Analysis

Though Tehran continues to engage the government in Kabul in a pragmatic fashion, Iran and the Taliban are not traditional friends or allies; they share an uneasy relationship. There is a sectarian angle to their differences and a long-standing dispute over water resources. Yet Iran has sought to normalize relations due to broader geopolitical considerations, security concerns, and perceived economic opportunities.

Less than 10 years after seizing power in Yemen, the Iran-backed Houthi militia continues to evolve — and so do the threats emanating from it. After several years of negotiations, it now seems likely that the Houthis and Saudis will reach a peace agreement, and it is worth considering how such a deal could change the group’s trajectory. This report examines a number of possible futures that could develop in Yemen over the next 1-2 years based on shifting capabilities, interests, and alliances.

In a significant and surprising turn of events, on the evening of April 5, a prominent Iraqi leader in the Syrian Sunni Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, Maysar bin Ali al-Juburi, also known as Abu Maria al-Qahtani, was reportedly killed in an attack in Idlib’s northern countryside.

Iran is a key stakeholder in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tehran does not have a deciding vote on the outcome of the current war in Gaza, but it does have plenty of capacity to shape the future course of the conflict. Iran is, after all, among the top backers of Hamas, both in terms of diplomatic support and as a supplier of military materiel and knowhow.

Six months since the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel and subsequent outbreak of war in Gaza, the deadly and devastating conflict looks no closer to concluding. Is it still possible to achieve a sustainable cessation of hostilities and restart the conflict-resolution process? To get there, what are the incentives and disincentives that could be constructed for the two main combatants, Israel and Hamas?

At the COP28 in Dubai last December, 74 countries, organizations, and multinational development banks officially linked climate change and conflict for the first time in the conference’s history by signing the Declaration on Relief, Recovery, and Peace. This declaration recognizes that countries affected by conflict and fragility are significantly more vulnerable to the effects of climate change and calls for the scaling up of climate finance to help them better prepare for and respond to climate impacts

Public opinion polls indicate that a plurality of Israelis have lost faith in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and support early elections. Recently, this trend has been coupled with renewed demonstrations against the government and maneuvers by key politicians, indicating that the chances Israelis will go to the polls during 2024 are on the rise.

The newly formed government coalition in Islamabad initially looked weak, unstable, and probably short lived. But in the weeks since the outcome of the vote was announced, the political landscape has rapidly changed. Nevertheless, there are portents of trouble ahead that could send Pakistan back into the political tangle from which it has so recently emerged.

Tunisian President Kais Saied appears to be constructing a new economic strategy. While he has previously outlined his priorities with broad strokes, like fighting corruption and defending sovereignty, he has recently begun to add greater detail, adopting a personalized approach that appears to be attempting to bypass the existing corporatist structures.

On March 12, the United States Department of the Treasury sanctioned four individuals for supporting the Iran-linked al-Ashtar Brigades in Bahrain. This US announcement might suggest that Iranian-Bahraini relations are about to take a nose-dive. But in reality, that is unlikely to happen — at least not while Iranian-Saudi détente continues.

Future climate change is set to increase temperatures around the Gulf further still, rising twice as fast as the global average and pushing the cities of this rapidly growing region toward the edge of their viability as human habitats. But how did this situation come to be in the first place, and why did humans settle in such an inhospitable environment and build such cities around the Gulf waters?

The Middle East and North Africa region is one of the lowest recipients of climate finance compared to other areas of the globe, such as East Asia and the Pacific Islands, despite MENA’s exposure to extreme climate risks. The MENA region’s share of climate financing from the big three global climate funds — the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) — and their sub-funds made up only 6.6% of their cumulative global financing through 2023.

Over the past two decades, relations between Israel and China expanded significantly. Since then, however, there have been indications that the growth prospects for the bilateral relationship have diminished. China’s stance on the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack and on Israel’s conduct during the ensuing war in Gaza, in particular, has further cast doubt on the future trajectory of the relationship.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the threat of sea mines to maritime traffic in the region has become exponentially more acute. The Turkish-Romanian-Bulgarian trilateral minesweeping mission is a welcome sign of regional willingness to cooperate in this space and could, with the right incentives and sufficient political will, open the door to the establishment of a NATO Black Sea Fleet.

International funders have often called upon recipients to carry out reforms before any funding can be made available or the amount increased. But in many crisis-wracked countries, such as Lebanon, the prospect of reforms may be too distant, with intervention needed immediately. This is why greater emphasis must be placed on risk mitigation measures over which funders can exercise control.