Memories of the Lebanese civil war resurfaced this week as images appeared of children hiding in hallways and behind cars while deadly sectarian clashes unfolded outside their schools in Beirut’s Tayouneh neighborhood. Protests organized by Hezbollah and the Amal Movement to demand the removal of the judge investigating the August 2020 Beirut port blast quickly went south when as yet unidentified snipers opened fire on the crowds, eventually killing seven and wounding dozens. The “peaceful” protesters seemingly retaliated with gunfire and rocket-propelled grenades. The two sides turned Tayouneh and its surrounding areas into a war zone, terrorizing citizens and destroying property at a time of unprecedented socio-economic hardship.
توقّفت شبكة الكهرباء اللبنانية عن العمل نهاية الأسبوع الماضي مع نفاذ الوقود في محطتي الطاقة الرئيسيتين في البلاد. توفر هاتان المحطتان، الزهراني ودير عمار، 45٪ من كهرباء لبنان من مؤسسة كهرباء لبنان المملوكة للدولة. التوقُّف هو الأحدث في سلسلة من الانقطاعات المتزايدة للشبكة واستخدام الحكومة للضغط العام لتقديم مزيد من المدفوعات المُسبَقة أو السُلف للمرفق المفلس ليتمكن من دفع ثمن واردات الوقود، وبالتالي الإبقاء على الوضع الراهن المستمر منذ 30 عامًا.
Power sector reforms are new Lebanese governments’ ultimate test
The formation of a new government in Lebanon — after more than a year of political deadlock and amid an economic crisis of dizzying severity — is a positive development. The scale of Lebanon’s economic challenges, however, requires a new government capable of breaking with its predecessors’ deliberate inaction. It necessitates strong and genuine political leadership, will, and action to tackle the country’s many pressing challenges, especially in its dysfunctional energy sector.
The consequences of Lebanon’s constitutional crisis
Lebanon is currently facing an unprecedented constitutional crisis that, if left to simmer, will further worsen the country’s numerous predicaments. Three decades after the Ta’if Agreement that ended the 1975-90 war, officials and warlords failed to implement a real reconciliation that could usher in civil order in a country known for its intrinsic vulnerabilities. Although a diverse society, Lebanon has always suffered from inherent political contradictions and currently agonizes over — among other calamities — major constitutional and political crises that, even though they are engulfed by crumbling socio-economic conditions, remain far more threatening than most imagine. How can the Lebanese put an end to such ongoing deterioration? And can Lebanon’s “business-political” class resolve some of the many crises confronting the country?
East Med gas needs clean tech and regional integration to support investment case
The viability of Eastern Mediterranean natural gas resources has long been a source of debate for reasons including cost considerations, market demand, and regional geopolitical tensions. The past couple of years have further complicated the debate, introducing new questions about the role of these resources in supporting post-pandemic economic recovery or helping more advanced markets achieve net-zero policies by replacing coal and other fuel sources (a particularly relevant topic of debate given Europe and Asia are key export targets for East Med gas).
Baghdad, Beirut, and the politics of Lebanon’s power crisis
On July 24, Beirut and Baghdad signed a governmental framework agreement under which Iraq pledged 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil to Lebanon over a full year.
Lebanon’s power crisis is on the agenda, as Arab Gas Pipeline quartet prepares to meet in Amman
These developments come against the backdrop of multiple U.S. hints that Washington is potentially willing to circumvent sanctioning the participating parties under the Caesar Act.
We rarely miss an opportunity to criticize our Gulf Arab partners — sometimes rightly so — for not doing enough to safeguard collective interests. But one must acknowledge that on Afghanistan, and especially our just-completed exit from the country, most of our Gulf Arab partners absolutely shined. They deserve a ton of credit for the role they played in our large, challenging, and deadly evacuation — a role which was nothing short of indispensable.
Hezbollah, America, and the race to supply Lebanon with power
Amid typical governmental absenteeism, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah announced on Aug. 19 that the party had secured fuel shipments from Iran. He asserted that the first of many fuel tankers would set sail to Lebanon that same day. Hours later, U.S. ambassador to Lebanon Dorothy Shea declared that the U.S. was working closely with Egypt, Jordan, and the World Bank to find solutions to Lebanon’s crippling fuel shortages. Shea’s comments imply a U.S. willingness to loosen Caesar Act restrictions that would otherwise prevent Lebanon from importing natural gas and electricity through Syria from Egypt and Jordan respectively. The two announcements have been in the making for weeks, but both come at a time when Lebanon’s physical and human infrastructure is crumbling in the absence of essential fuel supplies and energy sources.
Lebanon is a tinderbox, and Lebanese politicians have started dropping matches
Premeditated political paralysis and the absence of economic leadership have brought Lebanon to its knees. Critical infrastructure has collapsed. Reliable electricity and safe water provision are rare. Hospitals and medical services are crippled by the lack of power, medications, and supplies. Food security is at risk for the majority of the population. Desertions from the ranks of security forces are growing. A nationwide security collapse is increasingly likely. The humanitarian collapse is already here.
One of the most consequential changes in the Middle East’s geopolitical map is happening at the water’s edge. Along the entire eastern rim of the Mediterranean basin, global and regional actors are engaging in a spate of port capacity expansions, new private port construction, and the sell-off of major state-owned ports that will determine who sits atop the region’s global trade flows for decades to come. The international competition to rebuild Beirut’s port is one key puzzle piece in this larger process that is reconfiguring the Levant’s maritime commercial architecture and, as a consequence, the geopolitical contours of the Middle East.
The possibility that the Lebanese government could opt for China to reconstruct Beirut’s port has raised alarm in Washington and European capitals given China’s already outsized commercial port presence in Egypt, Israel, and Greece. Increased Chinese involvement in Lebanon’s port operations could consolidate Beijing’s hold over the commercial connectivity architecture of the Levant. Re-orienting global commercial flows between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia according to Beijing’s priorities would make China’s Belt and Road Initiative a dominant organizing principle in the international relations of the Middle East. The most effective way to offset China’s ambition may be to facilitate Mediterranean rivals France and Turkey to jointly rebuild Beirut’s port.
