitations on nuclear arms.

And now the third of the circles is one which I would call the control of states which have been brought into the Soviet security system, particularly in Europe. There is a mixed record here, but it tells us something about their priorities. They have had thousands of headaches in trying to deal with relations with the brotherly socialist states in Eastern Europe, and some very difficult choices in deciding what to do. In making those choices, they have allowed Yugoslavia and Albania to escape from their security zones--but they have not allowed Hungary or Czechoslovakia, which are strategically located in a different position, to do so and have used armed force to prevent it. And I am sure they would have opposed any Western military intervention in 1956 and 1968 in those two countries. If we really need a demonstration of the extraordinary sensitivity of the Soviet leaders on the question of a challenge to their primacy in Central and Eastern Europe (that part of it composed of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary), I think we could see it in Czechoslovakia. Basically, I think the invasion was a defensive reaction, not a harbinger of military adventure in Germany, the Middle East or elsewhere. It was a definite and very firm decision, based on their concern about what they consider the necessary protective belt around the Soviet Union itself.

Now Rumania, of course, is the case which holds our interest at the moment. We ask how far the Rumanians will go in pushing their line of independence, and how much the Russians will take in this respect. I don't think we are sure that each side has made the exact calculations on that point. But the important thing is that they both know that there is such a point. They know that if and when the Russians decide to do so they can get their way without force, and on such an occasion I do not think President Nixon's visit to Bucharest will make any difference.

Moving outward now, and lessening in intensity, is the fourth circle: those non-communist countries on the periphery where their aim has been to draw the teeth of the ties those countries have with the United States, to establish or to confirm a status of neutrality or non-alignment and eventually, I think, to draw those countries nearer to the Soviet orbit.

Let us take Turkey, for example. Between the wars Soviet policy was aimed at keeping Turkey non-aligned, and it was generally successful, keeping it out of any kind of combination with Western powers that might seem to threaten the Soviet Union. And after World War II, as you know, Stalin attempted to reduce Turkey to the equivalent of satellite status. The Russians saw that Turkey got support in the West and joined NATO. Since then Soviet policy has alternated between threats and blandishments in dealing with the Turks, with the basic purpose of weakening and breaking down those ties with NATO and the United States. But another of the self-imposed limitations on this policy on the part of the Soviet Union is that they do accept as a fact today that Turkey has strong ties with the West, that it does exist as a member of the Western alliance. They accepted the existence of missiles on Turkish soil and the fact that the United States had air facilities on Turkish soil for bombing the Soviet Union. They show no compulsion to change that situation. Certainly it is a desirable change from their point of view, but they have not felt the need for a more active policy against Turkish independence.

And now the fifth circle: beyond that more limited area just described is what we often call the Third World, that is the more underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: the regions where we have had most of the conflicts and crises of the latter part of the postwar period and where the Soviets have sought to hit at what our military people call "targets of opportunity." There have been plentiful opportunities for political gains in those areas, largely because of the obvious reasons: the fact that the historic opponents of the people in the new national leadership in those countries were the Western powers who had ruled or controlled them in the past, or the United States which was associated with the colonial powers in the past, and the fact that unlike the Turks or the Iranians in the Middle East, or unlike the Poles and Rumanians in Europe, these people did not have a long experience of their own in dealing with Russia and the Soviet Union. And so we saw the Soviets meet with considerable success in reaching out to places like Indonesia and India, Pakistan and the Arab world, Ghana, the Congo, Mali, Guatemala and Cuba in this hemisphere. They have tremendous problems in how to deal with these countries--what the position of the Communist Party is going to be, how much guidance these countries would take from them--but mainly it has been an alliance, a marriage of convenience between Soviet power and the national ambitions of these countries because of their common opposition to the West.

It certainly opened up some glorious vistas to the leadership of the Soviet Union, but along with the opportunity to gain were also opportunities to lose. If you look at the road over the past ten years, there are some striking examples of failures which the Soviet Union has had to accept. Some of the shining nationalist leaders on whom they had counted could not stay the course and found themselves either pushed aside at home or pushed into situations where they were no longer so useful to the Soviet Union.

It was obvious that in most of these cases their Soviet friends were not able to help them or would not take the risk of doing so. Among the lessons, I think, which were learned, or should have been learned, in Moscow about these adventures and these failures has been the lesson of logistics. For example, they committed themselves politically in the Congo, but simply could not project sufficient power, political or military, in the Congo to make it stick. Because of the unpredictability of local politicians, they can make alliances with leaders, governments, movements and factions, but they cannot call the final tune as to how local political situations work out and they cannot be sure that some of those they choose as their friends will stay in that particular category. There is the lesson also of not making too strong a commitment or too great an investment in countries where you cannot control how it works out. And finally, the danger of reliance in any one country on any one man. The examples here are clear enough, from Nkrumah to Ben Bella to Sukarno and the rest.

Now let us bring those questions a little closer to home and look at the United Arab Republic and the Soviet position there. Today it seems to me that they have a commitment that goes quite far and raises the question of whether they are perhaps over-committed to a situation which, in the final analysis, they will not be able to save. They have an investment which is heavy and seems to be getting heavier, not only as the only source for arms in large quantities, but also as the principal economic support of a country which has its own very grave economic problems, certainly if you look at the long run. They still face problems of logistics. It is nearer home than the Congo; but is it near enough? Turkey still controls the Straits. Do Soviet warships in the Mediterranean give them enough of a military push to have the effect which, perhaps, they would need to have? Does Russia have control over local politics in the UAR? No--despite their great influence--I don't think they have the final say.

And the question of an alternative to one man, there again it is quite unsure, although Nasir himself represents very much the mainstay of the Soviet position in the UAR. They are well aware, I think, of some of the uncertainties which that situation can represent. They would like to have, I think, a stronger institutional situation in the UAR which would give them some insurance against unpleasant possibilities. But where can they find it? In the Communist Party? The Communist Party in Egypt has never had any real strength which could affect the political situation and it has, by Soviet request and demand, been dissolved and told to make its way into the over-all national party of the Arab Socialist Union. But no political institution or force that you can see--the Arab Socialist Union, which continues to be more Arab than socialist in the Soviet sense, or any other--can provide the kind of support which the Soviet commitment and investment seems, perhaps, to require in the future.

These are some of the dilemmas which the Soviets are facing in the countries of the Third World but particularly in the countries of the Middle East which are our area of concern today. They have never, I think, really fully taken into account the force of nationalism in the Middle East, just as we did not take it into account sufficiently in our own relations with that area. Basically speaking, the attempt of the Soviet Union somehow to achieve a situation of control or domination is probably doomed by that very force of nationalism.

And now the sixth and outside circle is one which you might call the promotion of communist revolution, whether in Germany or the United States, Africa or Asia or elsewhere. I do not want to repeat what I said before about the role of ideology or revolutionary theory as a motivation of Soviet policy--it is largely liturgy I think today--but nevertheless this is a factor in promoting Soviet interests in the world. They do not like to see these instruments weakened; they like to see them strengthened to make what use of them they can. In a sense the Communist ideology and apparatus are part really of the reason for their being, as they see their situation domestically, and also provide an important rationale for what we might call Soviet imperialism as it appears in their foreign policy. But a look at the actual facts of the situation must, I think, indicate some judgment on their part as to the real value of communist connections, both parties and other communist states, in their world outlook of today. If you look at what has actually happened, almost inevitably when communist parties have come into power in other parts of the world, as responsible parties for the conduct of the national interests and policies of those states, they have become almost inevitably national communists. This has happened in China, Yugoslavia, Cuba and elsewhere. While there may be special close ties with the Soviet Union, the idea that there is a common policy with the Soviet Union is simply a contradiction of the facts as they have come about. Certainly the Soviets must have some understanding of the limitations of the spread of communism if it should be their fortune--good or ill--to have it spread according to the writ of the prophets. Let us ask, for example, would they really want to see a united communist Germany? What would happen to relations between Germany and the Soviet Union in that case?

Now the drawing of these circles doesn't explain everything. But it does provide a way to judge the relative importance of this or that interest, and to give us some understanding of the decisions which they make in foreign policy. To take one example, in Czechoslovakia they did intervene and would intervene again. This involved not only their supreme interest in control of the states within their zone, but it also involved the second and the first of the circles which I talked about, namely, the security of the Soviet Union itself as they saw it and the position of the party and the ruling group within the Soviet Union. But they did not intervene in the June War in the Middle East and I think they would not again, because this is further down on the list of priorities, further out among the concentric circles of their interests.

And now with these factors in mind, let us look for a moment at the leadership, at some of the policies and bring the subject closer to home. I want to look briefly at these ideas: Who are these Soviet leaders of today and what is their outlook; what are the internal forces within their own country which affect their foreign policy; how do they see, in the large, relations with the United States and with China; and how does all this bear on the Middle East? These men, eleven in the Politburo, have been described as the superior bureaucrats, the super-clerks, the unimaginative men of the new era, and I think basically this is true, although I don't think we should use these terms in the sense of underestimating them or the power at their disposal. At the time Khrushchev was in power we liked to think this was an era of transition after Stalinism. He had broken the crockery of the Stalinist system into something that would be different, that would be freer, that would be better able to come to agreements in the international field and that would be more easily dealt with by the rest of the world.

But I think we have seen in the five years that these people have been in power that they are not the new generation. We have only to look at their average age--which is well over sixty--to discover that. Many of the aspects of their regime resemble that of Stalin rather than that of Khrushchev and do not resemble very much a new era in the Soviet outlook, either at home or abroad. These are people who fought their way up through the traditional avenues of advancement in the Soviet system itself. They came up during the regime of Stalin and, in that sense, they are products of that regime and conditioned by it. At the same time they are strikingly conservative in their policies in a way that exemplifies the immobilism of the party bureaucracy. They seek, I think, a kind of safety after all the struggles within the leadership of the past. This is not to say there are not struggles in the present as well. Since no one of them is of the stature to be the one leader, since all of the others would be on the lookout for such a one to make the attempt, they seek a kind of collective insurance policy which would keep them in power with no one of them coming to power in the Stalin or Khrushchev style.

In a way they are men of their own internal system and it is interesting that, in the large, they have not had great experience or great concern with the realm of foreign affairs. After all, no one considered a professional in the field of foreign affairs, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, belongs to the Politburo; the Minister of Defense does not even sit there. These men are political animals who are the product of the kind of system which exists in the Soviet Union. And in foreign affairs I think they have distinguished themselves by not being bold or not being as unpredictable as Khrushchev, by not getting into situations like the missile crisis in Cuba. I think perhaps we can count on their not doing that in the future, not heating up a new crisis in Berlin, not looking for trouble in that sense. At the same time I think they could, by their very lack of imagination, be very stubborn in a situation in which they might get themselves. It has often been said they would not get into a situation like the Cuba one but, if they suddenly found themselves there, they would not have the sense that

Khrushchev had to get out. This is a situation which may carry some risks for the rest of the world. But they are not men to take great risks of war; at the same time they are not men who will take great risks for peace. They will rather respond to the pressures on them and try to consolidate their position at home and internationally, in a kind of conservatism in both foreign and domestic affairs.

I want, therefore, to turn now to their domestic situation and look at some of the forces which are working there. Within the system--this is a totalitarian system but not exactly the same kind that Stalin presided over--there are varying interests. There are groups, even pressures; there are disagreements. There is a politics which exists in the Soviet Union, much of it under the surface, and some of it is within the ruling segment of the system, where you have no automatic harmony. An example is the military, who are now more influential than before. This may not be a very comforting thought, but they have, I think, been able to get more of what they asked for than they did under Khrushchev. I do not say that there has been any kind of military take-over in the system; I don't know that that is true at all. Nevertheless, there is a greater military influence and there may be a greater military constituent element in Soviet foreign policy. And there is what you might call a managerial economic group--people mostly concerned about making the system work economically--who are very strongly represented in the Central Committee and in the Politburo itself. They are competing with the military, whether they like it or not, for Soviet resources, and therefore affording another element of pressure and tension within the ruling group. Then there are the people you might call the purely party apparatchiks--the people whose main concerns are police measures, security, keeping the system working and under control. Their very great concern with the preservation of the system has importance for their views on foreign affairs and foreign policies.

