Analysis

On March 4, OPEC+ members agreed to maintain their current production cut levels into April, and the Saudi- and Russia-led cartel’s decision further strengthened the upward trajectory of oil prices. While there were differing opinions among the OPEC+ members regarding the state of the global economy, the group’s unanimous decision reflects Riyadh’s current take on the markets, which is that the health of the world’s economy remains fragile as the recovery from the pandemic continues.

With debate on Yemen in recent weeks focused on the decision by the U.S. State Department to revoke the Houthis’ designation as an FTO, the Joint Declaration (JD) proposal by U.N. Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths has received relatively little attention. Since the global outbreak of COVID-19 a year ago, the U.N. special envoy has sought to use the urgency engendered by the pandemic to broker a nationwide cease-fire alongside a set of confidence-building measures — branded as the JD — between the Houthi rebels and the Republic of Yemen Government. But the content of the proposal is not new, nor is it a recipe for effective de-escalation and sustainable conflict resolution.

Relations between the U.S. and Black Sea countries are complex. The Western-oriented Georgia and Romania have shown unconditional support for greater U.S. involvement. Others, like Turkey and Russia, will continue to challenge Western involvement. And while relations between Black Sea countries reflect similarly complex cooperation and conflict patterns, common among them is a hope that the Biden Administration will bring a shift in U.S. policy in the region.

Frontier Europe Initiative’s new report, Alternative Futures for the Black Sea Region, is designed to inform the development of a U.S. strategy for the Black Sea region by considering a range of alternative future scenarios.

March 8 marks International Women’s Day and this year’s theme is “Women in Leadership: Achieving an Equal Future in a COVID-19 World.” However, refugee women and girls in Lebanon remain far behind the aspirations of the U.N.’s theme. This difficult situation is unlikely to change unless Lebanon ends its discriminatory policies toward refugees.

American support for Ukraine over the last four years has been unreliable and fluctuating. On the one hand, Ukraine was both an encumbrance and a political football for the Trump Administration. On the other, Congress and the regular U.S. Government continued to support Kyiv, and even began to send it lethal weapons.

Iran is an Islamic country where, according to official statistics, over 99% of the citizens are Muslim. Even though the state in Iran advocates for Islamic laws and regulations for all citizens, over 60% of Iranians identified themselves as non-Muslim according to a survey in June 2020 by the research institute “the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran” (GAMAAN). Only 32.2% of the 40.000 interviewed identified themselves as Shi‘a Muslim; 5% as Sunni Muslim; 22.2% as non-religious; 8.8% identified themselves as atheist; 7.1% as spiritual and 7.7% as Zoroastrian.

The understandings reached between Washington and Jerusalem half a century ago establish the critical context for the Biden administration’s current effort to restore the JCPOA, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu fiercely opposed during its adoption by the U.N. Security Council in July 2015 and which he still bitterly contests today.

For years, Georgia has played a vital role in East-West trade through the South Caucasus. With tensions high in Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia was the only show in town when it came to stable, secure, and predictable transport linking Azerbaijan with Turkey. Therefore, it is not surprising that some in Georgia are concerned that new transit corridors passing through the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, Armenia (Syunik province), and Azerbaijan might take away from Georgia’s strategic importance. However, this is unlikely to be the case.

President Joe Biden’s victory was cheered in Europe as the Transatlantic news of the year, given the strained Transatlantic ties during the Trump Administration. But just one month into the Biden Administration, (Western) Europe’s enthusiasm is waning. This Administration has indicated that while reinforcing Transatlantic ties will be a priority, Washington will maintain its heightened threat perception of both Russia and China. While the U.S. sees enhanced deterrence as necessary, the European Union’s major powers see this as provocative and counterproductively hawkish. If the EU indeed prioritizes a reinforced West, it will need to carefully develop its own balanced and realistic Eastern European security policy.

The following article addresses the question of how the Middle East might develop in the coming decade. Long-term and detailed strategic predictions are a thankless task and are often doomed to failure. Therefore, this article refrains from attempts at prophecy but deals instead with “thinking about the future.” It opens with an analytical framework for scenario development, supplemented by “trends impact” and “horizon scanning.” The second section studies “the futures of the past,” in terms of what we might learn about the pitfalls of future projection and scenario-building from those outlining possible futures for 2020 from years past. Then, on the basis of the first two sections, four scenarios elaborate some distinctly different pathways that the Middle East might take to 2030. Finally, the article concludes with several key takeaways for Israeli decision makers.

Only two days after an extremist attack that saw 14 missiles rain down on Erbil, and in the midst of a new coronavirus surge and lockdown, the Chaldean Catholic Archbishop of Mosul, Najeeb Michaeel, was optimistic about the upcoming visit of Pope Francis.

“Everyone is very happy about this historic event,” he said of Iraq’s inaugural papal visit, from his home in Ankawa, Erbil’s Christian enclave, which has given refuge to thousands of those displaced by ISIS. A previously planned visit in 2000 by Pope John Paul II to Ur, birthplace of the Prophet Abraham according to the Torah, was foiled by protracted negotiations with the government of Saddam Hussein. In 2020, Pope Francis had to cancel a trip due to security and pandemic concerns.

Earlier in February, Iran’s minister of intelligence, Mahmoud Alavi, signaled that if the U.S. continues provoking the country, Tehran might lash out like a “cornered cat” and consider the nuclear option. Will Joe Biden’s late reentry into the JCPOA and the expected resulting increase in tensions influence Iran’s strategic logic on nuclear weapons? A look back at the history of Iran’s decision making on the issue suggests that shifts in military threat assessments are as important as technical developments when it comes to Tehran’s nuclear strategy.

There have been some Iranian advances in building relations with Black Sea states over the last 30 years. However, Tehran’s wavering commitment to deeper ties with its northern neighbors, with the exception of Russia, has considerably reduced the potential footprint Iran could have otherwise had in the Black Sea region. Tehran’s ongoing standoff with the United States, its ideologically driven preoccupation to make advances in the Arab world, and a gradual but clear submission to Russian hegemony has meant that the Black Sea region is a policy matter of secondary importance to decision-makers in Tehran.

Throughout 2020, the geopolitics between the Middle East and its northern frontier have converged further. Russia, Turkey, and Iran not only compete for influence (as states and through non-state actors) in core countries of the Middle East and North Africa like Syria, Iraq, Libya, Egypt and beyond in the Gulf. They also happen to be the three former imperial powers in the Caucasus – the crucial link between the Black and Caspian Seas on the seam of Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia.

Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu is everything Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hates. He is a disillusioned former Islamist, a member of Parliament from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), and a human rights defender. Hence the jail sentence of two years and six months against him for a 2016 Twitter post advocating peace. Last week, Turkey’s top appeals court approved the jail sentence against Gergerlioğlu for spreading terrorist propaganda five years after his Twitter post, paving the way for him to be barred from Parliament.