After Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan hammered out a deal with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on March 5 to bring an end to the fighting in Idlib in northwestern Syria, he said he was hopeful that the two countries could extend their cooperation to Libya.
The United States has missed a valuable opportunity to use its influence in Iraq to encourage the government to implement the reforms Iraqi protesters have been demanding over the past six months and push back on Iran.
On March 1, Iraqi PM designate Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi announced that he had failed to form a new government to replace the current caretaker one headed by PM Adel Abdul-Mahdi. In the post-Saddam era, government formation in Iraq has always been a complicated process, but this is the first time since 2003 that a PM designate failed to form a government and the episode has revealed fundamental deficiencies in the Iraqi political process.
Minority communities in south-west Syria have shrunk to a fraction of their pre-2011 size, and the regime’s repressive policies perpetuate a cycle of violence and chaos that prevents their safe return. The regime’s strategy of transforming minority communities into sources of militia fighters has not only led to the deaths of thousands of young Alawite and Shi’a men, but also created sectarian tensions between formerly interconnected communities in south-west Syria. So long as the regime’s policy in the south-west is characterized by violence, the safe and dignified return of displaced Syrians will not be possible. This paper studies current and former minority communities in south-west Syria, the security and economic challenges these groups face, and the manner by which the regime exploits and weaponizes these vulnerable Syrians.
On Feb. 12, the director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, Sergei Naryshkin, made an official visit to Oman. During his trip to Muscat, Naryshkin engaged with senior Omani officials on strategies to de-escalate tensions in the Persian Gulf, counterterrorism cooperation, and approaches to conflict resolution in Syria and Yemen.
The U.S. killing of Qassem Soleimani, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force commander, along with the deputy chair of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, altered the political balance in Iraq. But the killings took place against a wider backdrop of political unrest and protests that forced the resignation of Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi at the end of 2019. With Iraq potentially headed for early elections,the country is set for significant changes as political actors vie for a seat at the table. U.S. and coalition forces in the region will inevitably be affected, and the coming months will determine the future of both Iranian proxies and the coalition presence in Iraq.
Iraq has been relatively calm in recent weeks. This could change following Mohammad Allawi’s withdrawal as prime minister-designate, but Iran’s proxies in Iraq are giving dialogue a chance before pushing ahead with what they say is revenge for the slaying of Qasem Soleimani, head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Al-Quds Force.
Sports diplomacy is the deliberate, strategic use of sporting events by states to create a favorable international image — the “continuation of policy by other means,” whereby sports, nationalism, commerce, and diplomacy are inextricably linked.
While attention in the third Israeli general elections in a year has focused on the performance of the caretaker prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu, a powerful light must be shed as well on the successful performance of Israel’s Palestinian citizens, who again increased their representation in Israel’s parliament.
The sheer density of protracted conflicts in the Black Sea region makes it particularly exposed to the geopolitical ambitions of regional and global powers. The rapid militarization in Russia-controlled territories in recent years has only added fuel to the fire, dramatically increasing security concerns and underscoring the need for the West and its allies in the region to address the so-called frozen conflicts.
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 fundamentally transformed U.S.-Iran relations from a special relationship into an adversarial one. However, this has not prevented American presidents of both parties, from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama, from reaching out to Tehran in the hope of a potential détente. There are many ideological, political, and economic factors behind the inability of Washington and Tehran to normalize their relations over the past four decades. One that has received little attention, however, is the cycle of U.S.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan typically never misses an opportunity to appear in front of the cameras. But after the airstrike last week that killed dozens of Turkish soldiers in Syria’s Idlib Province, he was unusually quiet. The local governor of the south-eastern Turkish province of Hatay, just across the border from Idlib, did the talking instead, providing information to the outraged public about Turkey’s worst day in the Syrian conflict so far. As the death toll rose, so did the public anger.
On March 1, the Iran-backed Houthis took control of the city of al-Hazm, the capital of al-Jawf Province, after weeks of fierce clashes with local tribes and Yemeni government forces. Incompetence, lack of unified leadership, and the absence of a military strategy by the Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition have played into the hands of the Houthis.
There has been a visible shift towards majoritarian politics and sectarianism in India since the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) accession to power in 2014. The party has promoted a Hindutva ideology that declares India as fundamentally Hindu and as such, its culture should be viewed in terms of Hindu ideas and values. This article discusses the series of controversial policies that the BJP under the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) has implemented since its re-election in 2019 and the domestic as well as international reactions they have elicited.
It is a near truism that U.S. relations with Pakistan have been historically unstable, waxing and waning, climbing to heights of interdependence and sinking to mutual recrimination. Yet this is presently a period unmarked by either high promise or driven by crisis. Rather than a reason, however, for leaving the relationship untouched and unexamined, this can be a time of unusual opportunity to create a more deliberative approach to thinking about the bilateral relationship and for shaping fresh initiatives.