Outside the system there are various forces and groups which are not easily described--which cannot be organized in a way in which they can define their own aims and publish them to their own people and to the world. But there are elements of unrest, there are elements of concern about the system, there are groups in the country which question many of the things which are represented by the system and some elements, perhaps, in the foreign policy. I can refer generally to the youth--to the student population. Certainly the leadership is very concerned about what is happening in the universities. There is a lack of interest in the welfare and concerns of the country, a feeling that students--the younger generation--just have no part in the system and the way is not there for them to have a part. Disaffection in the intelligentsia also has its reflection both in the scientific community as well as in the communities of writers, artists, etc. I think the leadership is well aware that throughout Russian history an alienated intelligentsia has been a very important political element in the way in which the history of the country develops.

All this may mean no crisis. Some people predict a crisis in the Soviet Union because of these elements. I think perhaps this is overestimating the possibilities of the existence of discontent and the forces which exist as pressures on the leadership. Nevertheless there are factors of uncertainty and bear on the question of what priorities the leadership itself chooses in dealing with both its domestic situation and its policies abroad. How far can it risk foreign adventures when it is not wholly sure of the home front?

And now a few remarks on how they see their relations with the United States. In a way, I think we have tended to interpret their policy as one of alternating cold war and detente and we sometimes ask ourselves in which direction are they going now? Are we in a period of cold war or is it coming to an end, or are we going into a period of detente, or have we come out of it and are we going back into something else. I think this is basically a confusing way to look at the Soviet policy because there is at any given time a mixture of these elements. There is really a permanent element of cold war in Soviet-American relations just in the fact of these two super-powers existing in the world as it is in the absence of any real agreement between them and the rest of the world on the nature of a working international order, and in the absence of any real political settlements in the heart of Europe which is certainly the key place. Nevertheless, in spite of this permanent cold war, there is the question of to what degree it colors the whole relationship between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Marshall Schulman likes to talk about a "limited-adversary relationship", which is what it is: we remain adversaries but we can find, perhaps, limited areas in which we can mitigate the effects or the opposition between us and use the techniques of negotiation and detente to improve the situation to the benefit of both.

Now insofar as the Soviets engage in this coexistence-detente type of approach, it may be as a tactical device, in which case I think we should find out and know what it is if we can. It may be merely to safeguard themselves against nuclear war and goes no further than that, which is very limited in scope, or it may be the beginnings of a real intention to negotiate on some of the political problems that face both of us. Our hope certainly is to enlarge that possibility and to enlarge that area of possible negotiation and agreement with them. And the test of this would come now, in the strategic arms limitation talks which are going to take place.

I am not sure that this is entirely true to the same extent in the negotiation about the Middle East--an Arab-Israeli settlement, the control of violence or the control of arms deliveries into that region. Coming up again will be the problem of the fate of Germany and what is called the problem of European security, about which I think we and our Allies will be talking to the Russians. To what degree we can hope for some progress is still not known. As I see it, much depends on Europe and on China in Soviet eyes and, in this sense perhaps, the Middle East takes on a lesser importance. The Soviets in many ways are now in a

classic Russian situation of fear--this is the old nightmare of Czarist Russia being between enemies on both sides, as was Soviet Russia with Germany and Japan before World War II. They see an economically re-surgent Europe with the United States behind it on one side, and they see a challenging China on the other side. China is not only an ideological rival which contradicts them all over the world, it also represents a territorial threat, a prospect of continuing border controversy and conflicts over the years. It has marked out for itself the role of the dominant power in Asia and, if there is one thing the Soviet Union says about itself in recent years, it is that it is an Asian power and is not prepared to see any other dominating power in Asia.

Now when you have a triangle of this nature, say the United States, the Soviet Union and China, which is the power situation we can see before us, the classic outcome is for each power to try not to be one against two. I think the degree to which the Soviet Union will try not to be the one against two is the great open question. Even though we say we are not going to attempt to play this game, it is also a question which will face the United States in the future. I am inclined to think the Soviet Union will attempt to put off that kind of decision. In the interim their choice will be to hold the line. They are dealing with two potential enemies and their great present task is to build up their own strength to be a super-power on all levels with the United States. To those people who say you are already a superpower if you are a nuclear power who can destroy the rest of the world if you like, just as the United States can, they want to make sure they have what they consider an equal or comparable position in all aspects of power. That means building up their economy and those aspects of their military forces, particularly far-reaching air and naval power, which will enable them to exert their political influence in parts of the world where they have been shut out. They envisage for themselves a role not only in the Middle East, but in the Indian Ocean and in South Asia, Southeast Asia and on the high seas, where they will be able to bring their military power to bear in the future in the way we have.

And that, I think, explains a good deal of the build-up of Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It is not just aimed at supporting certain Arab countries. It is not just aimed at threatening Turkey. It is not just aimed at the Sixth Fleet. It is part of a worldwide policy in which they are building up power which they exert in many parts of the world. Similarly their talk of an alliance with Asian countries, presumably in which they would be the leading power, rather reminds me of a Soviet SEATO or Baghdad Pact.

If there is one thing which we have learned, it is that alliances directed against the Soviet Union in those parts of the world to the East of NATO have their limitations and can bring losses. If we have learned something about our great strength in military power in some of these parts of the world, we have learned that it has its limitations. If the Soviet

Union is going to concentrate heavily on the exertion of military power in the far reaches of the globe, and if it is going to attempt to build up an alliance system of its own, I think they may discover some of these lessons that we have learned.

This brings us now to my final concern with the Middle East. One thing that I think should be drawn to your attention because it bears upon our later discussions here: Although the Soviet Union does not attack frontally the questions of its relations with the United States and China, it is attempting, I think, a policy in the Middle East more active than elsewhere in the Third World--partly because this tends to strengthen its position in dealing both with the United States and with China. They see the Middle East as an area where United States influence is still small and perhaps can be extinguished. I might just mention that they are continuing to pour arms into certain countries and increasing their economic investment in the Middle East at a time when they are reducing it--or at least not continuing it at the same rate--in Latin America, Africa and other parts of Asia. And they are continuing their steps to deal themselves into the Middle East oil business. I call your attention to the fact that this is the first time in nearly an hour of talk in which I have mentioned the word "oil."

I think it is safe to predict that we will see this higher level of Soviet activity in the Middle East continue. I also think you can draw the conclusion, from what I have said, that it is not going to be easy for them. There are many obstacles existing in the area itself and it is not going to be easy for them unless everyone else runs away, and I think that has some lessons for us. Anyway, there is the background--there are a few keynotes, at least one man's view of it, and now the conference can get to work.

SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE AREA

Soviet Ideology

The panelist's presentation was an attempt to clarify the role of Soviet ideology as a "destabilizing element" in the Middle East situation. It is important to recognize this dimension: behind the great power role of the Soviet Union lies the ideological or ideocratic character of the Soviet state.

He defined the function of ideology in the Soviet Union as the justification of the party rule over society as the necessary precondition to the attainment of Communism. Hence, the significance of ideological shifts is not to be found in their philosophic depth or scientific accuracy but their symbolic significance and what they reveal about the leadership's psychology and its changing concept of its mission.

Stages in Soviet Revolutionary Ideology

The panelist then presented three stages in Soviet ideology.

1. The Soviet Union as an isolated revolutionary state was, the panelist stated, considered an anomaly by the first Soviet rulers. They expected that the Soviet Union would soon be greeted by revolutions in the developed capitalist nations of the West, as Marx had predicted. Many early Muslim Communists did not, however, believe that it was necessary to wait for revolutions in the developed countries of the West. Indeed, one of them, Sultan Galiev, thought that material conditions upon which the transformation of mankind depended could only be achieved by the dictatorship of the colonial and semi-colonial territories over the industrial metropolis.

2. The "imminence of world revolution" ended in 1925 when the doctrine of socialism in one country was declared by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

3. In 1961 the 3rd Program of the CPSU discarded the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat and instituted the doctrine of the state of the whole people. This meant that the class character of the party was abandoned and in its place was proclaimed the party of the whole people. Little has been heard of these doctrines since the fall of Khrushchev but they continue formally as the latest Soviet dogma.

The Significance of Ideological Shifts

The panelist attached several points of significance to the last shift:

1. The end of the dictatorship of the proletariat meant that the class struggle was formally at an end. This in turn meant the official abandonment of the Stalinist mass terror.

2. With the end of the class struggle there was an abandonment of the proletariat as the sole revolutionary vanguard. The entire Soviet people has replaced the proletariat as the protagonist of revolution.

3. With this development, there was little interest in fostering revolution in non-Communist societies, although there remained a great concern for foreign Communist parties. Interest in revolution was supplanted by a new interest in implanting "Socialism, Soviet style" from the top of the society by decree. This has led to the phenomenon of co-optation or self-promotion into the ranks of the Communist states. States such as Algeria, Guinea, Mali and Cuba fit into this pattern. Still further beyond the Communist ranks but clearly possible candidates for admission are Iraq, Syria and the UAR.

In sum, the panelist concluded:

1. The degradation of Soviet ideology provides a reflection of how the Soviet leadership views its own role in the Soviet state and their state's role in international affairs. Ideology merely provides an explanation for the metamorphoses of the Soviet leaders.

2. But like any group of men engaged in a common enterprise, the Soviet leadership has its ups and downs. It strives to minimize failures and maximize successes. This leads one to the question, the panelist said -- What kind of success is the Soviet Union seeking in the Middle East? The impulse towards ideological success lends an air of uncertainty to the answers we can formulate to the other questions we are asking about the area.

Soviet Interests

The next panelist began by asserting his central hypothesis: Soviet interests in the Middle East are like those of the Soviet Union in other parts of the Third World. They arise out of being and wanting to be a great power and competing with the other great powers on this basis. The panelist explained that after a society has satisfied its basic imperatives of homeland security and the welfare of its people, its attention turns to the control and care of others, the management of alliances and the drive to gain respect for itself through military, political and cultural channels.

The Soviet interest in the Middle East is derivative of such great power motivations, and it may be said to be defined by the American interest in the area. For great power rivalry in this area is not surprising in view of Soviet-American rivalry in such less strategic locales as Antarctica and outer space.

The panelist concluded that the only compelling reason for Soviet interest in the area is political. The Soviets are motivated by the Western presence and desire to displace it or compete with it and have no interest there, either:

1. Culturally, for they seal off their large Muslim population from all but the most sanitized contacts, while the West has important cultural, sentimental and scholarly ties,

2. Sentimentally, if one excludes the Soviet Jews' and non-Jewish Soviet humanists' interest in Israel. On the other hand, the US has important ties with both Arab and Jew alike,

3. Economically, except what is tangential or politically derivative whereas the West has large oil and commercial interests,

4. Militarily, for while useful and convenient, the Middle East does not occupy a central place in Soviet strategic planning and Soviet presence does no real damage to Western interests, or

5. Ideologically, for the truest standard bearer of socialism in the Middle East is Israel.

The Evolution of the Soviet Presence

The panelist described the evolution of Soviet presence in the Middle East in terms of the following stages:

1. A casual arrival

2. Muscular tenure

3. A questionable future policy

He then examined the proposition that a questionable future policy is subject to change. He argued that:

1. Ideology gives the Soviets no guidelines for action in an unfamiliar area. They are hunting and pecking like journalists.

