A version of this article first appeared as part of an Expert Views special feature on the new rules of the game in the Iranian-Israeli conflict.
The month of April saw a series of unprecedented escalations in the long-simmering Iranian-Israeli conflict, with both countries launching missile and drone attacks against the other’s territory for the first time in history.
In the wake of these strikes, what will be the impact on the regional security and political environment going forward, what is needed to stabilize the new rules of the game, and how can US diplomacy help to facilitate that process? MEI has asked its experts to weigh in.
On April 21, the US House of Representatives passed the long-awaited aid package for Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan. The legislation contained another long-sought-after measure: authority for the US government to tighten restrictions on Iran’s oil exports. But in truth, aggressive US action remains unlikely and there are powerful operational, strategic, and political barriers preventing the US from shutting down Iran’s oil trade or hindering it in a material way.
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A version of this article was originally published on the Substack “Thinking Middle East.”
Prime Minister Sudani has been delicately balancing between maintaining bilateral relations with Washington and ensuring political support for his cabinet from pro-Iran hardliners in Baghdad. Both sides have conflicting expectations from the prime minister, and delivering on his promises will come down to his ability to convince each to compromise. But Sudani’s task has now become even more challenging as Iraq finds itself in the middle of direct confrontation between Iran and Israel.
The Iranian strike against Israel was a first of its kind. Its mere occurrence sets a precedent that will have a long-term impact and require Israel to weigh new considerations when planning future military operations against Iranian assets.
Though Tehran continues to engage the government in Kabul in a pragmatic fashion, Iran and the Taliban are not traditional friends or allies; they share an uneasy relationship. There is a sectarian angle to their differences and a long-standing dispute over water resources. Yet Iran has sought to normalize relations due to broader geopolitical considerations, security concerns, and perceived economic opportunities.
Iran is a key stakeholder in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tehran does not have a deciding vote on the outcome of the current war in Gaza, but it does have plenty of capacity to shape the future course of the conflict. Iran is, after all, among the top backers of Hamas, both in terms of diplomatic support and as a supplier of military materiel and knowhow.
Six months since the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel and subsequent outbreak of war in Gaza, the deadly and devastating conflict looks no closer to concluding. Is it still possible to achieve a sustainable cessation of hostilities and restart the conflict-resolution process? To get there, what are the incentives and disincentives that could be constructed for the two main combatants, Israel and Hamas?
On March 12, the United States Department of the Treasury sanctioned four individuals for supporting the Iran-linked al-Ashtar Brigades in Bahrain. This US announcement might suggest that Iranian-Bahraini relations are about to take a nose-dive. But in reality, that is unlikely to happen — at least not while Iranian-Saudi détente continues.
The results of the March 1 election for Iran’s Assembly of Experts hold great importance for understanding how the regime is preparing for the selection of the next supreme leader. The major responsibility of this 88-member body is to designate Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s successor, either after his death or if he becomes incapable of fulfilling his responsibilities.
In his new book, Steve Coll casts doubt on whether Iraqi intelligence had actually tried to assassinate former President George H. W. Bush in Kuwait in April 1993. If the Kuwait plot were a fabrication, it would fit yet another brick in the wall of many well documented falsehoods and misunderstandings that led to the US invasion. Unfortunately for that allegation, the plot was very likely to have been quite real.