Research & Commentary Results

This essay is part of the series “All About China”—a journey into the history and diverse culture of China through essays that shed light on the lasting imprint of China’s past encounters with the Islamic world as well as an exploration of the increasingly vibrant and complex dynamics of contemporary Sino-Middle Eastern relations. Read more

February 2016 marks the beginning of a new phase in the Chinese lunar calendar, drawing to a close a year marked by heightened risks and fortuitous gains in China’s efforts to secure its interests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This essay addresses three questions: How well has China adapted to the conflict and instability that have swept the region? And as we enter the Year of the Red Fire Monkey, what are the concerns that are likely to preoccupy Chinese leaders? What, if any, policy adjustments by Beijing, can realistically be expected in light of the current circumstances and uncertain prospects for the region and for China itself?

Saudi Arabia is back, knocking on Pakistan’s door. Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir and King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud’s son and deputy crown prince, Mohammad bin Salman, arrived separately in the early days of the new year to persuade Islamabad to join hands with Riyadh in confronting regional security threats. That is, the Saudis want Pakistan’s support against Iran. 

The article was first published on NPR’s Parallels blog.

Less than two weeks after international sanctions were lifted, Iran is already cutting megadeals with Europe. The French automaker Peugeot-Citroen said Thursday it will return to Iran, while Iran appeared poised to buy at least 100 planes from Airbus.

The essays featured here are the products of a workshop series analyzing China’s position in the context of Gulf security, organized by the Department of International Affairs and the Center for Humanities and Social Sciences of Qatar University under the direction of Dr. Imad Mansour.  

This article was first published in Middle East Studies [PDF], a publication of Marine Corps University.

Boasting the fourth largest oil reserve and the second largest supply of natural gas in the world, Iran is a global hydrocarbons behemoth. Nevertheless, Iranian policymakers have shown great interest in renewable energy (R.E.) sources to improve energy security, reduce internal dependence on hydrocarbons, and meet its projected growth in electricity demand. The fulfillment of these objectives is not only realistic and desirable, but also probable for the Iranian government as it has an advantageous topography for renewables.

The latest escalation in tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia has set off alarm bells across the globe.

Saudi Arabia’s execution of prominent Shi’a cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, is a gift in disguise to Iran’s hardliners seeking to undermine President Hassan Rouhani’s administration, and rally support ahead of key elections in February.

Although Saudi officials have insisted Iran is interfering in its internal affairs with its vociferous condemnation of the execution, Iranians, particularly the hardliners, saw the act as a direct provocation.

The prospect of establishing direct popular elections for mayors has precipitated a heated debate in Iran, resulting in divisions within the conservative and reformist factions and even a reversal of their roles. The debate surrounding the bill and the forces that render urban governance as political stem from the coupling of decentralization of governance with the arbitrary and despotic rule of mayors over urban matters. Decentralization in non-democratic settings has led to the reorientation of municipalities from merely managerial authorities to institutions that are both the field for, and the target of political struggles between elites and by citizens. Such localization of political life, especially in large cities such as Tehran, has the potential for making urban policy-making less opaque and bureaucratized as it has been under the Pahlavi Monarchy and the Islamic Republic.

Turkey’s reaction to the latest spat between Saudi Arabia and Iran spells more trouble for Ankara at a time when it is already at loggerheads with many of its neighbors. Initial remarks by Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmus criticizing both sides were an attempt to keep Turkey out of the rift. He was upstaged, however, by Turkey’s foreign ministry, which followed up with a statement singling out Iran for condemnation.

The recent escalation in tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran is throwing the GCC into a crisis of unity. Riyadh’s actions in particular are built on the frustration of the Yemen war and the perception of Iranian encroachment in Arab lands that the Saudi kingdom believes is its domain. King Salman and his son, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, feel the kingdom is being ignored by the international community in other hot zones, namely Syria, where the outcome of the war is being determined by Washington and Moscow.

This paper is part of a MEI scholar series titled “The Middle East and the 2016 Presidential Elections.”

The New Year has seen relations in the region spiral out of control with Saudi Arabia cutting off diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sectarian tensions mounted following the execution of prominent Saudi Shi’a cleric Nimr al-Nimr and the subsequent attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran. The immediate impacts of this escalation will likely be felt in Yemen, with the latest ceasefire collapsing over the New Year, and in Syria where U.N.-sponsored peace talks are set to begin later this month.

Paul Salem, Vice President for Policy and Research at MEI, explains the drivers behind the recent flare-up of the Iran-Saudi feud, how it will impact regional issues including Syria, Yemen, and the fight against ISIS, and what the United States can do to help get diplomacy back on track.