2. They will most probably bumble along with no pattern to their actions. We may retroactively see a pattern but they have none at present. This is illustrated by the twists and turns in recent Soviet policy in the area and the fact that the Soviets do not refrain from hinting at their own doubts and uncertainties about their policy there. Among these doubts are: a) The feeling that the Arabs don't know how to use Soviet aid and are incapable of building socialism; b) The Arab regimes are unstable and shift from military to political gears or vice-versa too suddenly; c) the fidā'iyīn are irresponsible; d) The Arabs have a tendency to lock up Communists; e) The Soviets may be backing the wrong Arabs -- the poorer countries which are an economic drain and a political risk rather than the richer countries who have something to offer, and f) Regret over the closure of the Suez Canal.

Quoting Roman Kolkowicz of the Institute for Strategic Studies, the panelist stated that the Soviet presence in the Middle East may be a reflection of a larger strategic debate in the Kremlin between the "militants" who stand for over-all nuclear rivalry with the United States and the "realists" who favor competition in the relatively low cost, low

tension conventional weapons situations such as the Middle East.

The Soviet policy in the area is not settled, he maintained, and he asked if there was not a revisionist in the Socialist house who might ask the costs and benefits of Soviet policy? He concluded by asking why the Soviets would not review their interests in the Middle East as the US has done in Vietnam, for they are subject to changes of heart and mind and the course of events.

Soviet Military Policy and Interests

The third panelist opened by observing that he saw no need for anxiety about the Soviet presence in the Middle East. Instead there is need for clarity of diagnosis of the situation.

He noted that an assessment of Soviet military policy in the area is dependent on knowing what the Soviet military interests might be and then attempting to speculate on Soviet motives. He explained that the Soviets' prime military interest in the Middle East is their own national security. Because the Soviets have sensed a threat to their security in the post-WWII US presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, they are motivated to attempt to neutralize the US strategic capability in the area for the strategic balance in the Mediterranean basin still favors the US.

This attempted neutralization has led to a Soviet-American military rivalry in the Middle East which takes two forms:

1. The arms transfer rivalry. The Soviet Union began military aid, consisting of arms transfers and technical assistance, as a profitable business but now political returns are paramount.

2. The Soviet-American Naval Rivalry. The build-up of Soviet naval strength in the Eastern Mediterranean has at least two motivations:

- a. The Soviets are a super-power but wish to become a global power. In order to translate their power into influence globally they must have a large naval force.

- b. The Soviets have been trying to establish a naval presence in the Mediterranean since 1789 and have been frustrated each time except the present one. Although the Soviet force is tactical, its importance rests in its ability to neutralize the American presence in the area and especially to limit the American ability to affect the course of crisis situations.

The panelist maintained further that the shape of Soviet policy in its attempt to neutralize the US presence in the area is different in each of the three sub-regions of the Middle East: the Northern Tier, the Arab East and the Arab West or the Maghrib.

- a. In the Northern Tier (Afghanistan), Soviet aid has been given benignly. The Soviets are not trying to overthrow the monarchical

regime but probably are looking over their shoulders at the other Northern Tier nations (Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran) and trying to convey to them that the Soviet Union has nothing but good intentions. He added that this might be part of a larger design to recreate the interwar buffer zone.

b. In the Arab East the Soviets are pursuing the diplomacy of polarization. According to the panelist, the Soviet intent is to demonstrate to the Arabs that the USSR is their only friend and that the US is aligned with Israel, in order to weaken the American position in this area.

c. In the Maghrib the Soviet position is midway between their Northern Tier and Arab East policies.

In conclusion the panelist elaborated three choices for American policy vis-à-vis Russian policy in the area:

1. Shut the Russians out. This choice has largely been used up in the successful containment of the Soviet Union in the first postwar decade.

2. Competition -- This is the present situation in the Middle East and there is little indication that the Soviet Union is willing to come to an accommodation. It is still bargaining for position in the bilateral talks now taking place.

3. Accommodation -- More evidence is needed that the Soviets are willing to accommodate in the long run; however the US may have placed the cart before the horse in attempting to develop a package for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict before negotiating with the Soviet Union on superpower differences in the area.

Discussion

Several of the questions raised in discussion concerned Soviet motivations for activity in the Middle East. One conferee asked if Soviet Middle East policy did not take into account Muslim unity, for the Soviets also are interested in Nigeria, Cyprus and Turkey, and the Baku Conference of 1920 involved many Soviet Muslims and called for Muslim unity.

One panelist answered that the Baku Conference or the Conference of the Toilers of the East was an attempt to incite anti-colonialist, especially anti-British, feeling and had no intention of calling for a Muslim International. Sultan Galiev, a prominent Soviet Muslim, was pressing for this but the Soviets said no. The Soviets were talking in terms of the more limited goal of expelling the colonial occupiers.

Another questioner asked a panelist whether he would deny that the Soviet Union has important historical interests in the area. He replied that the "tail of Russian interests was long but slender." There was, of course, the Russian interest in the Eastern Question and the problem of the Straits, but the Soviet interest was never substantial compared with those of the West, he maintained.

A panelist was also asked the status of the vacuum theory when the British withdraw from the Persian Gulf after 1971 if their only interest in the area is the Western presence. He modestly replied that his theory could be seriously challenged on this point but that he would back up only half way, because the US presence can still exercise an attraction at the same time the vacuum theory is in operation. Another panelist suggested that an adequate answer to the question required a closer examination of the British presence and its role East of Suez and its role after 1956. The United States was the major power West of Suez but the British retained their presence despite the loss of India because of the Persian Gulf oil. The British acted as a complement to the US and chiefly protected local stability for there was no Russian threat; however the British had little real responsibility in the area and their announcement to withdraw from the area flowed from an earlier decision to scrap a large carrier-based fleet. The British announcement brought no American plans to institute another fleet or attack force because of the pressure of Vietnam. The panelist asserted that the basic Soviet motive in this area was not to fill a vacuum but to extend itself as a global power and utilize military power in support of its diplomacy. A navy is an important element in such a capability and the Soviets have developed one after studying US at-sea replenishment and repair techniques.

Another question concerned the possibility of Soviet interest in Middle East oil. A panelist answered that any answer to this question was pure speculation. He suggested that available evidence indicates that the Soviets seem to have adequate oil in Baku and Siberia. This however raises the question of why the Soviets sought the contract with the Iraqi government. Such a development does however make the Soviets vulnerable to the same kinds of pressures the US had felt when it bought oil from two competing producers. The Soviets may be getting themselves in very deep if they buy from both Iran and Iraq.

The question was raised whether the revolutionary Arab states -- Algeria, Syria, Iraq, and the UAR -- could become Communist states without the Communist Parties in those states assuming control? A panelist replied that given the current stage of Soviet ideology it was quite possible that these states could be taken into the Communist system without a local Communist Party taking over. Different standards apply before and after Stalin and a state can now be called Communist without the Communist Party coming to power.

Another category of questions concerned the prospects for Soviet-American rivalry in the area. A panelist was asked whether the US was simply reacting to Soviet initiatives in the area or whether the US had initiatives of its own? He replied that although at the present time we have lost momentum, our policy over the years has not been a reactive one, especially in the Northern Tier in the early post-war years. In the Arab East we stayed out of the Arab-Israel dilemma as long as we were able to do so. As to our involvement now compared with the Soviet Union, the panelist asked just how progressive are the Soviet clients -- Syria, Iraq, and the UAR? Our clients, especially Jordan, have moreover come a long way economically, he added. Furthermore, the UAR's increasing dependence on the Soviet Union is a sign of weakness, not of strength.

And if the Soviets want to become more deeply involved politically they are liable to run into serious difficulties.

The possibilities of a fourth round of large scale hostilities and the likelihood of a Soviet-American confrontation in that event were raised. A panelist asserted that it was facile to speak of the Middle East as a powderkeg and that the outcome of any so-called collision course was deeply embedded in a complex of forces, chiefly military. These might be leading to some type of great power confrontation but the matter needed close analysis. A second panelist added that the characterization of the Middle East as a powderkeg may have stemmed not only from President Nixon's anxiety over the area but also an optimism about his ability to solve the problem. This optimism has quickly receded and with it much of the explosive rhetoric.

The third panelist added that the Soviet Union has little interest in seeing its client states at war but a considerable interest in maintaining the tension in the area.

THE SOVIET UNION AND AREA DISPUTES

The first panelist characterized two schools of thought on the Soviet attitude on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first sees increased Soviet activity as sinister. According to this viewpoint the Soviets did little to try to dampen the dispute before the 1967 War; they have actively fostered Arab-Israeli polarization along the lines of the global Soviet-US opposition and the Soviets would not want to throw away gains made among the Arabs by pressuring them to an accommodation. A more optimistic viewpoint sees that there are potentially encouraging elements in the new Soviet involvement. According to this view, the Soviets have no intrinsic interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict per se. There are limitations on the nature and extent of Soviet political support for the Arabs and the Soviets are taking an active part in international efforts to achieve a political settlement.

The panelist then proceeded to amplify the generalizations made by those holding the more optimistic view:

1. The Soviets have no intrinsic interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict per se. They have drifted into it for pragmatic reasons and not for doctrinal or strategic ones. Although the Soviets have had strategic interests in the Northern Middle East for over a century, they pursued an even-handed policy in the Arab world after their recognition of Israel in 1948 until the mid-50's when the West was attempting to build a Western-oriented defense alliance in the area. The Soviet interest in the Arab world in this period was, moreover, not an attempt to contain Israel but to reduce the Western presence. Even in the period around 1957 the main motive of Soviet policy did not concern Israel but the stability of the pro-Soviet regime in Syria and its ties with the UAR.

2. The fact that there are limitations on Soviet support for the Arabs may be seen by the following:

a. Soviet support for the Arabs has not altered the Soviet view that Israel has the right to exist and the Soviets have called for this recognition if a political settlement is to be achieved.

b. The Soviets have reiterated the ideological premises of the dispute. It is not a contest of two nationalisms but the struggle of the forces of imperialism represented by Israel versus those of the world-wide liberation movement. This ideological line makes it clear not only to the Arabs but to other Communist states that the Arabs could not count on Soviet support for objectives other than the promotion of leftist governments in the area.

c. The Soviet attitude toward the fidā'iyīn supports the commando activities only in the occupied territory and only those aimed at ending this occupation. The Soviets ignore the Palestinian national aspects of the movements because of the question of consistency with their view that Israel has the right to exist.

3. The Soviets' desire for a peaceful political settlement is not contradicted by the tension which they encourage in the area, for it is not inconsistent to have a limited amount of tension at the same time as a search for peace is taking place.

The panelist then concluded by stating various Soviet motivations for and against a political settlement.

Pro-settlement:

1. The danger exists of a new war by miscalculation in which another Arab defeat might necessitate Soviet intervention or bring charges of infidelity from the Arabs.

2. There is the possibility of a confrontation with the US if another full-scale war occurs.

3. A continued impasse might bring anarchy and instability in the leftist regimes which are clients of the Soviets, while a settlement would bring stability.

4. Continued commando success might focus light on the Soviet attitude toward Palestinian nationalism and the Israeli right to exist. Such exposure might provide an opening for the Chinese.

5. A continued arms race is a financial drain on the Soviet Union.

6. The Egyptian disappointment over the Soviet role at the UN and its approval of a cease-fire without a withdrawal might increase in the absence of a settlement.

7. The limited détente with the US necessitated by the Chinese threat and the strategic arms build-up would be enhanced by agreement in the Middle East.

Anti-settlement:

1. A settlement would reduce the dependence of the Arabs on the Soviets.

2. A settlement would also rebound to the credit of the US.

3. Concessions on the Soviet's part could jeopardize Nasir's position.

4. A new war is unlikely at this time.

5. If a new war were to occur it would be much closer to a draw and there would not be as much pressure for either the US or the USSR to intervene.

6. If a settlement effort is drawn on and on there are more opportunities for exploitation of the situation by the Soviets. The US may be portrayed as totally on the Israeli side.

7. In the event of a solution the Soviet image as revolutionary power among Third World countries might be hurt. Such a trend would provide openings for China.

