Analysis

Within the first months of ‘Abdullah’s term as King, the Saudi government pursued a number of policies to improve the Kingdom’s economic profile. Saudi Arabia became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the limits were raised on foreign stakes in sectors such as banking, telecommunications services, wholesale, retail, and franchising. These reforms were intended to answer the economic priorities of diversifying from dependence on oil revenues, finding jobs for young Saudis, and opening up foreign investment.

Even Saudi film production has revived recently, following the move of Saudi Television empires such as Rotana and ART to cinematic production. This comes after more than two decades of suppression by conservative Islamist groups who prohibited film screenings to Saudi citizens. In 2005, the Kingdom saw the opening of the first movie theatre in Riyadh, followed by the release of a couple of Saudi films with Saudi actors. The first Saudi production was Zelal Assamt (2006), followed by the film Keif al Hal.

Originally posted: October 2009

Originally posted October 2009

Originally posted October 2009

It was in the summer of 1979 that Islam in Saudi Arabia became all about women. At the urging of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Baz, then chair of the Department of Religious Guidance, Legal Rulings, and Propagation of the Faith, Interior Minister Prince Nayf sent a letter to government offices asking for cooperation in curbing practices offensive to Islamic principles. At the top of the list of condemnable behaviors were unsuitably dressed foreign women shopping or eating out in public.

In the late 1970s, two Muslim figures attempted to make their ideas of the True Islamic State a reality.

Saudi Arabia always has been a tough neighborhood for religious minorities. This has been especially true for the Kingdom’s Shi‘ites, the country’s largest minority, with almost two million of them living in the oil-rich Eastern Province. From early in the 20th century, Shi‘ites have been the targets of scorn and opprobrium, much of it with the official blessing of the Saudi rulers. The origins of anti-Shi‘ite enmity are hardly a mystery.

The 1979 “oil shock,” which was precipitated by the Iranian Revolution and compounded by the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, was the second major market disturbance of the decade. The curtailment of oil supplies and the skyrocketing of oil prices had far-reaching effects on producers, consumers, and the oil industry itself.

Though the Saudi royal family still rules the realm, they have initiated a number of reforms over the past 30 years. Some of these reforms have been bolder and more successful than others. Some have been doomed from the very start — a few, perhaps, were intended to be stillborn. Judicial reform is one of the most recent and potentially one of the most important reform initiatives undertaken in the Kingdom.

Saudi Arabia is overwhelmingly Islamic and has always been ruled under the Shari‘a, or Islamic law. The sheer existence of an additional legal system in Saudi Arabia, besides the Islamic Shari‘a, is regarded as an offense against the Islamic character or modernity of the country and its judicial system. Islamic law is supreme in Saudi Arabia, and the idea of the divine right of kings, used to justify absolute monarchies in Christian Europe, would be considered heresy. As divine law, it is immutable and unchangeable. As constitutional law it cannot be amended.

The question of succession is the core issue of contention among the members of the Saudi royal family. Ever since its advent in the second half of the 18th century, the dynasty has been suffering from this problem and been trying to overcome it, succeeding as often as failing. This problem is due to the power structure inspired by the local system of kinship.

For the past 50 years, Saudi Arabia has been endlessly engaged in defending and expanding its position in the Middle East. This is, in part, a function of its self-image as the guardian of Mecca and Medina, the two holiest shrines in the Islamic world, but it also reflects its dominant role as the world’s largest repository of oil and as one of its largest producers. Ironically, these two factors behind the Kingdom’s foreign policy have made, at times, uncomfortable bedfellows, particularly when set against its domestic politics and foreign attitudes towards them.

The siege of the Grand Mosque in November 1979 came on the heels of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, the leader of the rebels, though, seemed not be very much inspired by what had happened next door. Whatever he may have noticed from Iran’s turmoil — and it might not have been too much because he never watched TV and rarely browsed newspapers — he deemed it to be irrelevant because Iranians were Shi‘ites, incorrigibly stuck in their heretic beliefs.

Since it emerged in Yemen around three decades ago, the country’s Salafi movement has maintained complex, if not tense links with Saudi Arabia.^[1] Before establishing a Yemeni manifestation of Salafism with its own features and clerics,