Research & Commentary Results

Over the past 14 months, there have been moments when it seemed like progress was being made toward de-escalation in Yemen, but there have also been significant setbacks as well. Peace efforts thus far have been largely fragmented and frail, and two primary lessons from the past failures have become clear.

Since the death of its founder Ali Abdullah Saleh on Dec. 4, 2017, the General People’s Congress (GPC) — Yemen’s dominant political party for the past four decades — has faced a test in attempting to reunify its divided wings in Riyadh, Cairo, Abu Dhabi, and Sanaa amid a shifting strategic landscape. The GPC’s factions have competed over the party leadership, failed to elect a transitional leader, and exchanged accusations following the Saudi-brokered meeting in Jeddah in July 2019. Nevertheless, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh’s attempts to revive Saleh’s damaged old political vehicle continue, both politically and militarily.

Absent international pressure, the Iran-backed Houthis have no reason to stop expanding

Just over a year ago, the international community rejoiced in the revival of the UN-led Yemen peace process with the conclusion of the Stockholm Agreement between the Yemeni government and the Houthi insurgency (Ansar Allah), brokered by UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths. Although the deal marked the first political breakthrough in the peace process since the collapse of Geneva and Kuwait talks under Griffith’s predecessor, the ensuing hurdles in implementation meant that hopes for its success were short-lived. In evaluating the progress on the agreement’s three key components — covering prisoner exchange, Hodeida, and Taiz — it quickly becomes clear that the truism that implementing peace agreements is far more important, and difficult, than concluding them still rings true.

The passing of Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said on Jan. 10 truly marks the end of an era.

MEI experts Robert S. Ford, Fatima Abo Alasrar, and Emad Badi join host Alistair Taylor to survey what lies ahead for the Middle East in 2020, with particular attention to Iran, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Iraq and Algeria.

The announcement of Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said’s passing on Jan. 10 marked the end of an era. Now that the Arab world lost its longest-serving leader, none of the Gulf states has a ruler that was on the throne when the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981. Most Omanis have never known another leader and this transition period, marked by three days of mourning, is an emotional time for those in the sultanate.

Thus far, the reaction to Soleimani’s assassination among the Gulf states has been cautious.

Delays in achieving a peace deal will have consequences throughout Yemen, especially if the Houthi’s power remains unchecked.

The UK’s impending exit from the EU will present a new chapter for British interests in and posture toward the region. If the UK is to find a trade-off for loss of diplomatic and economic heft, it will need to re-prioritize its engagement efforts. Policy continuity toward Morocco and Tunisia appears inevitable; Algeria, in contrast, promises great opportunity for an evolving relationship.

Since 2017 three separate blocs have emerged within the Gulf. Driven by the region’s divisions, rival power centers, and conflicting interests, the Gulf states are playing an ever-greater role in Palestinian affairs.

The steps the Saudis have taken in 2019 may help to ease international pressure on the kingdom’s leadership and restore its image as a constructive player in the world.

The subject of extensive international interest and attention over the past few years, blockchain technology is regarded as a key component of the fourth industrial revolution. This article seeks to shed light on the use of blockchain technology in the Gulf states by analyzing current trends of blockchain adoption in the region compared to those internationally. In so doing, it will determine Gulf institutions’ capacity for keeping pace with the changes and developments blockchain adoption has introduced.

The leaders of the six GCC member states will meet in Riyadh on Dec. 10 amid signs that the 30-month-old confrontation with Qatar by the self-described “Anti-Terror Quartet” is diminishing.

After more than two months of Saudi-mediated indirect talks between the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), the two sides finally reached a deal on Nov. 5. The Saudi effort, which culminated in the signing of the Riyadh Agreement, is aimed at resolving the conflict within the Arab coalition-backed front and uniting the two parties in the fight against the Iranian-backed Houthi militias. The agreement, which spans political, economic, security, and military arrangements, involves restructuring the executive, military, and security branches of the ROYG, partial disarmament of STC-loyal forces, and the demilitarization of Aden — all of which will be phased in over the next three months.