The Soviet Union and Inter-Arab Disputes

The second panelist indicated that he wished to make four points:

1. In inter-Arab disputes before 1967, quarrels among Arab régimes and movements were not always of an ideological nature. The panelist cited the quarrels of the Arab left as examples. The conflicts between Qasim and Cairo from 1958-63 and Cairo and Damascus between 1963-64 saw the use of Israel as a stick to beat the other side. One must therefore be careful of saying that the Arabs always agree on the Israeli question, for the Arab states' responses to Israel are different and may be a factor for friction as well as unity.

2. The Soviets before 1967 had no inhibitions about profiting from inter-Arab quarrels and the Arab-Israeli conflict. This policy did not cost the Soviets anything and they gained by embarrassing the West. This policy the panelist said was a response to the period when the West was trying to build a defense network in the area, and the USSR was ready to latch on to those groups who opposed the West.

3. While the Soviets could encourage quarrels between the Arab Right and Left, the Soviets found they could not feel the same about quarrels of the Left. It was embarrassing to Moscow when two Soviet clients, Egypt and Syria, were arguing. The USSR therefore tried to heal

this and other inter-left quarrels. In 1966 under Soviet prodding the Syrian Ba'thists and Nasir signed a defense treaty and exchanged ambassadors for the first time since 1958. At this time the conflict over the Islamic pact was raging so this move was also tied to the Left-Right conflict. This reconciliation between Syria and Egypt brought Israel into the picture and the mutual defense treaty led directly to the 1967 War.

4. In the post-1967 period the surprising thing according to the panelist is how much the Arab chessboard has been shaken up and the Soviet relation to it changed. Although most people thought that the aftermath of the '67 War would bring attempts to blame foes and rivals for the Arab failure, the aftermath has instead brought the Khartoum Conference and further attempts to increase the common ground between the radicals and conservatives. In this connection the subsidies from the rightist countries to the leftist ones, the meetings of Nasir and Husayn, and the moratorium on propaganda are prominent examples of reconciliation. The panelist asked how the Soviets related to these developments. He maintained that the Soviets find it disadvantageous rather than advantageous to promote conflicts in the Arab camp. He then listed three reasons for maintaining good relations among the Arab states:

1. The subsidies from the rightist states to those of the Left and Jordan are preferable to adopting economic responsibility and fuller political responsibility than the Soviets already have. *

2. From the Soviet point of view the Arabs are in need of restraint and sobriety in dealing with the Israelis and inter-Arab squabbles are dangerous from this point of view.

3. Given that the Soviet Union wants accommodation, it must reckon with the need for American help in achieving it. Therefore there is a need to have the Leftists call a halt to the propaganda attacks on the rightists favored by the US.

The Soviet Union And The Cyprus Problem

The last panelist began his talk by asserting that the Soviet Union is well aware of the tense situation which prevails on Cyprus and proceeded to look at the Soviet interests from two perspectives:

1. Outwardly the Soviets must consider the impact of their position in the Greece Cypriot community, the Turkish minority, Greece, Turkey, the US and the UK, and the other countries in the area. Therefore the Soviet position since 1949 has been ambivalent and contradictory. As stated the policy supports the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the island. Actually, the panelist said there are three fundamental Soviet goals which remain constant despite tactical shifts. These are:

- a. Intensify dissension in NATO
- b. Get rid of the two British bases, Western overflight

rights and eventually the extensive US communications facilities on the island.

c. Keep alive the tension and instability on Cyprus to distract Western attention from other areas.

2. Inwardly the Soviets suffer from what the panelist termed an "embarrassment of riches." Their problem is what to do about the strongest Communist party in a non-Communist ruling state on a percent of the adult population basis. About four per cent of the Cyprus adult population belongs to the Party which makes it larger than that of Italy or Indonesia before the Party there was outlawed. The Party is almost totally Greek, so the Soviets have the problem of what to do with them so as to not alienate Turkey. The Soviets were placed in the position of having to denounce a 1966 attempted Czech arms deal with the Cyprus rapprochement with Turkey.

The panelist then listed some of the characteristics of the Cyprus Communist Party, AKEL:

1. The voting strength of AKEL is not known because Cyprus has only had one Parliamentary election since 1960. The panelist estimated it at 20 per cent.

2. The Party is legal, one of two in the Middle East that is so favored.

3. It is pro-Makarios, but anti-enosis.

4. The party is loyal to the Soviet Union.

5. There is no Chinese influence and no pro-Peking wing.

The panelist next asked what the function of AKEL would be from the Soviet viewpoint. Is it merely the symbol of the world-wide nature of the Communist movement or is it and can it be something more? How can the Soviets capitalize on it? The panelist began to answer the questions by arguing that:

1. Cyprus will not be the Cuba of the Middle East for the Soviets do not need another client state in the area.

2. The Party is a parliamentary socialist party and not addicted to violent ends or means.

3. It is a non-revolutionary party which wants a share of power. It has a professional elite which has not changed since 1949. It derives benefits from its relationship with the USSR and sees no reason to rock the boat.

4. The party's behavior according to the panelist is determined by three factors -- it wishes to stay legal, it supports Arch-

bishop Makarios, and it supports Cypriot independence. Archbishop Makarios allows the party because it is Greek and he believes that he can control it through the church.

The panelist next reviewed recent Soviet policy toward Cyprus characterizing the period since 1965 as one of "watchful waiting" on the Soviet's part. They don't wish to threaten AKEL or strengthen NATO's SE flank. They are committed to Cypriot independence and abolition of all foreign influence. Following the threat of a Turkish invasion in November, 1967, the Soviets were not sure what to do and their policy is in transition at the moment. It may be said to be pro-Turkish but not anti-Makarios. They are conducting a holding operation and as long as Cyprus remains a bone of contention it will remain a possible entrance point for Soviet influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The panelist ended his talk by listing a series of propositions:

1. Quantity is important to the Soviets and the Soviets will place Turkey over Cyprus in any policy conflict.
2. The Communist Party in Cyprus may be put in a new role by the Soviet navy's role in the Mediterranean although the Soviet interests are not clear in this regard.
3. AKEL can't be sure of Soviet moves and therefore feels expendable.
4. But what will happen to other small loyal Communist Parties if the Soviets consider AKEL expendable?
5. The USSR would like to continue to use Cyprus as a transmission belt. It is a useful base for infiltration and propaganda.
6. The Soviet Union is concerned with Makarios' stance and the possibility of a rightist threat to the party's existence.
7. The Soviet Union faces the same dilemmas as the US. It is walking a tightrope between two friends on Cyprus.
8. The changed situation in Libya may alter the importance of Cyprus although it is too early to tell.

Discussion: The discussion centered on Cyprus, factors influencing Soviet policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the status of democratic socialist principles in the Middle East today.

A panelist was asked the ethnic breakdown of AKEL, its position on Palestine, and its relation with the Turkish left and Arab Communist parties. He replied that the party was virtually 100 per cent Greek Cypriot, that AKEL supported the USSR on Palestine condemning Israeli aggression and calling for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. As to AKEL's relations with peripheral Communist parties, he indicated

that AKEL's strongest relations are with the Communist parties of Britain and the Commonwealth although it maintains fraternal ties with the Greek Communist Party and good relations with the Israeli Community Party.

The panelist was next asked if the Cypriot Communist Party will follow the trend of other national Communist parties and become more independent of the Soviet Union. He indicated that this is an eventuality that the party will one day have to face. A crisis of identity is in the offing when the party will have to choose whether it wishes to alienate the Soviets and become a Cypriot nationalist party. Thus far it has been docile but only time will tell.

The panelist was also asked whether AKEL's support for self-determination was interpreted as a call for self-determination by the Greeks on the island and/or the members of the party itself. He answered that 'self-determination' meant just that -- the right to have a choice as to your future and the party was taking the risk of this meaning enosis to the Greeks if they wanted it to; however self-determination to AKEL members does not mean enosis. Moreover enosis is getting more difficult because of Makarios' opposition and that of business interests, the bureaucracy, and the church.

Another panelist was asked several questions concerning factors influencing Soviet Mideast policy. He responded to a question asking if there was dissension in Moscow over Soviet ME policy that there certainly was not unanimous agreement on it during the War when several groups of intellectuals protested the policy as it was being explained to them. After the War the Soviet anti-Israeli policy has been opposed by many. When asked if Soviet academicians' opinions could be taken as influencing operational policy, he replied that Soviet specialists in international relations especially those with an area expertise have influence in high policymaking circles just as those in this country do. The panelist was also asked about the Chinese role in the Middle East and replied that the Chinese have an interest in potential conflict in the ME and that they are held like a candle under the Soviets' foot by the USSR's friends in the area. There is certainly some Chinese activity in the area now but they are a more long-term problem.

Another panelist was asked if he saw evidence of democratic socialist principles among the socialist parties of the Middle East. He answered that a number of individuals and parties either out of power or before they came to power have had a genuine intellectual attachment to democratic and socialist-reformist principles. However, this is generally eroded as these individuals or parties take power. For example the earlier Ba'thists had a genuine attachment to such principles but on assuming power in 1963 they were overtaken by events and military men who had different ideas. In Lebanon and Egypt in particular the panelist said there are a great many people, mostly intellectuals, who combine a socialist-reformist philosophy with a belief in free institutions and lawful means of change.

THE USSR AND NORTH AFRICA

A panelist opened the session with remarks on the important link between North Africa and the Arab east, on their "natural affinity" culturally, religiously and politically. Yet even before North Africa's association with the Arab world, North Africa can be viewed as an important part of the Mediterranean world. It is impossible to be categorical about Soviet aims in North Africa. They are varied, and the least of them may be military.

Great Power Concerns in North Africa

He listed three categories of Great Power concern in the area as strategic, economic and political. The "obvious" strategic importance of the area lies in its position as both the gateway to Africa and as the gateway to the Mediterranean. It is directly related to both the Middle East and the NATO area. The economic importance of the area is newer, especially with the discovery of oil and natural gas. While the US is not, itself, dependent upon Middle Eastern oil, her European allies depend very heavily on Middle East fuel supplies, especially from Algeria and Libya. For example, forty per cent of West Germany's crude comes from Libya. US economic interests are more in its heavy investment there. Over ninety per cent of Libya's oil development is a result of American investment and enterprise, which brings a large net benefit to the American balance of payments. The political concerns are related to North Africa's association not only with the Arab east, particularly after the June War, but also with Africa, through the OAU, with the West and with the UN. The political advantage the West has in developing relations with the area is that it is not the monolithic block of states that the USSR and her allies represent. The West therefore offers several political alternatives with which the North African states can deal.

North African Concerns

The primary concern, or motivation, of the states themselves is their own national development economically, socially and politically. After this, however, the states feel a sense of responsibility towards the causes of the Arab East, especially after the traumatic impact of the June War. As an example, he feels that the recent Libyan change of government was basically caused by domestic factors. Underlying the domestic concerns, however, was the tremendous impact of the June War and the feeling of the officers that Libya had not given sufficient support to the Palestinian cause.

1960 - 1970: A Balance Sheet

In 1960, the US pluses could be listed as follows: the Mediterranean was largely a "Western lake," the area was dependent, generally, on the West for aid, the West had bases in the area, and the Maghrib provided a balance for the Arab east. The negative side included the Algerian war and the beginnings of Russian penetration into the area. For the positive side in the intervening decade, the panelist included the fruit-

ful relations that the US has entered into with both Morocco and Tunisia, the US support for their aid programs, the active Western enterprise in the area and the settlement of the Algerian war. Negative developments would include Russia becoming a major power in the area, especially in Algeria through military and economic aid, the closing in peacetime to much of the North African coast to the US Sixth Fleet and the opening of much of that coast to the Soviets. The West has withdrawn from most of the bases in the area, including the US withdrawal from its base in Morocco (although this was by mutual agreement and not the result of the Cold War) and the suspension of training at Wheelus Base, with the future of that base in doubt. Most important has been the traumatic effect of the June War on the area.

