Expert regional analysis by MEI scholars and contributors.
Marsin Alshamary joins the program to discuss the upcoming Iraqi parliamentary elections on Oct. 10. Originally scheduled for 2022, the elections were moved up amid pressure from the Tishreen protest movement that began in late 2019. MEI Senior Fellow Randa Slim also speaks with two long-time watchers of Iraqi politics, Farhad Alaaldin and Naufel Alhassan, about how they see things playing out and the impact the elections might have on Iraq’s political landscape going forward.
Inside the Khaleeji Art Museum’s Architecture of Memory, which showcases the work of Dana Al Rashid.
في الأول من أكتوبر/تشرين الأول، تجمع عدة مئات من العراقيين وشاركوا في مسيرة، احتجاجًا على عدم حدوث تغيير وذلك في ذكرى حركة تشرين التي اندلعت قبل عامين من ذاك اليوم والتي أحدثت هزة عنيفة بين النخبة السياسية العراقية. كانت التجمعات صغيرة والاحتجاجات خافتة لا صوت لها، وهي محاطة بالمنشورات الدعائية الانتخابية وملصقات المرشحين بينما يستعد العراقيون للذهاب إلى صناديق الاقتراع في 10 أكتوبر/تشرين الأول في انتخابات برلمانية مبكرة.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
بعد غزو العراق في ٢٠٠٣، تحولت الأنظار إلى السيد علي السيستاني في النجف بوصفه نقطة محورية ليس فقط على مستوى العراق، بل في عموم المنطقة. اليوم، يبلغ السيستاني ٩١ عامًا مما يجعل مسألة خلافته أمرًا يشغل المتابعين، ليس فقط على مستوى الساحة الشيعية، ولكن على مستوى منطقة الشرق الأوسط بشكل عام. وعليه، تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى تسليط الضوء على مستقبل المرجعية الشيعية على أساس التغيير المرتقب القادم بعد السيستاني.
For Shi’a Muslims, the highest-ranking religious authorities are known as marj’as, who serve as a reference point for emulation for laypeople (marj’a al-taqlīd). The position of the marj’a, known as the marj’aiyyah, has the exclusive right to issue religious rulings (fatwas). Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Sistani in Najaf has become a focal point not only for Shi’a in Iraq, but for the entire region. Sistani is now 91 years old and the question of succession is a central one — one that concerns not only Shi’a Muslims, but the wider Middle East as well. This paper aims to shed light on the future of the religious authority in the Shi’a world based on the unavoidable change after Sistani.
It took the Taliban just three and a half months to undermine a 20-year international effort to build a competent Afghan military. The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) collapsed once it was clear the U.S. was pulling out ground troops and ceasing air support operations after two decades of training and sustainment that cost the American taxpayer approximately $83 billion. When required to stand alone, against a Taliban force, the ANA failed unequivocally. Building the ANA as a mirror image of the U.S. military was strategically and operationally flawed. If they are designed to fight like the U.S. but cannot fight in the absence of U.S. forces, they are ineffective. What lessons should we learn from this and how could our approach be different in the future?
Ross Harrison, Paul Salem, and Randa Slim join host Alistair Taylor to reflect on 9/11’s impact on US policy in the Middle East over the past 20 years and how its legacy has been viewed by the region.
On July 24, Beirut and Baghdad signed a governmental framework agreement under which Iraq pledged 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil to Lebanon over a full year.
We rarely miss an opportunity to criticize our Gulf Arab partners — sometimes rightly so — for not doing enough to safeguard collective interests. But one must acknowledge that on Afghanistan, and especially our just-completed exit from the country, most of our Gulf Arab partners absolutely shined. They deserve a ton of credit for the role they played in our large, challenging, and deadly evacuation — a role which was nothing short of indispensable.
Mick Mulroy and Ken Tovo join host Alistair Taylor to discuss their recent paper on how US intelligence and military operatives effectively collaborated with local Kurdish partners in Northern Iraq in the early 2000s, why it was a successful partnership, and what lessons it may provide for future operations. The paper, “Irregular Warfare: A Case Study in CIA and US Army Special Forces Operations in Northern Iraq, 2002-03,” is available now on MEI’s website.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Irregular warfare (IW) is increasingly common in the 21st century and the U.S. must learn from its successful experiences with it and apply those lessons to great power competition. For the past two decades the CIA and Army Special Forces have demonstrated how to leverage interagency relationships and apply complementary capabilities to achieve successful IW outcomes. The CIA/Army Special Forces partnership in Northern Iraq during the invasion of Iraq demonstrates the value of this interagency team and provides lessons and a model for the conduct of IW in the future.
في 8 أغسطس/آب، سلَّم وزير الخارجية العراقي فؤاد حسين، عبر نظيره السعودي، دعوة من رئيس الوزراء مصطفى الكاظمي إلى العاهل السعودي الملك سلمان بن عبد العزيز آل سعود لحضور “قمة” لدول جوار العراق على مستوى القادة، والتي ستُعقد في نهاية هذا الشهر. في اليوم نفسه، وجَّه دعوة أخرى إلى الرئيس التركي رجب طيب أردوغان. لا شك أن الفكرة طموحة والصورة الأولى التي تتبادر إلى الذهن هي الاحتمال غير المرجح أن يجلس الملك سلمان والرئيس الإيراني الجديد المتشدد إبراهيم رئيسي، على جانبي الطاولة نفسها في بغداد.