Monday Briefing: Erdoğan and the “symbolic war” over Hagia Sophia
This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Seren Selvin Korkmaz, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Mirette F. Mabrouk, Robert S. Ford, and Nilsu Goren.
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Ragui Assaad is Professor at the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota. He has written extensively on labor market and youth issues in the Middle East and North Africa. The author acknowledges the able research assistance of Stefan Johansson in the preparation of this essay.
This week’s briefing on recent news and upcoming events in the region featuring Seren Selvin Korkmaz, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Mirette F. Mabrouk, Robert S. Ford, and Nilsu Goren.
بقلم سيرين سيلفين كوركماز
“في غياب سياسات ملموسة للتعامل مع المشاكل الاقتصادية والسياسية التي تواجهها البلاد، يجد أردوغان الخلاص في الشعبوية”.
أصدر الرئيس رجب طيب أردوغان مرسوما يوم الجمعة يأمر اسطنبول بتحويل متحف آيا صوفيا التاريخي إلى مسجد. آيا صوفيا الكاتدرائية البيزنطية التي اكتمل بناؤها عام 537 تم تحويلها إلى مسجد من قبل السلطان محمد الثاني بعد الفتح العثماني عام 1453. وفي عام 1934، في عهد الرئيس مصطفى كمال أتاتورك، تم تحويلها إلى متحف بموجب مرسوم حكومي.
Multiple signs point to a crisis of confidence in Afghanistan. Ever since the publication of a sensational report alleging that a Russian military intelligence unit secretly offered bounties to the Taliban to kill American soldiers, there has been an intense debate about the possibility of peace in Afghanistan following the U.S. exit.
Alex Vatanka, Nazila Fathi, and Amin Mohseni join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the social, economic, and political challenges facing Iran, ranging from the COVID-19 and economic crises to the new Parliament and next year’s presidential election.
ضيفة الحلقة الدكتورة رندى سليم، وتناقش القوة الحقيقية للميليشيات المدعومة من إيران في العراق، إذا ما كانت الولايات المتحدة قادرة على المساعدة في تقليص نفوذ هذه الميليشيات، وهل يوجد مواقف مختلفة من دعم هذه الميليشيات داخل النظام الإيراني، ومقارنة الوضع في لبنان مع الوضع في العراق، وموقف حزب الله.
As in other countries, not all announced investments come to fruition. But the ratio in Syria is particularly staggering. Of the 118 projects approved by the Syrian Investment Agency in 2018, only 46 percent have taken any serious steps toward implementation as of early 2020.
Having given Yemen’s Houthi rebels control over the ports of Hodeida governorate on humanitarian grounds as part of the December 2018 Stockholm Agreement, the international community has failed to address the looming environmental, economic, and political threats presented by the decaying Safer oil tanker sitting offshore — a “floating bomb” waiting to explode.
Name any category of weapons system and then check which countries are working on a design of that kind of weapon and one will make an interesting discovery: the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have more different types and designs of that weapon in development than the rest of the world’s arms producers combined.
After the fall of ISIS in 2019, many relatives of fighters who were detained or killed, including 10,000 families of foreign fighters, were housed in camps like Roj and al-Hol in territory controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces. Like any closed society, the foreigners’ annex in al-Hol has its own dynamic and life there is much more complicated than is often portrayed.
Since Yemen was first hit by the coronavirus in April, the southern port city of Aden has gone on to become the epicenter of COVID-19 in the country. While the number of cases and deaths remains low, the situation on the ground in Yemen is far more complex than the official numbers suggest.
Turkish-US relations, while fraught with tension, must also align with a mutual interest in stability in the Middle East and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
With the impending U.S.-supported annexation of West Bank territory, Palestinians living in these designated areas stand to lose not only their long-held aspirations for an independent state, but further eradication of their presence — a “spacio-cide” — in support of an Israeli-envisaged demographic and political vision.
When OPEC+ ministers hold their next monthly meetings on July 14-15, the Saudis are likely to be a strong voice pushing for the continuation of production limits, for both economic and political reasons.