Analysis

Ukrainians are pondering what their recent local elections mean for the future of their nation. While results varied across different regions, it’s clear most of the population has grown ambivalent and cynical about the political process, with their country is battered by economic hardship, invasion by Russia, a thus-far disappointing record of performance by the current President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, and now the disastrous effects of COVID-19.

Kavkaz 2020, the latest in Russia’s series of major military exercises, demonstrated its burgeoning military capabilities on its southern flank. Several lessons for both the region and outside observers can be drawn from the exercise, but when juxtaposed with the subsequent flare-up of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, they emphasise not just Russia’s strengths but also its limitations.

While the geopolitical importance of the Black Sea is indisputable, more attention is needed to its separate actors. Ukraine, having had the largest territory of coastline in the Black Sea before the illegal annexation of Crimea, is ideally positioned to play a central role in the future of the region.

In areas under the control of both the Syrian regime and Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES) in Deir ez-Zor Province, the governing bodies are failing to secure the loyalty and support of locals. The security structures built by the regime and the AANES have coopted and incorporated local tribes to a significant extent, but a lack of support from the central governing bodies amid increasing ISIS attacks threatens long-term stability in the province. These two regional dynamics are outlined and compared in this paper to illustrate the dual challenges both governance bodies face in appealing to locals and thwarting the resurgence of ISIS in the area.

Since Fatah and Hamas reached a reconciliation agreement in September, Palestinian scholars, activists, and journalists have speculated over when, how, and if this latest reconciliation might actually go forward. Many observers, both inside and outside of Palestine, view the move as a response to the recent rapprochement of Arab countries with Israel, as well as to uncertainty over this week’s U.S. presidential elections.

On October, 16, Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif set his country’s politics ablaze by offering a withering critique of the military establishment. Calling in from London via video conference, Sharif addressed a crowd of over 20,000 protestors at a rally in the Punjabi city of Gujranwalla organized by the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PMD), a recently formed coalition that brings together all major opposition parties. Under the PMD’s banner, erstwhile rivals like the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam–Fazlur (JUI-F) have joined forces to achieve two goals that they see as intertwined: unseating Prime Minister Imran Khan and regaining power from the military.

At a rally in Florida, Donald Trump stated that Iran will be the first country to call to him after his reelection because the Iranians are “dying for a deal.” National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien added that “it is very difficult for Iran to refuse to negotiate” because “Iran cannot sustain economic pain much longer and… we don’t think they can hang in there for another four years.”

There is no doubt that the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign has had serious negative impacts on Iran’s economy and that the country is experiencing a crisis. But, if the past is any indication, the sanctions or economic pressure will not be the main drivers of Tehran’s decision-making if it decides to compromise with the United States. To imagine that a deal is in the offing due to Iran’s dire economic straits seems simplistic.  

While most experts believe that the recent normalization of ties between Israel and the UAE will not lead to a significant change in the regional balance of power, there are indications that it has the potential to bring about such a change in the long run.

Iraq’s economic and fiscal crises, which came to the forefront this year following the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, were bound to happen at some point. What corona and the ensuing drop in oil prices and declining demand for oil did is accelerate the timing, according to the recently released Iraqi government white paper, a report of the Emergency Cell for Financial Reform. What the paper doesn’t predict is that in the next 6-12 months, and possibly beyond, we could see a worsening of the crisis with both current and future governments trying to adjust oil production and revenues in an effort to contain public discontent.

As the U.S. prepares to head to the polls to choose its next president, Iran finds itself at a dead end. Hit hard by American sanctions and its own mismanagement of the economy, Tehran needs to negotiate with Washington to get out of its current economic crisis and shore up its waning popular legitimacy. With an eye to addressing these issues and mindful of the steady erosion of support for the government, President Hassan Rouhani has obtained permission from Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to negotiate with the U.S. While the news has not yet been made public, Rouhani has told Ayatollah Khamenei that he will begin talks to reach an agreement with the winner of the upcoming election — regardless of who it is — and the Iranian leader has given his initial consent.

TurkStream, the much discussed gas pipeline across the Black Sea, is now a reality. In January, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Vladimir Putin presided over the launch ceremony in Istanbul. Gas shipped over the so-called “Western route” is now pumped into the Turkish grid through TurkStream rather than via Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria as before.

Drawing on ideas and styles passed from vibrant Middle East trading cities into the West, the architectural heritage of Europe — and America — owes an important debt to the Arab and Islamic world.

Deadly fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh has continued unabated for over a month. This so-called “frozen conflict” on Russia’s periphery was never truly frozen. Unresolved grievances on both sides festered for almost three decades, and smaller skirmishes periodically erupted. But this time the fighting emerged as the largest and deadliest flare-up and even spilled into neighboring Iran. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s support for Azerbaijan played a decisive role in raising the scale and turning the tide in favor of Azerbaijan. Turkish involvement raises questions about Moscow’s role and expectations, and the broader Russia-Turkey relationship.