Range of Possibilities

The worst projection that could be made, the panelist said, would include the deterioration of the Arab-Israeli situation, the exclusion of the US from the area, Soviet dominance there, the denial of access to the oil facilities to the West and the posing by the Soviets of a military threat to NATO. A more likely prognosis would be that both the US and the USSR would learn to live with a variety of Arab regimes, both moderate and radical. There are limits to Soviet capabilities, both in supplying aid and technology. And neither the US nor the USSR is interested in precipitating a major military reaction from the other. The US continues to have an important asset in the economic and technical possibilities it can extend. The most dramatic example of this was the agreement between El Paso Co. and SONATRACH which will require an investment in Algeria of \$1 billion. It will be the largest single project in Africa, including Aswan.

Russian Penetration: Local Reactions and Realities

The panelist in discussing the internal reactions to the USSR excluded from discussion both Tunisia, where his comments would be "less relevant," and Libya, where the recent governmental change left the future unclear. He also dismissed Chinese penetration in the area from discussion with the comment that China "is there" but its attempts at penetration have not been very successful.

"Communist" Penetration in Morocco

He presented two aspects of local "communist" penetration. The first is the PLS, the revived communist party. Its life is very "unstable and uncertain," and its leader has been arrested. The party does have an affinity for the Soviet Union but does not have any deep conviction for communist doctrine per se. The party was no more radical than the UNFP. It did not provide a threat, it was "not frightening." The other aspect of communist penetration in Morocco was the presence of "communism" as opposed to "communists," among the students. This "communism" provides students with exciting political discussion and activity. The meetings are organized along communist lines, but the communism discussed is not necessarily "orthodox." Out of these meetings, the students gain familiarity with a revolutionary, socialist way of

discussing and analyzing political problems.

Russian Presence in Algeria

Algeria, he thought, provided a good example of the Russian change in foreign policy from stirring up trouble in the "have-nots" among the "have-littles" to providing aid to the "have-somethings," aiming for their long range friendship, cooperation and support. There is a coincidence of foreign policy between Russia and Algeria. In the Czech crisis Algeria, with nothing to gain for doing so, supported the Soviet position. The coincidence, however, is not total or constant. Further, with the eclipse of Boutiflika and Kaid and the rise of Boumedienne himself and people like Medeghri, he sees movement away from the Soviet foreign policy hard line although the shift has more significance in domestic than foreign policy. At present, there are about 2,000 Russian technicians in Algeria. Algerian-Russian trade has tripled since 1965 and is now about \$140 million annually. Russian trade, however, is still only one tenth that of French-Algerian trade.

Similar Revolutionary Patterns

Given the above facts, the panelist feels that Russian presence is no more significant than Russian penetration in Morocco or Tunisia. The significance of Russian influence in Algeria is that both countries share the same revolutionary history. There are important parallels in both countries developing, out of the revolutionary experience, a technocratic, state socialist society. Both face the same problems in restructuring the agricultural and industrial sectors of society. The significant difference between the countries is that Algeria lacks communist party and ideology. Another panelist questioned the degree of Russian penetration, pointing to the seeming Algerian preference for American over Russian technology. His interlocutor accepted the point saying that there was, indeed, a challenge to be picked up by the US. In terms of the number of technicians and in the similarities of revolutionary background, however, the USSR had the advantage. Russia has picked up her advantages not only in the military and economic aid but in other types of agreements. Russia has agreed to train 250 Algerian cadres in Russia and has reached an agreement on accrediting Algerian education. Standing in the way of Russian penetration the panelist saw Algeria's profound nationalism and distrust of Great Power interference. Yet Russia can provide not only technical advice but advice on party organization and ideology. The historical parallels of their revolutions are not exact. Algeria's revolution is, after all, only six years old. But the problems involved in restructuring society by violence with an organization that draws on mass support, hopefully leading to state organization on a technocratic, industrial basis are the same.

Historical Internal Patterns

The third panelist discussed only Moroccan and Tunisian historical reactions to the Great Powers. Both Algeria and Libya were part of the Ottoman Empire and therefore did not establish such patterns in

their historic past.

Morocco: Morocco has always tried to remain independent of all powers, to maintain its isolation from all powers and to manipulate all powers to maintain that independence. King Hasan used these historical patterns of manipulation in internal politics when, from 1956 to 1963 he faced internal political division. He undercut the liberal or leftist opposition by moving to the left himself. His turn to the USSR for arms was not only to procure the arms themselves but to prove to the opposition that the government was flexible enough to turn to communist Russia.

Tunisia: The country does not share Morocco's strategic importance. There was, therefore, no real great power conflict over control over the country. As a result, Tunisia has usually been dominated by one power.

Russian Interest in the Area

Morocco: Russian interests in the area are threefold. Russia has strategic interests in Tangiers and in locations close to British bases. Russia is also interested in Morocco as a moderating influence in the Arab world, as a moderate spokesman in the Arab League Council. Russia may also have a possible interest in supporting an Islamic alliance of some sort. Morocco has been able to use this interest when France cut off aid and the US would not supply all the military equipment Morocco felt was necessary. Significantly, however, Moroccan pilots and personnel are being trained on American F-5Bs in the United States, with no parallel training carried on in the Soviet Union.

Algeria: The panelist saw the real turning point in Russian-Algerian relations as after 1963. In 1954 and 1955 the Algerian communist party had been told by the French communist party not to back the "bourgeoisie uprisings." The policy was continued in 1958 when the USSR needed DeGaulle's support for its global foreign policy, and could therefore not support the Algerian revolution until the 1963 agreement. He saw this policy as a blow to the communist position in Algeria which is still significant. After 1963, Algeria turned to the USSR for arms and Ben Bella became the "darling of Russia." Algerian relations have continued to be close with the Soviet Union. Since the June war, however, Boumedienne has not been as cooperative with the Soviet Union. After the war, Algeria became the spokesman for the radical position in the Middle East and the USSR has been seen as unwilling to jeopardize its peaceful co-existence with the US for a more radical position when that position would lead to a nuclear conflict. Therefore, despite Russian trade and aid, Russian influence in the country is far from complete. And Algerian nationalism is still a very strong force.

Tunisia: Russia has, in effect, written the country off for Russian penetration at least until Bourguiba's death, and rightly so, the panelist feels. Bourguiba has attempted to demonstrate his ability

to be neutralist, to support liberalizing attempts in the Soviet camp by maintaining good relations with Rumania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. Basically, however, Tunisia is in the Western camp.

Prognosis

The most fascinating area for Soviet interest is Morocco. There is social turmoil at the base of society, although this unrest is totally unorganized. Eventually, there will have to be some kind of change, and when it does occur, the USSR can provide support. While Algerian and Russian policies do tend to coincide, there are still basic and important differences between the countries. There is little to interest Russia in Tunisia, especially with the present Tunisian trend even further away from socialism. Libya remains an open question.

Discussion

US policy toward Israel: Given worsening relations between both Arabs and Israel and Arabs and the US, wouldn't a US shift away from support of Israel be a wise policy? One panelist pointed to the US domestic political scene with its Jewish constituency as precluding a foreign policy change. Another remarked that the US would very much like to separate its relations with Israel from its relations with the Arab world but that this often was not possible. He did point to the recent El Paso - SONATRACH agreement as proof, however, that Arab states, even the so-called radical states, can maintain economic ties with the US when diplomatic relations between the countries have been broken.

Algeria exporting revolution?: Two panelists agreed that no, Algeria was not exporting revolution but that it was supporting revolutionary movements, especially in Palestine and southern Africa.

Roots of the Libyan coup: One stressed that the Libyan officers had reacted to essentially domestic problems which they decided were "intolerable." The coup was catalyzed, however, by the events of 1967, by the deep sense of humiliation after the June War and the feeling that Libya had not sufficiently supported the Palestine cause. He noted that the coup was not the result of a mass movement based on widespread urban and rural dissatisfaction, but was carried out by a small group of strongly motivated junior officers. Yet the present government had evoked widespread approval of its action. Another panelist added that the coup could be the "healthiest thing" for Libya, provided that the present regime carried out the necessary transformation in society. The regime had been corrupt, the distribution of wealth had been extremely unequal, there were too many contradictions within the system for it to survive.

Arab North Africa: The first agreed that the discussion had ignored parts of Arab North Africa. Both in the Sudan and Mauritania a majority of the population was Arab, with the governments of both reflecting that majority. Both countries broke diplomatic relations with the US after the June War and the causes of the Arab east have a strong

impact on both countries.

Russian "Advantages": A panelist noted several liabilities the US had in dealing with the area: its "imperialist" position in Vietnam, its refusal to provide unlimited quantities and quality of arms to the area, and most important, its close association with Israel in the Arab mind. How could the USSR capitalize on these liabilities? Another pointed to a seeming US or Western advantage in the area in the aid it extends and said many of the favorable results of this aid were either overestimated or the result of favorable weather conditions rather than technical assistance. Western projects will be successful in the long run only to the extent that they effect a redistribution of wealth. The Russian advantage in this respect has been its doctrine of and support for revolutionary change to bring about just such a redistribution of wealth.

USSR arms supply to Algeria: Moroccan Reaction: One panelist gave his impression from recent visits to the area that there was much less suspicion between the two countries than he had previously seen, that there was not the feeling he had noted on prior trips that war between the two countries was "inevitable." Therefore, there is room for the USSR to help both countries without necessarily arousing the suspicion of the other.

Great power manipulation?: A panelist said that if there was manipulation in the area, it was more likely to be by the North African states of the Great Powers than the other way around.

Impact of the June war: The panelist said it was impossible to exaggerate the impact of the June War on North Africa. He felt there will be a long period of feeling of Arab solidarity, not only out of fear of criticism by other Arab states for failure to support Arab causes, but also out of a deep inner feeling of "moral responsibility" for the Arab causes. Meanwhile, however, the North African states will continue to function, to "get on with it," and this may include continuing economic and technical ties with the west. Another noted that the governments were concerned about the popular reactions to the June War, that popular reaction could be infectious, spreading to the police and military. The governments had acted very quickly, therefore, to insure the loyalty of their police and armed forces.

Boumedienne-Hasan rapprochement: A panelist said it was more a Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement than a personal one between the leaders. The rapprochement was more an "arrangement of interests" where the interests of the states dovetailed and the wish to dovetail them was present.

THE USSR AND THE ARAB EAST

Soviet-Arab Relations

In his opening comments, the panelist stated that despite the differences existing between the Arabs of the urban Levant and the Bedouins of Saudi Arabia, there are generalities to be made concerning their attitude towards the USSR.

Historically, the first manifestation of Soviet sympathy for the area appeared in 1917 when Moscow revealed the Allied Sykes-Picot Treaty, thereby appealing for Arab support against Europe. With several exceptions though, the Arabs continued to look to the United States rather than to the Soviet Union. They did welcome the Soviet Union's official recognition of 'Abd al-Aziz in the Hijaz in 1926, the first European country to extend it, and of Yemen in 1928, although little followed in the way of material benefit.

The Arab-Israeli dispute of 1948 acted as a watershed for most issues but not that of the negative Arab attitude towards the Soviet Union. They continued to be suspicious of Communist activities and were particularly disturbed by the Soviet Union's vote for partition in the UN. Only after 1953 and the death of Stalin did a more pro-Arab policy appear from Moscow to which the Arabs responded in kind. Gradually, a community of interest was to develop between the two.

A foreign policy favorable to the Soviet Union is considered to have four aims by the Arabs. First, it can gain Soviet support and votes in the United Nations. Second, there has been a great deal of military aid available to the Arabs since 1955; over \$13 billion worth of arms have been supplied to Egypt, Syria and Iraq in the past twelve years. A third factor is the economic assistance offered since 1954. Such aid has been available faster and more directly than from other nations and thus is readily accepted by the Arabs. The fourth point is the usefulness of the Soviet Union in Arab opposition to the West. As long as the United States remains a friend to Israel, the enemy, it will be an enemy to the Arabs and viewed as a Western imperialist nation. Although cognizant of ulterior motives and double standards, the Arabs turn to the Soviet Union for support in this area.

