The Gulf in 2020 faces many questions, few answers
Thus far, the reaction to Soleimani’s assassination among the Gulf states has been cautious.
Thus far, the reaction to Soleimani’s assassination among the Gulf states has been cautious.
Since 2017 three separate blocs have emerged within the Gulf. Driven by the region’s divisions, rival power centers, and conflicting interests, the Gulf states are playing an ever-greater role in Palestinian affairs.
The steps the Saudis have taken in 2019 may help to ease international pressure on the kingdom’s leadership and restore its image as a constructive player in the world.
The subject of extensive international interest and attention over the past few years, blockchain technology is regarded as a key component of the fourth industrial revolution. This article seeks to shed light on the use of blockchain technology in the Gulf states by analyzing current trends of blockchain adoption in the region compared to those internationally. In so doing, it will determine Gulf institutions’ capacity for keeping pace with the changes and developments blockchain adoption has introduced.
The leaders of the six GCC member states will meet in Riyadh on Dec. 10 amid signs that the 30-month-old confrontation with Qatar by the self-described “Anti-Terror Quartet” is diminishing.
Fears of a large-scale war in the Middle East remain heightened as the U.S. continues ratcheting up sanctions against Iran while Tehran takes measures to scale back its restrictive commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The latest sign of Iranian retaliation against the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear accord was its decision, confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Nov. 11, to begin refining uranium at its Fordow underground enrichment facility.
After more than two months of Saudi-mediated indirect talks between the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), the two sides finally reached a deal on Nov. 5. The Saudi effort, which culminated in the signing of the Riyadh Agreement, is aimed at resolving the conflict within the Arab coalition-backed front and uniting the two parties in the fight against the Iranian-backed Houthi militias. The agreement, which spans political, economic, security, and military arrangements, involves restructuring the executive, military, and security branches of the ROYG, partial disarmament of STC-loyal forces, and the demilitarization of Aden — all of which will be phased in over the next three months.
On Nov. 4 Daily Sabah, a strongly pro-government English-language daily in Turkey, published a scathing editorial with a title that says it all: “Al Jazeera English: A threat against the Turkey-Qatar alliance.” According to the editorial, Al Jazeera English slandered Turkey over its recent military incursion into northern Syria, and thus jeopardized the future of the Turkey-Qatar alliance. Given the close relationship between the Turkish government and Daily Sabah — and indeed the broader media environment in Turkey — it is highly unlikely that such a fiery editorial, which directly threatens Qatar, would have been published without a green light from “the palace.”
Putin’s visit to Saudi Arabia and the UAE takes place as the U.S. position in the Middle East collapses in the face of a series of misjudgments and “own-goals” by the Trump administration.
After five years of indecisive war, there is a clear desire on the part of the international community to bring the conflict in Yemen to an end, and the recent UN-endorsed Houthi initiative seems predicated on the assumption that ending the fighting between Riyadh and the Houthis would achieve this. A closer look at the situation, however, suggests this assumption is flawed.
The microblogging and social media service Twitter recently announced the suspension of 271 accounts linked to several Middle East governments a year after the company first released public information about the existence of state-run manipulation using its tools. The company cited violation of its policies on platform manipulation as the reason for the suspensions.
The Saudis made their first cautious moves to disentangle themselves from Yemen but remain far from any settlement. In response to an earlier announcement of a unilateral ceasefire by the Houthis on the fifth anniversary of their entrance into Sanaa, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman said that a settlement in Yemen would be far easier if the Houthis abandoned their Iranian backers. His comments come after the Saudis announced a partial ceasefire covering some areas in Yemen, but Saudi planes attacked Houthi positions in northern Yemen along the border as if to emphasize that it is only a partial ceasefire.
In late July, Lt. Gen. Michael Anker Lollesgaard left Yemen after his six-month term as the second head of the UN Mission in support of the Hodeida Agreement (UNMHA) came to an end. Unlike his predecessor, Maj. Gen. Patrick Cammaert, who departed quietly, Lollesgaard was given a proper sendoff from Sana’a. A senior Houthi commander, Maj. Gen. Ali al-Musheki, even went so far as to describe Lollesgaard as “a conscientious military commander.”
Khalifa Hifter has managed to garner outside support by appealing to foreign states’ desire for a stable Libya, but this rogue former general and would-be authoritarian has proven a troublesome proxy. In supporting his ongoing offensive on Tripoli, foreign states are undermining their own narrative of authoritarian stability.
The news came eight months after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu paid a visit to the Omani capital for surprise talks with Sultan Qaboos in October 2018, and four months after Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah met with Netanyahu in Poland during the Trump administration’s “Peace and Security in the Middle East” summit.