Analysis

When President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ) of the United Arab Emirates visited the White House on Sept. 23, the joint US-UAE statement was one of the most extensive yet covering pledges to cooperate on nearly every technological sector and signaling a clear goal to shift the bilateral relationship away from hydrocarbons.

A cycle of retaliation against energy assets, though far from a guaranteed outcome, would be to the detriment of all and the benefit of none.

The devastating details of what has happened in Gaza since the war started have been widely covered. Absent from the discussion, however, are questions about what led to the war, what went wrong on the policy front, and, more importantly, whether this man-made tragedy could have been averted. Without understanding Gaza, plans for the “day after” may very well result in the further mismanagement of the already devastated enclave.

The Middle East Dialogue, a panel of regional and extra-regional experts convened by the Middle East Institute’s Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues Program and the Middle East Council for Global Affairs, met in Doha, Qatar, on May 21-22, 2024, to explore regional political and economic dynamics. This moderator’s report provides a summary of the issues and recommendations discussed.

The United States is trapped in a reactive Middle East policy approach of its own making one year into a regional war that continues to expand.

Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, arrived in New York this week for the United Nations General Assembly amid both widespread skepticism and a small dose of hopeful anticipation about his message to the world. In the end, he landed somewhere in the middle. The question now is how much leeway Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his foot soldiers in the Revolutionary Guards will give Pezeshkian in an attempt to start a new chapter.

The two leading presidential candidates in America’s 2024 election have made statements and established track records on the Middle East based on their time in office. This document aims to highlight the most important and reliable positions staked out by former President Donald Trump and current Vice President Kamala Harris.

In the latest installment of the Defense Rapid Reaction series, experts from MEI’s Defense & Security Program provide their views on the likely evolution of the Israeli-Hezbollah war, the potential for the conflict to draw in outside actors, as well as the impact of the war on global terrorist recruitment and appeal for extremist activities.

The deadly, back-to-back pager/two-way radio attacks against Hezbollah, which killed dozens and wounded thousands of its operatives, undoubtedly signaled a new phase in the intense cross-border exchanges between the group and Israel.

Over the past few days, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has entered a precarious new phase, with Israel carrying out both unconventional attacks and heavy airstrikes against the Iran-backed Lebanese militant group, while Hezbollah has responded with an increase in retaliatory fire. 

Three years since the US and allied withdrawal from Afghanistan, the facts on the ground challenge some more optimistic depictions of the Taliban’s counterterrorism cooperation with the US, al-Qaeda’s reemergence, or the capacity of ISKP to direct external attacks that could threaten American interests.

Before Tunisian voters have their say in the presidential election on Oct. 6, state institutions have already had their say. The security services, judicial authorities, and the High Independent Electoral Authority (ISIE) have either obstructed or officially barred over a dozen potential candidates from running. Of the three eligible candidates officially approved by the ISIE, only President Kais Saied and former Saied supporter Zouhair Maghzaoui remain outside of prison. Candidate Ayachi Zammel was arrested on Sept. 6. Many other potential candidates attempted to run from prison or were jailed for alleged technical violations of election laws. By restricting the list of potential candidates effectively to two, state institutions have embraced their historically paternalistic, modernizing role toward a distrusted citizenry.

In the corridors of power in Brussels, it is common to hear that the position of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is an impossible job. It may actually become even more difficult for the outgoing Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, who is set to succeed the Spanish Josep Borrell as the European Union’s foreign policy chief in the coming weeks.

The question of whether Armenia’s recent shift away from reliance on Russia is reversible is central to understanding its democratization trajectory. In recent years, Armenia’s dependency on Russia for security and economic stability has been severely tested, particularly during the 2020 Second Karabakh War and subsequent Azerbaijani incursions on sovereign Armenian territory, where Russia’s lack of support led to widespread disillusionment. This discontent has spurred Armenia to diversify its security, economic, and diplomatic ties, with a notable strengthening of relations with the United States. However, the sustainability of this shift remains uncertain, as it hinges on various societal factors and internal dynamics.

Azerbaijan’s takeover of Karabakh in September 2023, while a disruptive event, has opened the window for renewed dialogue to peacefully resolve the longstanding tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia. While the ongoing negotiations are unlikely to lead to a comprehensive peace deal in the near term, they could alter the strategic calculus of key actors in the region. The most likely and consequential outcome of the talks will be a peace framework agreement that could rebalance the regional status quo, potentially leading to a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan.