The killing of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah along with the rapid degradation of Hezbollah’s power over the past two weeks signals a tectonic shift in the Middle East.
In the latest installment of the Defense Rapid Reaction series, experts from MEI’s Defense & Security Program provide their views on the likely evolution of the Israeli-Hezbollah war, the potential for the conflict to draw in outside actors, as well as the impact of the war on global terrorist recruitment and appeal for extremist activities.
The deadly, back-to-back pager/two-way radio attacks against Hezbollah, which killed dozens and wounded thousands of its operatives, undoubtedly signaled a new phase in the intense cross-border exchanges between the group and Israel.
Over the past few days, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has entered a precarious new phase, with Israel carrying out both unconventional attacks and heavy airstrikes against the Iran-backed Lebanese militant group, while Hezbollah has responded with an increase in retaliatory fire.
Three years since the US and allied withdrawal from Afghanistan, the facts on the ground challenge some more optimistic depictions of the Taliban’s counterterrorism cooperation with the US, al-Qaeda’s reemergence, or the capacity of ISKP to direct external attacks that could threaten American interests.
After more than six months of talks, the United States and Iraq look set to announce a significant agreement stipulating that the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition will withdraw entirely from the country over the next two years.
After the Cold War, the Romanian government chose to slim down its sizeable defense industry, but it essentially maintained its state-backed structure, personnel, and management, thus producing a thoroughly inefficient system. Today, Romania retains a proclivity to purchase Western, and particularly American, defense equipment; but it has often neglected any thorough assessments of life cycle costs or real force design considerations.
The Middle East teeters on the precipice of a substantial escalation, threatening to more fully draw in Lebanon, Iran, and perhaps other countries. What happens in the coming days, along with the decisions made by adversaries and allies alike, will determine if that happens.
Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack touched off a destructive war with Israel and a limited but fierce regional conflagration between Israel and the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance,” with Lebanese Hezbollah at the forefront. The ongoing conflict has been multi-fronted, multi-faceted, dynamic, and already highly consequential. While a clear bottom line remains elusive, exploring the war’s primary origins and evolution offers useful indicators.
As speculation continues about a possible Turkish-Syrian normalization, what might such a process mean for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a close US ally? In a new piece for MEI, Amer al-Ahmed lays out three possible scenarios for the future of the SDF amid normalization.
Israel’s targeted killing of Hezbollah military leader Fuad Shukr in Beirut and Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran are explosive events for the region. Coming within 12 hours of each other, they were also an earthquake within the “Axis of Resistance” — but not one likely to encourage de-escalation. Far from it.
Although Russia and China are in regular dialogue with the Houthis, the motivations that undergird the engagements of both countries differ markedly. The Houthis regard both Russia and China as partners against American unilateralism but have a warmer relationship with Moscow.
The extensive coverage and analysis of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent visit to the United States mostly focused on optics and domestic politics, rather than on policy. Nevertheless, policy issues were very much present throughout the course of the visit, with Biden and his team trying to push for a hostage and cease-fire deal between Israel and Hamas.
In reaction to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Gaza war, the Biden administration articulated six main objectives. After nine months of the Israel-Hamas conflict, which has repeatedly threatened to spill out into neighboring theaters, the Biden administration’s success toward achieving these goals has mostly declined, not for a lack of effort but rather a reflection of considerable challenges in the environment and major shortcomings in policy conceptualization and implementation.
The recent Houthi drone attack on Tel Aviv, which struck an Israeli apartment building near the Embassy of the United States, killing at least one person, should surprise no one. And the fact Israel’s state-of-the-art air defense could not prevent it will probably embolden future attempts.