Soviet accomplishments in the Middle East, however, are limited by several facts. The first is that, the more influential it becomes, the more likely it will be viewed by the Arabs as a traditional imperialist power. Second, the Arabs are very concerned with Communist activities and the possibility of subversion. In line with this was the roundup of local Communists in Egypt in 1960. Another factor serving to limit Soviet influence is its attitude toward Arab unity. Unlike the Arabs who have seen unity as a possibility since 1950, Moscow remains less than enthusiastic and tends to regard the area in terms of individual states. The existing conservative-radical split in the Arab camp is another factor. Starting from zero as it did in terms of influence, Moscow's efforts have become well received in the Arab East. But those more moderate governments have since been put on guard by the Soviet Union's links with radical states. And a fifth reason is to be found in the attitude of many Arab extremists. They consider the Soviet Union to be a "slow boat" in the revolutionary world scene and some have seen it

advantageous to play Moscow off against Peking. Little aid has been forthcoming from the Sino camp to this date, but all Arabs are aware that Peking had nothing to do with the original creation of Israel.

In general, the Arabs recognize the Soviet Union as a prime source of aid and support but at the same time realize its limitations, such as its inability to solve the Israeli problem. Varying degrees of contact are maintained with the Soviet Union by the Arab nations: the UAR, Syria and Iraq have been the most involved. Yemen, PRSY, Kuwait, Jordan and Lebanon all conduct normal relations, while Saudi Arabia alone has no contacts. It remains highly suspicious of Soviet aims and feels no need for economic support.

Soviet Military Policy

As a preface to his analysis of the Soviet Union's military policy in the Near East, the next panelist presented some historical background relevant to the current situation. He noted that Soviet interest in the Middle East goes back at least to 18th century Czarist Russia and Catherine the Great. In 1784 an offer was made to support Egyptian independence in return for the right to station Russian troops on Egypt's soil. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, Soviet aspirations for influence in the Middle East continued, as evidenced by the exposure of the Sykes-Picot Treaty and various attempts to promote local Communist activities. A shift in policy was noted after 1935 when Soviet cooperation with Arab groups became apparent, working first under the common banner of anti-colonialism and later after World War II in sympathy with their anti-West feelings. Subversive tactics were renewed somewhat in the early 1950s, particularly in Egypt and Iraq where no headway had been made by other means.

Since 1955, however, the position of the Soviet Union has become increasingly favorable vis-à-vis the Near East. The first notable event was the arms deal negotiated between Nasir and Khrushchev in 1955. The protector role of the Soviet Union in the 1956 Suez crisis and in the later flare-up between Turkey and Syria further strengthened its image. Added to this was its support of the new Iraqi regime in 1958 and its subsequent pro-Arab policy in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

A new slant to Soviet policy accompanied the beginning of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime in 1965. The formation of a block of progressive Arab states was advocated, standing in noticeable contrast to Khrushchev's policy of selectively supporting individual Arab states. It was to become apparent that the Soviet Union, while anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist in its stance, was also prone to discouraging pan-Arab unity.

A final note in the development of Soviet-Arab relations was the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Although the situation was encouraged by the Soviet arms supply to the fighting Arabs, the possibility of an actual big power confrontation was not welcomed. That attempts, including talks with the United States, were made to contain the hostilities is an indication of Soviet concern.

Since the war several new factors have appeared in conjunction with the Soviet presence in the Middle East. Moscow's decision to re-arm Nasir and step up its technical assistance to other Arab nations is one. As an attempt to restore the military balance between the Arab states and Israel, it at the same time promotes Arab dependence on the Soviet Union and reduces the prospects for peace in the area. Another factor to consider is the recent expansion of the Soviet naval force, both in the southern Gulf waters where England is scheduled to leave and in the Mediterranean, particularly in the eastern portion. How this is to be interpreted is not quite clear but it seems safe to say that the Soviet Union is determined to offset the notion that the Mediterranean is solely a Western preserve.

Further consideration of the Soviet military presence is to be made in light of its attempt to restore prestige by means of showing public support for the Arabs and deterring Israel from making any severe retaliatory raids. By gaining control of the situation, the Soviet Union also hopes to dampen hostile action of its client Arab states. And a fourth point is the apparent desire to reduce the access of Western forces to the Mediterranean. It is not known how ambitious this interest is beyond general Soviet surveillance of the waters and harrassment of NATO forces there.

In the political sphere, the panelist felt the main issue concerning the USSR to be whether it should continue to support the Arabs in their fight against Israel or should attempt to persuade them to accept a peaceful solution. Seemingly in line with this former approach, the Soviet Union kept the situation just below boiling immediately after the 1967 War. Then in 1968-69, in an apparent attempt to promote stability and thus prevent a big power confrontation, the Soviet Union indicated its willingness to break the impasse. The result was the US-Soviet talks initiated in April.

A second issue involves the degree to which further Soviet aid is made contingent upon internal reform in the Arab countries. Some have felt that change should come fast and that all bourgeois elements must be eliminated from the Arab forces. The other, more prevailing Soviet school of thought, is to go slower and let men such as Nasir be responsible for these changes. Local Soviet pressure may still be aimed at such targets as the release of Communist prisoners but it refrains from direct intervention.

Third, there is the question of how close to side with the radical Arab nations against the more conservative ones. As long as conflicts exist such as that between the Syrian Ba'th and Husayn of Jordan and that between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, it behooves Moscow to maintain a non-ideological line. Only in this way can it persuade the oil-rich conservative regimes to continue their support of their more radical neighbors such as Egypt.

A fourth problem is that of competition with Nasir for influence in the Arab world. Such an area of dispute is Algeria, where

both Egypt and the Soviet Union are vying for sway.

In summary he felt there are two alternative motivations involved in Soviet policy formation. The first, and in his opinion most likely, is the desire to replace prestige lost elsewhere with new-found influence in the Middle East. By pressuring the West with the threat of cutting off its oil supply and also setting up more radical governments in power throughout the Middle East, the Soviet Union could hope thereby to consolidate its position and offset any attempts of Peking to establish spheres of interest.

A more moderate approach may involve programs for economic progress and military aid. The panelist stated several reasons making this a more practical avenue for Soviet interests.

1. It avoids active intervention in face of the Arab-Israeli War and minimizes US-Soviet confrontation.

2. Denying oil to Europe can in turn hurt the USSR if Arab nations demand that it make up for the revenue of these lost markets.

3. The continued closure of the Suez Canal hurts both Egypt and the Soviet Union while the West has successfully managed to do without it by employing large tankers. At the same time, the Soviet Union finds itself in difficulty, being cut off from its direct supply route to the Indian sub-continent.

4. There is growing Soviet appreciation for the fact that stability in the area will both restrain the radical governments from rash action and result in increased pay-off on Soviet credits to the area.

5. Middle East oil is made available to the Soviet Union. Not only is it cheaper than Soviet oil but its purchase will allow conservation of Soviet resources and make more money available for other development projects. In line with this, the Soviet Union revised downward its production of oil in 1967 and simultaneously made arrangements in Iraq for the production and purchase of its oil.

The Soviet Union then may find that Arab unity, which worked for it in opposing the West, will play against it if the Arabs feel that Western imperialism is being replaced by Soviet dominance.

Soviet Oil Problems

In his introduction the panelist qualified the area of oil-production in the Arab East as being Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt. During the first half of this year, these nations alone produced 9 million barrels of oil a day; this figure is comparable to the total annual US production. Since all but Egypt have a very sparse population and have not yet developed a high industrial demand for oil consumption this oil is largely exported for world trade.

Recent years have seen the Soviet Union and the Arab nations come into direct competition for world oil markets. Production goals of the Soviet Union, as announced by Khrushchev in 1957, included expansion of both oil and gas production but not for export. Then the Volga-Ural area was found to be a rich source of oil and a second burst of development ensued. Before World War I and up through the 20's and 30's the Soviet Union had supplied Europe with oil by means of its long-distance oil lines originating in the Baku fields. With the Volga discovery a surplus situation came into existence; by 1960 both the Soviet Union and the Arab East were vying for the same markets.

In an attempt to ease this tension, Soviet oil officials attended the second Arab Petroleum Conference held in Beirut in 1960 and the third held in Alexandria in 1961. A rebuttal to Arab accusations was presented, saying that the Soviet Union only wished to establish itself as an exporter and had no intentions of cutting Arab prices. Two prices for oil were quoted, one being applied to its Arab friends and one used in trade with competitor nations. As an example of this competition for markets, 33 per cent of Egypt's oil in 1969 came from the Soviet Union as did 21 per cent of Italy's oil.

Referring to a statement made earlier that Soviet oil is unlimited, he pointed out that recent developments make this no longer correct. Economic and growth activity in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc has been such that the rate of oil consumption is steadily increasing. While the Eastern Bloc is growing at a rate of 11-13 per cent a year, the Soviet Union is also increasing its energy demands by five per cent a year. Looking ahead, the eastern region of the Soviet Union holds great potential as shown by recent discoveries in Siberia and north of the Arctic Circle. But the problem of development, operation and transportation is intensified by expense and distance to this area. Simple economics may prevent the Soviet Union from immediately cashing in on its valuable resource.

Thus, although ten years ago it could be said that the Soviet Union had no oil interests in the Middle East, it most certainly does now. Gas is currently piped to the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and another line is under construction from Iran. These were felt to be indications of similar development in the future.

The effect of the closure of the Suez Canal upon the Soviet Union was also mentioned. It is definitely feeling a pinch in sales, having been a supplier to India, Ceylon, Japan and Pakistan by way of the Canal. Another effect has been the realization that it has no supply east of Suez. This desire for diversified sources, whether backed by a master Soviet geopolitical scheme or concerned economists in Moscow, calls for further Soviet political and economic expansion in the area. Or as in the case of Iraq, it is being furthered within the government by local Russian representatives.

Touching upon the problems involved in payment for Arab oil, the panelist stated first that the Arabs have greatly benefitted from

oil revenues. In particular, multilateral trade agreements drawn up with those nations purchasing oil have made for easier and more speedy growth in the Middle East. Oil from Iraq, Syria and Kuwayt is paid for in convertible currency which can then be used to hire researchers, engineers and teachers.

On the other side of the picture there is state trading and barter. The difficulty, though, as in the example of Kuwayt, lies in its capacity to absorb merchandise equivalent to the export of 100,000 barrels of oil a day. Annually, this means \$500 million worth of transactions. Such "switch actions" are obviously difficult to get since few nations can move that much money. The Soviet Union has no such barter arrangements in the Arab East. Rumania does, however, in return for refineries to be built over a lengthy time-span.

If too many of these "switch back" arrangements are negotiated, a rather absurd situation may develop. The developing Arab countries will find themselves delivering oil on a deferred payment basis, thus subsidizing developed countries at the Arabs' expense.

One solution suggested has been that the Arabs move less oil than they produce and let other governments undertake transportation costs. Supposedly this would not affect competition in market prices. But the panelist was of the opinion that any oil, by its very existence in barrels, acts as a factor in competition.

Rivalry between the Arab East and North Africa for western European oil markets is a recent development. Libya, which produced no oil ten years ago, is now producing three million barrels a day and at a cheaper and quicker rate than its Arab neighbors further East. This is naturally seen as three million barrels worth of growth not available to the Arab East and as such intensifies inter-Arab competition.

