The US administration appears to have great expectations for Iraq’s new prime minister, Ali Falah al-Zaidi. But the expectations need to be tempered.
The 2026 Iran war has made Lebanon a core Gulf security concern, and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar now have a narrow opportunity to curb Hizballah’s influence by leading reconstruction, strengthening Lebanese state institutions, and tying economic re-engagement to reform.
The US-Iran standoff over the Strait of Hormuz — disruptive to global trade and energy flows, and devastating for debt-burdened economies — has handed Pakistan an unexpected geoeconomic opportunity, one that may persist even if the framework agreement announced on June 14 results in a lasting peace and permanent reopening of the strait. But seizing it will have interlocking consequences for Islamabad’s ties with Tehran, Washington, and the Gulf states.
As the US and Iran move to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the war’s real lesson lies in how Gulf states rapidly adapted — building pipelines, ports, and rail to bypass the chokepoint. Washington should seize this momentum, pursuing a “long game” of regional connectivity that serves shared security and economic interests.
ISIS appears to have collapsed in Syria in the wake of the SDF’s military defeat and subsequent integration, followed by the withdrawal of US troops. To the extent that the US prioritizes the group’s enduring defeat in the country, a relationship centered in Damascus is the best way to achieve it.
In March, there was talk of armed Kurdish fighters opening a second front in Iran’s northwest, but it never happened — for several very good reasons.
Three months after the Iran war began, the United States and Iran are engaged in talks aimed at ending the crisis, even as both sides conducted limited military strikes against each other this week and a separate-but-linked conflict between Israel and Hizballah in Lebanon continued to escalate.
When Iranian drone strikes hit two of Amazon’s data centers in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in early March, amid the ongoing US-Israeli war with Iran, much of the media’s reflex was to declare it the end of the Gulf’s artificial intelligence (AI) ambitions. That read is misguided, and it misses why what Iran was trying to accomplish failed.
As Syria moves toward reconstruction, the country’s new authorities have already made a consequential decision about who will control the postwar economy. Last June, President Ahmed al-Sharaa enacted Investment Law 114 by presidential decree, granting sweeping and permanent concessions to investors. Yet rather than make those incentives broadly accessible, the law preserves the country’s longstanding model of state-mediated market access.
The UAE’s departure represents an undeniable strategic setback for OPEC+. Its most likely response will be to shore up the amount of output capacity subject to quotas. For now, there are two clear pathways it could take to accomplish this, although neither represents a quick fix.
The limelight for American foreign policy shifts to Beijing this month, where US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping will meet on May 14-15 to address a long list of unresolved issues. But the Iran war and still unfolding geo-economic calamity resulting from it cast a long shadow. One thing to watch for is whether China or the US feels like it has a stronger hand in light of recent events in the Middle East.
While Egypt is not in the direct line of fire in the US-Israeli war with Iran, its economy is acutely vulnerable to the conflict. In addition to the rising energy prices and shortages that have affected much of the world, it also struggled with issues that reflected its economy’s own underlying structural vulnerabilities.
The war-time disruptions of international shipping passing through the Strait of Hormuz are spreading through the fertilizer market and affecting supply chains encompassing regions that have no margins to absorb the impact. The Sahel is one such region and now faces a severe threat of widespread hunger.
President Donald Trump now appears to share a view gaining traction in some policy circles: that sustained pressure on Iran’s oil sector could inflict lasting damage on its production and eventually force Tehran to compromise. The thesis is appealingly simple, yet dangerously incomplete.
The standoff in the Hormuz is not simply a question of whether Tehran can survive economic pressure, but whether Washington can sustain the pressure at an acceptable cost.