Analysis

The U.S. is disengaging from the Middle East as it shifts its focus elsewhere, a move widely perceived within the region as a sign of a coming American departure. Many in Israel were concerned that this would strengthen Iran and its influence in the region. Instead, it is Israel that has emerged stronger.

Academic and policy-based research demonstrates that women and youth in most MENA countries face legal, regulatory, and socio-cultural barriers to entering the formal labor market and generating income. Entrepreneurship can be a viable alternative for MENA women and youth because of its prestige in the region and its ability to catalyze inclusive growth. This brief draws on research and evidence to formulate policy advice on how support for entrepreneurship can enhance the economic security of women and youth in what will be a slow and painful post-pandemic recovery.

With the recent announcement of the Jafurah Field, a massive unconventional, non-associated gas play, Saudi Arabia is looking to enter the global gas sector. The field’s estimated reserves, while substantial, are insufficient to meet current domestic needs and, in the future, displace dirty heavy fuel oil used in power generation and satisfy international export goals. The kingdom thus faces difficult decisions regarding the allocation of the Jafurah gas — to either domestic or international markets — and both options have significant challenges.

The Arab Gulf states appear to be following a common template in responding to the global transition toward an energy system in which renewables play an increasingly central role. They are publicizing renewable energy targets, decarbonizing upstream and downstream oil and gas operations, commissioning renewable energy projects, and improving energy efficiency, among other strategies. A closer look, however, reveals differences in how they have deployed solar and wind power capacity.

The Black Sea basin has become a flashpoint due to Russia’s interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. This has implications not only for European security, but also for Mediterranean security as well. There are three key areas where the MENA region will be affected by a large-scale confrontation between Russia and Ukraine: energy, agriculture, and refugees.

The U.S. request for Qatari assistance in ensuring the EU’s energy security in case of a Russian supply disruption should be perceived as a political gesture of support addressed to Western allies and a warning to Russia. In reality, however, the American request is just one factor in Qatar’s calculations as it considers increasing its energy exports to Europe, and Doha’s final decision will be determined by an intricate combination of long-term economic and political considerations. In this equation political reasons may not be dominant and economic drivers will not always be in the West’s favor.

​​​​​​​The Program on Economics and Energy asked our non-resident scholars and advisory council members for their outlook for 2022 on some pointed energy questions. Topics include oil prices, Iran’s production, OPEC+ output targets, and the adequacy of current SWF savings levels.

In May 2021, the world watched in horror, as Israeli police evicted the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood against their fervid resistance. Meanwhile, another fight was raging: that of narrative power. As journalists, citizen activists, and human rights organizations attempted to document Israel’s brutal crackdown, many found their communications subject to overzealous content moderation. Key social media posts were removed from influential platforms, including Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, precisely when those posts were most crucial.

When the normalization agreement between the UAE and Israel was announced in August 2020, the response from the heavily policed and surveilled Emirati population was — understandably — muted. Social media accounts tied to government officials, or those thought to be close to the regime, were quickly vocal and aggressive online in support of the new policy, threatening retribution for anyone who might disagree. Opposition to the policy has come from within the Emirati exile community instead.

Beset by severe socioeconomic grievances, Algeria is now facing the most challenging economic situation since the 1988 October Riots, when thousands of young people took to the streets to protest an economic crisis caused by the decline in oil prices, austerity measures, and a youth bulge that led to mass unemployment. The latest food shortages are not the first, however, and given the administration’s current approach, they are unlikely to be the last. While the authorities have blamed business owners and even consumer behavior for the crisis, the underlying drivers are more systemic and structural.

Jordan has the lowest rate of women’s economic participation of any country not at war. According to the ILO, the kingdom’s female labor force participation rate is below 15%, while that of men is about 60%. This is lower than rates of female labor force participation in neighboring Lebanon (23%), Saudi Arabia (22%), and the West Bank and Gaza (18%). As the COVID-19 pandemic stretches on, the government of Jordan should take the opportunity to expand the accessibility of remote work and corresponding opportunities for Jordanian women who aim to play a role in their nation’s economy.

Lebanon is currently at a crossroads as the government faces the daunting tasks of rebuilding the economy, restoring public trust, and clearing the way for free and fair parliamentary elections in May of 2022. The country finds itself spiraling downward — an agreement with the IMF is yet to be realized, poverty and emigration are increasing, and there are growing threats to stability due to a failing economy and widespread corruption. Given this critical situation, it is worthwhile to review U.S. interests in Lebanon’s survival and consider key recommendations for U.S. policy to help Lebanon avoid complete collapse and help the Lebanese people move toward economic recovery, political legitimacy, and a more capable, transparent, and sovereign state.

When addressing security challenges in the Middle East, the United States must re-examine how it engages with and views women’s potential security contributions.

Gulf oil producers do not envisage a post-2050 world devoid of hydrocarbons, even though two of the region’s biggest producers, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have committed to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 and 2060, respectively. Reconciling their future environmental commitments with their current reliance on hydrocarbons is going to be an arduous and expensive journey that starts with decarbonizing their oil and gas production to reduce their carbon footprint and increasing their domestic green energy production. With demand for oil and gas forecast to continue post-2050 — albeit at lower levels than now — their net-zero target does not equate to zero oil and gas production. Instead, their transition will differ from that of other countries and will happen at a different pace.

The UAE has made bold strides to normalize relations with embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, opening itself up to criticism as many countries remain reluctant to reconcile with Damascus. Despite this measured reintegration of Assad into the Arab fold, many serious complications and challenges lie ahead. The most important of these is the lack of support from a hesitant Saudi Arabia, which would impede the crucial next step of Syria’s restoration to full membership in the Arab League before its upcoming summit.