In the question and answer period which followed, the panelist was asked to comment on the theory that the Soviet Union imports Iranian oil to replace that coming from the Caucasus, which can then be sold to Europe. His response though was that the costs of transplanting oil are too great to make this plan feasible. Questioned about the position of Rumania and of Alaska in world oil competition, he said that Rumania presently consumes more than it exports. He sees it as a bridge, though, since it can refine more than its local demands. Competition from Alaska will be felt first in the United States where there is no duty. Again, transportation will be a problem. It seems that oil is always found far from the point of consumption.

A panelist was asked to comment on the Soviet Union's policy in regards to the Palestinian revolutionary movement. He felt it to have been an ambivalent one, not recognizing extremes but being aware of their political implications. The Soviet Union's stipulation that no arms shipped to Arab governments may be sent on to the Fidā'iyīn forces is indicative of its concern that the movement may become difficult to control.

Speaking further on Soviet military designs in the Middle East, the panelist admitted that its objective are an open question. There is the possibility that the Soviet Union is using military power as a traditional tool of foreign policy. On the other hand it may have long range strategic plans to gain footholds in the area. Bases which could provide air support would then become outflanks against NATO Europe. He personally thought there was little coordination between political and military policy-making in Moscow.

As regards possible Soviet military moves were fighting to break out in the Red Sea to stop the oil flow to Israel, he felt the Soviet Union would refrain from becoming actively involved if possible. Its navy has to come from too long a distance to make direct intervention possible at this date. Added to this is also the deterring factor of the nearby US 6th Fleet.

A recent development in the Persian Gulf has been the projected British withdrawal from the area and the subsequent increased presence of the Soviet navy. Asked if this might cause the Arab countries in the Gulf region to take a more pro-Soviet stance, a panelist felt it depended on the United States' attitude. The Soviet Union first appeared on the scene in April-May, 1968, closely following Britain's announcement of withdrawal in January. Its interest in the area is evident and if the local groups find no other source of support, they may switch. One alternative may be a federation of the Arab States in the lower Gulf which would be stronger and more able to stand on its own.

There has been much speculation recently concerning the cost of transporting oil around Africa versus the cost of shipping through the Canal. In response to a related question, a panelist mentioned that costs have changed with the introduction of large tankers and the subsequent drop in long-distance in shipping. Today, a case can even be made for the Cape route over the Canal.

In conclusion, the panelist commented that western Europe and Japan will be the best markets for Arab oil in the next fifteen years. Any industrial nation is a potential buyer, though, and India could possibly move into this category soon.

THE SOVIET UNION AND TURKEY AND IRAN

Soviet Policy in the Northern Tier

The first panelist began his remarks by characterizing the Soviet policy toward the Northern Tier during the last decade as a "Good Neighbor Policy." He asked why this was the case, for it would appear that the unfulfilled historical ambitions of the Soviet Union and Moscow's ideological goals, if actively pursued, would combine to create an unstable situation in the area. Instead, the period has been

so quiet that US policymakers often worry that it might be an intermission between periods of greater activity.

The panelist sought to explain this apparent contradiction by examining Soviet national interests and ideological motivations in terms of Moscow's priorities.

To set the background for this examination the panelist sketched the larger developments within the international Communist movement in the past decade: the erosion of Soviet control over the international Communist movement, the decline in strength of national Communist parties, and the weakening of the Communist movement by national and ideological differences.

Changes in Soviet Strategy and Attitudes

These developments have caused several changes in Soviet strategy and attitudes:

1. As a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the question of who is a friend and who an enemy is no longer answered on an ideological basis. Ideology is no longer the gauge of policy.
2. With this change has come a shift in Soviet tactics. Great power capabilities have replaced revolutionary movements as the chief implements of Soviet foreign policy.
3. The Soviets have thus begun to pursue their ideological objectives by government-to-government relations rather than revolutionary or clandestine methods. To the extent that it has ideological objectives it is pursuing them by slow and gradual means. This has caused a subtle shift in Soviet priorities. There is no longer a push toward radicalization of the area. The first priority is the improvement of relations on a state-to-state level. The sale of arms to the Shah of Iran is an example of an attempt to improve government-level relations.
4. There has been a shift in the Soviet attitude toward regional stability. If Soviet objectives are to improve relations with all governments of the area and the Soviets back both sides they are presented with a dilemma when a regional dispute arises. This might provide an opening for the Chinese.

As a result of this shift in the Soviet perspective on the stability of the region, states such as Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan which are members of security alliances, have discovered them to be of limited value in cases where the issue of Communist aggression is not present.

Similarly, the panelist indicated, these small states have found it difficult to resist the friendly overtures of the USSR when it has disavowed territorial gain.

Cyprus and Iran as Illustrations of Changing Soviet Policy

The panelist used the Cyprus question to illustrate these propositions. The Soviets have never taken any action to exacerbate the question of relations between the two communities on Cyprus and have further been interested in maintaining the independence of the country. Their advocacy of the abrogation of the London Agreements which allowed great power intervention had this purpose; however, it was interpreted by the Turks as anti-Turkish because the same agreements guaranteed the legal and political rights of the Turkish minority on the island.

According to the panelist, if the Soviets had wanted to weaken NATO in either of the recent Cyprus crises they could have; however, the Soviets have been anxious to avoid war between Greece and Turkey for several reasons:

1. They wished to avoid a great power confrontation.
2. They wanted Cyprus to remain an independent state.
3. They wished to insure Turkish control of the Straits.

As a second example for his propositions on the changing nature of Soviet attitudes, the panelist pointed to recent Irano-Soviet relations. The USSR is an imminent threat to Iran but Iran buys arms from the USSR. This action was caused by the Shah's long-time apprehension over radical Arab nationalism in the Persian Gulf. Having seen several disputes where membership in a Western alliance did not have bearing on a conflict of Arab-Iranian interests in the Persian Gulf for this complicates the Soviet problem of maintaining good relations with both sides.

The Problem of US Posture

The shift in Soviet policy has also created a problem for the US posture in the area, the panelist stated. What position is Washington to take when the policy of the USSR is a normalization of interests and no action of a subversive nature? Of what value is CENTO in a situation of this type? It seems less well geared to this dilemma than to the intervention of the USSR.

The panelist concluded his remarks with the forecast that in the early 1970s both Iran and Turkey could deal with the USSR in relative security and hence their interests did not necessarily lie in pursuing their policies of the 50s and 60s.

Irano-Soviet Relations

Analytical perspectives: The second panelist introduced his discussion of Irano-Soviet relations by offering three problem-areas for the analysis of Soviet policy toward Iran:

1. The functions of ideology in Soviet policy-making toward the Third World which are basically the following:

a. An explicit or implicit body of guides for action. The nature of the international environment since 1945 has made strict application of Marx difficult, however.

b. An analytical tool for the whole of international relations. An example of this type of analysis is the over-emphasis of the Soviets on foreign relations as a function of the type of economic system of a country.

c. The symbolic, quasi-religious function which has characterized Soviet policy in the recent past.

2. The critical difference between Soviet objectives and aspirations.

3. The area of initiatives and options. (Often it is assumed that the initiatives in great-small power relations belong to the large power. In the recent past just the opposite has been the case.) The panelist then suggested three interdependent contexts in which Irano-Soviet relations could be viewed: 1) Bi-Power 2) Regional 3) International bi-polar or global.

Phases of Irano-Soviet Relations since 1945: Utilizing these frameworks of analysis, the panelist then identified four phases of Irano-Soviet relations since 1945:

1. 1945-1947. In the immediate post-war years it is possible to say that Soviet objectives and aspirations overlapped; indeed they were identical. The Soviet policy was expansionist and had a heavy ideological content. The chief elements of this policy were attempts to obtain oil concessions in Azerbaijan, support for communist groups in Iran and for minorities such as the Kurds. This Soviet policy failed because of the policies and reactions of the US and the U.N., the danger of confrontation with the US and the Iranian policies and diplomatic maneuvers.

The Iranian reaction was conditioned by the necessity of coping with a clear and present danger to Iranian security, and assuring that the Soviets didn't resume their subversive activities.

2. 1948-1958. In this period Soviet-Iranian policy underwent changes on the doctrinal-ideological level. The Iranian regime was still unsure of its capability of dealing with the Soviet Union, for its security was still in danger. There was, accordingly, a search by Iran for a treaty-based commitment to its security. Although the Mossadegh revolution interrupted this search, by 1955 the Baghdad Pact was formed. In the wake of the Iraqi revolution this type of alliance system was shown to be ineffective in coping with a Qasim type rebellion. Iran therefore floated a series of trial balloons to the Soviet Union on the subject of a non-aggression pact during the winter and spring of 1958-1959. The Iranian initiative had two objectives according to the panelist:

a. To attempt to persuade the Soviets to consider the sections of the 1921 Treaty which sanction Soviet intervention in Iran null and void.

b. To elicit US response to the end of securing additional US agreements.

The Soviets, on the other hand, hoped to persuade Iran to:

a. Withdraw from CENTO,

b. Grant no foreign military bases,

c. Sign no new treaty based on bilateral agreements with the US.

The Soviet Union did not achieve any of its objectives while the Iranians achieved only one -- a bilateral agreement with the US.

3. 1959-1962. Iranian-Soviet relations worsened until 1962 when Iran promised in an exchange of letters that it would allow no missile bases of any kind on its territory. The Soviet Union did not annul the 1921 provisions but this exchange paved the way for a normalization of relations.

4. 1962-1969. Relations normalize. The panelist indicated that the motivations for such a normalization were as follows:

a. The Iranian definition of its own security has undergone a gradual but fairly radical change. Iran has come to view the Soviet Union as a status quo power and not a clear danger. Thus, a clear distinction between objectives and aspirations has emerged.

b. By the 1960s the Iranian regime felt confident enough to be able to deal effectively with Communist groups in the country.

c. The government has been attracted to the logic of a non-alignment posture -- the sources of aid increase, there is more prestige, and alternatives and hence independence are maximized.

In this period the regional context of Irano-Soviet relations becomes very important. The Soviet Union is likely to face problems in trying to coordinate its diverse interests in the area. As an example, the panelist pointed to the controversy over the Shatt al-'Arab. In this instance the Soviet Union attempted to perform a mediating function. Because of its own involvement with Iraq, the USSR could not stand a direct Iranian attack on Iraq.

Prospects for future Iranian-Soviet relations: The panelist ended his remarks with comments on the prospects for the future:

1. A continued normalization of relations unless there is a change in the Iranian regime or a radical change in the international

system such as an increase in bipolar tension.

2. A continuation of Soviet economic aid for economic, ideological, humanitarian, and purely national or mutually advantageous grounds.

3. A continuation of de facto non-alignment for Iran. This would mean a policy of disengaging from a rigid pro-Western policy to one of national independence when options are maximized.

4. Iran remaining Western-oriented even at the completion of the present Soviet aid projects. Iranian-Soviet economic ties should not radically change (at the present time the value of goods traded with the USSR is only 10 per cent of Iranian trade.)

Turkish-Soviet Relations

Soviet goals: The last panelist commenced by describing Soviet goals in Turkey in the following terms:

1. Erase fears toward the Soviet Union engendered in the 1940s. This prescription emphasizes that Stalin was to blame for the Soviet territorial claims on Turkey.

2. Induce Turkey to adopt a non-aligned policy.

3. Create pro-Soviet groups with ideological loyalties.

4. Stimulate and exploit anti-Western feelings and policies.

5. Effect a change of regime if conditions permit.

Tactics and conditions promoting the achievements of these goals: The panelist next outlined the tactics and conditions in Turkey which would promote the achievement of these goals:

1. He stated that Soviet policy toward Iran and Turkey was far more sophisticated and calculating than toward the Arabs. It is an error, he maintained, to lump Turkey and Iran with the Arabs for conditions are very different. In fact, more Soviet scholarship is directed toward Turkey and Iran.

