Shahmahmood Miakhel

For the past several decades, successive Egyptian governments have practised the economic equivalent of riding a skateboard without a helmet; risky but manageable in the short run as long as one doesn’t encounter any obstacles. However, the inevitable has happened. Egypt’s economy smashed into not one, but two, major obstacles; a pandemic, which it just managed to stagger away from (World Bank, 2021), followed by the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In discussions on Iran’s future in a post-Khamenei era, one crucial player in the transition to a new supreme leader is often overlooked: the inner circle surrounding Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, primarily operating within the framework of the Office of the Supreme Leader.

This article breaks down five key takeaways from the February 2024 survey conducted by Stasis Consulting ahead of Iran’s upcoming March 1 parliamentary elections.

Findings from the latest survey on Iran from Stasis Consulting: Turnout in the March 1 parliamentary election is expected to be a record low of 34%, the majority of Iranians disapprove of President Raisi’s job performance as well as that of the parliament (65% and 61%, respectively), and in a hypothetical face-off between President Raisi and former FM Zarif, Mr. Raisi wins out 30% to 16%.

As Yemen’s Ansarullah movement—better known as the Houthis—steps up attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, Gulf Arab states have opted to stay on the sidelines. They have their reasons for not engaging, including security concerns and the fact that their economies have, to a significant extent, remained shielded from the impact of the strikes. More importantly, these countries are bracing for the more serious economic risks they may face in the future.

Over the centuries, Iran and Turkey have engaged in an ebbing and flowing, but continual, rivalry for regional influence and supremacy. Yet such potentially escalatory dynamics have not been limited to geopolitical competition by proxy; they have also spilled over into efforts to meddle in each other’s internal affairs.

Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.

Elections in the Islamic Republic are highly restricted and engineered to produce the veneer of political representation. And yet, there is significant symbolism around heightened absurdities of holding elections in Iran that the vast opposition to the Islamist rule could have utilized if it had any gameplan.

On 13 December 2023, following discussions with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, US President Joe Biden rejected congressional calls to stop or condition US military assistance to the Jewish state.

“We’re not going to do a damn thing other than protect Israel in the process. Not a single thing,” he said at the time.

A month earlier, Vice President Kamala Harris said the United States “(was) not going to create any conditions on the support (it) was giving Israel to defend itself.”

As the US engages in a dialogue with the Iraqi government over the future of the coalition forces combating the Islamic State, Washington must ensure a continued relationship between the US Special Operations Forces and the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service.

In mid-January, with the war in Gaza continuing to rage on, Iran launched a series of surprise missile attacks on its immediate neighbors Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan over two days. Taken together, these attacks illustrate that the Islamic Republic puts regime survival above national interest in its foreign policy calculations, which undermines its efforts to engender solidarity and good relations with other Muslim-majority states in the region.

MEI Non-Resident Scholars Nadwa al-Dawsari and Ibrahim Jalal contributed to this multi-author report for the American Enterprise Institute.