Research & Commentary Results

When the American-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) captured the village of al-Baghouz in late
March 2019, ISIS’s self-proclaimed “caliphate” came to an end. The largest multinational military
coalition in modern history spent four-and-a-half years methodically rolling back ISIS’s control of an
expanse of territory the size of Britain, stretching across Syria and Iraq.

Immediately after the Syrian regime and its allies captured central Syria in late 2017, ISIS began waging an effective and deadly insurgency in the area. It first targeted urban centers along the western Euphrates before shifting focus in spring 2018 to the transport lines and mountains running along the M20 from Khunayfis to Shoula. These wide-ranging operations have killed a minimum of 860 pro-regime fighters of all ranks, units, and types. This report tracks self-reported regime losses in the region, as indicated on loyalist Facebook pages, community pages, and unit pages, from Nov. 10, 2017 through March 31, 2020.

The ingredients that fueled ISIS’s explosive expansion in Syria in 2013-14 are not only still present today, they are worse.

In active threat zones, the capacity to launch major operations will likely be constrained for at least several months once the virus begins its inevitable surge.

It is a near truism that U.S. relations with Pakistan have been historically unstable, waxing and waning, climbing to heights of interdependence and sinking to mutual recrimination. Yet this is presently a period unmarked by either high promise or driven by crisis. Rather than a reason, however, for leaving the relationship untouched and unexamined, this can be a time of unusual opportunity to create a more deliberative approach to thinking about the bilateral relationship and for shaping fresh initiatives.

An airstrike last Thursday, which killed 33 Turkish soldiers and wounded 60 more, was a game-changing development in the Syrian conflict. In the days since, Turkey has unleashed a major military response, carrying out scores of drone attacks on Syrian Army units and facilities. All of this is taking place against the backdrop of a massive and growing humanitarian crisis, with nearly a million people fleeing toward the Turkish border. Charles Lister and Sasha Ghost-Siminoff join host Alistair Taylor to discuss how events are unfolding.

Over the past 14 months, there have been moments when it seemed like progress was being made toward de-escalation in Yemen, but there have also been significant setbacks as well. Peace efforts thus far have been largely fragmented and frail, and two primary lessons from the past failures have become clear.

On Feb. 21, Iranians will be voting to elect a new Majlis, the country’s unicameral Parliament. Viewed from the outside, participating in the electoral system might seem futile. While the Iranian constitution recognizes popular will, as represented by an elected president and Parliament, the whole political system operates under the supreme leader, who, although appointed by an elected clerical body (the Assembly of Experts), is, in effect, answerable to no one. The Majlis does, however, have the power to remove the president — a fate that could potentially await President Hassan Rouhani if the conservatives win a majority in the upcoming elections.

Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, many analysts have examined the role played by a handful of key outside actors, such as Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Yet China has received comparatively little attention in most discussions about the Syrian crisis. A deeper look at Sino-Syrian relations and Beijing’s policies vis-à-vis Syria is long overdue as this bilateral relationship is set to become increasingly important to both China’s ambitious foreign policy as well as the Syrian government’s vision for reconstruction and redevelopment.

While proclamations of ISIS’s defeat were certainly premature, international policy and attention on countering terrorism in Syria has since declined — as if to suggest that the job is done. In fact, as 2020 sets in, the world seems to be getting counter-terrorism all wrong in Syria, in three interlinked ways.

18 years after CIA and U.S. special operations elements touched down in Afghanistan to pursue al-Qaeda and topple the Taliban, ongoing, incremental troop reductions reveal the smoke and mirrors manner in which the U.S. is withdrawing from the conflict in lieu of a negotiated settlement.

It is unclear how many civilians were killed in February and March 2019, when the U.S.-led coalition and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) pounded ISIS’s last enclave around the town of Baghouz. Presumably, the numbers reached into the thousands. Those who escaped found themselves in the desert, hundreds of kilometers away from lifesaving aid. The reasons for the failure of the humanitarian response were mainly political.

Over the past five years, the focus of U.S. counterterrorism strategists has remained on the Middle East, especially after the emergence of ISIS in 2014, while Islamist terrorist organizations operating in South Asia have been considered a secondary threat. However, the fact remains that South Asia is home to more Islamist terrorist organizations than any other region of the world. Al-Qaeda was born there, in Afghanistan, and ISIS has roots in the region. But at the turn of the decade both global jihadist groups are now facing major challenges and the critical question is whether they will manage to survive this period of crisis amid a severe leadership vacuum following the death of ISIS’s supreme leader and caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and the killing of al-Qaeda heir apparent Hamza bin Laden. 

The consequences of what happens in Idlib could come to define the future of Syria — a country already destined for many more years of instability and suffering.

After several years of behind-the-scenes efforts, the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act will be signed into law in Washington. It is an extraordinarily expansive and aggressive piece of legislation, allowing for a significant expansion of sanctions against Syrian regime figures and bodies, including the Central Bank and multiple sectors of the state economy. More significantly, the “Caesar Bill” will place an expectation on the U.S. government to sanction any individual or organization anywhere in the world who provides any form of financial support to the Syrian regime that furthers its ability to repress its people.