2. He then reviewed the conditions which permit the diplomatic offensive of the USSR.

a. The rise of Western type entrepreneurial middle class has isolated former élites who resent the middle class parliamentary regime because it has sustained the increased status and power of the rising middle-class and correspondingly lowered their own. The Soviets can portray this new class as the servile tool of imperialism and capitalism, and as wage-earners exploiting the peasants.

b. The relatively successful and rapid economic development of Turkey has made the socialist model of state intervention in economic development more popular, especially among the Turkish intelligentsia.

c. A combination of cultural nationalism and foreign policy nationalism has led to a questioning of foreign policy postulates. The question of Cyprus made Turks realize that when Turkey's national interest conflicts with the great powers, those interests are pushed to the background. What reason is there, therefore, for allying Turkey with the West? The developing cultural nationalism questions Western values in terms of the interests, realities, and values of Turkish society. This questioning of Western concepts is the surest sign of Turkish modernization and progress.

d. The relatively liberal atmosphere which prevails in Turkey has permitted radical groups to organize and engage in systematic propaganda not only by the Turkish Labor Party but also by student groups and other cultural organizations popularizing Marxist doctrine.

e. The existing constitutional system has impaired the functioning of the executive capability of the system. There are so many checks that the executive can't function and the opposition has exploited his weaknesses.

Effects of recent Soviet policy on Turkey: The panelist enumerated several effects which the Soviet diplomatic offensive and the developing conditions in Turkey have had:

1. On the level of governments there have been exchanges and visits between Russia and Turkey of various kinds. There has been agreement on a more independent posture but the pro-Western stance has not changed fundamentally. Several bilateral agreements with the US have, however, been reviewed and rewritten.

2. Among the entrepreneurial class animosity toward rapprochement with the Soviet Union is stronger. The masses remain aloof although the fear of Russia has subsided and there is now the possibility of Soviet penetration of their ranks.

3. It is, however, the leftist intelligentsia which is most susceptible to these Soviet ideas. This intelligentsia, made up of the press, university students, and professors, and perhaps some of the bureaucracy, is influential in spite of its size, for it controls much of the media and the educational system.

4. It was difficult to discern a split in the leftist intellectuals before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, although their degree of involvement varied. The invasion hit the leftist where it hurt most -- on the sensitive point of nationalism, and over the past year or so, Maoist groups have been coming to the fore as a result. This Maoist view (not openly Maoist because overtly pro-Communist views are not

allowed) combines nationalism and latent hostility for the Russians. It also defends liberation of the minorities in the Soviet Union -- a very sensitive point in Russian security which Turkey is uniquely placed to affect.

The foreign policy of Turkey is, therefore, contended the panelist, in the course of transformation. Nothing is finalized yet but a future change of government or a coalition may do so.

Discussion

In the discussion which followed, a panelist was asked what reaction a regional pact of Northern Tier Asian countries might elicit from the Soviet Union. He answered that there had been an important shift in Soviet policy as a result of the problems with China, for until recently the Soviets have not encouraged regional cooperation or regional security organizations. They have looked upon them as tools of Western imperialism or as complications to Soviet efforts to establish bilateral relations with the countries of the Middle East and Asia. Although the meaning of the Brezhnev Doctrine is quite unclear at the moment, the panelist said he believed that it is a reflection of a shift in the perception of Asia's problems and a recognition of elopment and cooperation. The Soviets realize that collective security is very complicated and that regional economic cooperation is a first step in that direction. Although there is no necessary connection, the Soviets see a relationship in that one might pave the way for the other. Another panelist added that there was at present a vacuum among the former and present allies of the United States in the area and that there was a pressing need for a new type of regional organization which the Soviets are taking the initiative in proposing. The panelist maintained that Western diplomacy would do well to look at this vacuum in its proper perspective. He indicated that there was a chance for a regional organization without ties to either East or West.

Another panelist was asked whether the students in Iran who have joined the Communist Party are no longer pro-Soviet but pro-Peking? The panelist prefaced his remarks with the reminder that the vast majority of national groups shy away from formal affiliations with the Communists and operate clandestinely.

According to the panelist, a section of the TUDEH party Central Committee seceded and found its way to China. But this move is just a "seasonal" shift, for there are enough ups and downs in Soviet-Iranian relations to justify such moves. Radical pro-Peking groups do, however, use the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Iran as a means of attacking the TUDEH Party. The TUDEH in turn justifies its pro-Moscow stand by citing the tactical nature of the rapprochement and the long-range industrial results derived from it.

The panelist next was asked the present status of the 1921 Treaty between the Soviet Union and Iran. He replied that Articles 5-7

of the treaty state that if Iranian territory is ever used by hostile forces the Soviets have the right to intervene. A few years after the Treaty was signed, there was an exchange of letters emanating from Iranian misgivings that this was an infringement on Iranian sovereignty. These exchanges specified contingencies relating to the activities of anti-Communist Russian groups in Iranian territory. In 1959 the Iranian government wanted to annul these provisions but failed to get a specific declaration of intent from the Soviet Union. In a further exchange of letters in 1962 the Iranian government attempted a narrower definition of "base" by pledging that it would allow no foreign missile bases on its territory. The Soviet response was that the commitment had been "acknowledged."

Another panelist commented on Articles 5-7 of the 1921 Treaty by asserting that the treaty and articles still exist. He maintained that the 1958-1959 response of the Soviets was to this effect and that he doubted that an exchange of letters could supersede the treaty. He stated that there is every reason to believe that it will be invoked in a crisis.

STATEMENT ON LEBANON

The Honorable Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, gave an off-the-record address to the Dinner Session of the Conference on Friday, October 10. In the discussion after his address, Assistant Secretary Sisco answered the following question:

Question: I am a Lebanese-American and am very concerned at the threat posed to Lebanon from the south. In the wake of the most recent Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon I understand that the Lebanese are very worried about the possibility of Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. What is the United States' position on this?

Answer: While the Israeli-Lebanese border has been traditionally quiet, we have been concerned over incidents that have occurred this year. The United States has long enjoyed a warm friendship with Lebanon and values the open and democratic society that has been traditional in Lebanon for so long. We continue to attach great importance to Lebanon's independence and integrity. We would view with great concern any threat to that integrity from any source.

FINAL COMMENTS

The Honorable Parker T. Hart

The experience of the last day and a half has brought us much penetrating analysis by some of the best of our scholars, diplomatic practitioners, businessmen and news analysts on the subject of the Soviet Union and the Middle East. I join all of you in expressing warm appreciation to those who made these thoughtful presentations and I share what I believe is the general satisfaction over the free-ranging floor to platform debate. No doubt some here feel that many more questions have been raised than answered and that points were not made that should have been. We each have our special slant and our deep interests--some formed out of a lifetime of effort--which may have been satisfied only in part. However, the purpose of such a conference as this is to assemble people of devoted interest in a very critical area of our foreign relationships and take stock together. We have shared our thoughts as freely as the unusual size of our assembly permitted; and it has been large, the largest, we believe, in the history of the Institute. Over 500 came into this hall yesterday after the registration count closed at 430. Last night at the banquet 292 attended. These figures testify to the concern which Americans feel over North Africa and the Middle East, and their geographic distribution shows the effort they made to get here. The vast majority of growingly aware Americans are sampled by those who made this trip and many will await the impressions of their friends at this conference. Others will seek means of study and travel to widen their direct knowledge. Some will be forming discussion groups in their own communities.

This Institute stands ready to be helpful in any way it can. It is a growing enterprise and it will henceforth furnish speakers and films, as well as its own publications, bibliographies and study guides to universities, high schools, and citizens' organizations such as World Affairs Councils and other foreign policy discussion groups. Our purpose is to help light the way to broader and deeper understanding, not to formulate conclusions in advance and propagate them. Trying to avoid that pitfall, I now offer my concluding thoughts on our deliberations.

The Soviet Union, we have seen, is, indeed, in the Middle East. In fact, it has been there since it conquered part of it in the last century. We have seen how it endeavored to expand its territorial control at the close of World War II and, failing this, leap-frogged the Northern Tier and Greece to establish for the first time a position for itself in an Arab world seeking a rapid path to modernization and beset by frustrations over Palestine, resentment toward the West and social and economic gaps within and between Arab societies. Measured by a zero index of 1945 to, say, 1955, the USSR has come a long way and America's position in relation, has greatly declined. However, that leap-frogged Northern Tier is still very much in place and in it economic and military strength--compared to the same index period--has vastly grown.

There is no comparable strength south of it in the Arab East-- or North Africa. And this is especially true of the most leftward leaning states of the Arab East, as compared with the societies retaining strong ties to the West. The inter-Arab fissures, rivalries, power seizures and vast expenditures on armaments (one speaker, mentioned an average of 15-20 per cent of GNP in Israel and adjacent Arab countries, compared to a world average of seven per cent) are factors which have given the USSR a certain opportunity. However, they have burdened the Arab societies heavily. They have yielded to the USSR neither the control, nor the reliable friendships it desired. In fact, Soviet feet have come down in uncertain, shifting and sometimes ungrateful sands.

Both the USSR and the West face instability and the likelihood of further change in the Arab East. That such change will be clearly to Soviet benefit is unclear; so unclear that the USSR seeks moderating Arab influences--as one panelist has pointed out--its wooing of Morocco is a case in point. It has never ceased to woo Husayn of Jordan and Faysal of Saudi Arabia. Its long reliance on Nasser as the natural area leader (in a sense following in our footsteps of an earlier period) is imperilled by the possibility of another defeat in the Palestine area.

This brings us to Israel, strongest state south of the Northern Tier, but whose strength must be focussed heavily on defense. Israel is an intriguing and worrisome factor for the USSR, since its prowess seems to have been underestimated in the Kremlin and could once again cause the collapse, not only of a second Arab defense establishment worth a billion rubles, but perhaps of the industrial complexes the USSR has also financed in the high hundreds of millions. How long can a Presidium in Moscow hold its present composition and observe the loss of \$2 to \$3 billion of investment and Soviet prestige in what our keynoter referred to as the fifth circle of targets of opportunity? There is good reason for the USSR to seek conversations with us. Believing that they can erode further the American position in relative peace but fearing sudden collapse of their own in all-out area war, they seem to retain their position so they can work against ours. At least they want the "competition" to be kept open.

On our side we have a basic reason to prefer that there not be all-out area war. Whether the US-USSR role in the area is labelled peaceful competition or something else, self-determination and self-development, in the best and broadest sense, are best assured by the achievement of peace. Nationalism is a force that resists a Communist take-over and it seeks technological help where the best value can be obtained.

Along with nationalism the importance of democracy in the area must not be overlooked. Lebanon and Israel in the immediate sense, while cast as enemies, have a stake in the mechanism of stability and progress which only an orderly process of power transfer can bring. North of them Turkey, which has its national election tomorrow, is crucial in the example it sets in the entire area. As the one powerful democracy which in the Middle East belongs to NATO it is and should remain, a rock of good sense

as well as a deterrent to a larger war. The virus of the Cyprus problem (which we have discussed) must certainly be contained and gradually eradicated if this great factor is to exert its continued influence--and go on to increase it--in abatement of irrationality and turmoil in the Middle East.

The year 1970 will certainly be a year of great trials. The United States has certain choices. It cannot seek to win a popularity contest. It must focus instead on long-term goals; in particular just settlements, by fair compromise, of the area's dangerous disputes. At the same time it must help strengthen those strong points that serve area peace. I am speaking particularly of the Northern Tier. In this key region let not our profile be so large as to invite legitimate irritation over our presence, but let us be strong where it counts, in NATO and in the Mediterranean. In the face of emotionalism and anti-Americanism let us be patient. These waves are high but they reflect inexperience and a lack of the habit of grappling firmly with one's own problems. They will subside if we remain steady, calm, fair and continue to keep our door open.

We shall take stock again in October 1970. With this I declare the 23rd Annual Conference adjourned.

DS 42 .M6 no.23 c.2

AUTHOR
Middle East Institute

TITLE
The Soviet

DS 42 .M6 no.23 c.2

Middle East Institute
The Soviet

