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Jordan is going full speed ahead in normalizing relations with the Syrian regime, 10 years after it suspended political and economic ties with its northern neighbor in the wake of the eruption of the Syrian uprising. On Oct. 3, and in the first public contact between Abdullah and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since 2011, Amman announced that the king had received a call from Assad. Talks focused on bilateral relations and ways to strengthen cooperation. The king stressed Jordan’s support for efforts to back Syrian territorial integrity, sovereignty, and unity. Jordan had allowed the Syrian embassy to remain open in Amman and kept a skeleton staff at its embassy in Damascus.
يجتمع الرؤساء الروسي والتركي والإيراني يوم الأربعاء 29 سبتمبر/أيلول في مدينة سوتشي الروسية لمناقشة الوضع في سوريا. وكما كان الحال في الاجتماعات السابقة، من المرجح أن يتصدر الوضع في شمال غرب سوريا جدول الأعمال. على الرغم من أن منطقة إدلب الكبرى ظلت من الناحية التقنية خاضعة لوقف إطلاق النار الذي اتفقت عليه روسيا وتركيا في مارس/آذار 2020، إلا أن الطائرات الروسية والمدفعية السورية ارتكبت انتهاكات قاتلة ومتكررة منذ ذلك الحين.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
After 40 years, Syria once again has dual military rule, where the president and his brother are the highest authorities. In the early 1980s, Rifaat al-Assad, the brother of Hafez al-Assad, was the commander of the Defense Companies and the strong man in Syria in the military, security, and even civilian spheres, while Hafez was in a coma. Today, we see this scenario echoed with the control of Maher al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s brother, over the Fourth Division, which has become an elite military unit due to strong Iranian support and its control over various territories of the country.
بعد أربعين عاما، تتجدد ثناية الحكم العسكري في سوريا بين الرئيس وشقيقه، ففي مطلع الثمانينات كان رفعت الأسد (شقيق حافظ الأسد)، قائد سرايا الدفاع الرجل القوي في سوريا على المستوى العسكري والأمني بل حتى على المستوى المدني، بينما كان حافظ الأسد يشكو من الغيبوبة – آنذاك-.
It took the Taliban just three and a half months to undermine a 20-year international effort to build a competent Afghan military. The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) collapsed once it was clear the U.S. was pulling out ground troops and ceasing air support operations after two decades of training and sustainment that cost the American taxpayer approximately $83 billion. When required to stand alone, against a Taliban force, the ANA failed unequivocally. Building the ANA as a mirror image of the U.S. military was strategically and operationally flawed. If they are designed to fight like the U.S. but cannot fight in the absence of U.S. forces, they are ineffective. What lessons should we learn from this and how could our approach be different in the future?
These developments come against the backdrop of multiple U.S. hints that Washington is potentially willing to circumvent sanctioning the participating parties under the Caesar Act.
The central media apparatus of the Islamic State group is mis-reporting on the activities of its cells in central Syria. Rather than exaggerating their capabilities, something that it is conventionally assumed to be doing all the time, its Central Media Diwan appears either to be deliberately under-playing them, or, less likely, to be unaware of their full extent, possibly due to communication issues.
At the dawn of the Biden era of American foreign policy, a more mature, realistic Saudi foreign policy is emerging to match the shifting signals from Washington. In some measure, the Saudis are readopting elements that traditionally characterized their policy preferences before the meteoric rise of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), the kingdom’s de facto ruler.
In June 2021, southern Syria once again dominated the headlines when the regime laid siege to the Daraa al-Balad area of Daraa city. A few days after the monthlong siege, an agreement to end the escalation collapsed and the Syrian army’s Fourth Division spearheaded a major military push in the area. Intense clashes broke out as groups of unreconciled rebels violently repelled the advancement of Syrian military forces. Armed confrontations spread into eastern and western Daraa amid heavy bombardment via missiles, artillery, and mortar shells, marking the deadliest and most intense fighting in Syria’s south-west since the conclusion of the 2018 “reconciliation” agreements.
Despite being largely low-key and limited in nature, ties between pro-Al Qaeda jihadists operating in Indonesia and Syria respectively continue to exist. Recent activity involving Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other militant Indonesian groups illustrates the potential security risks from this nexus, which should not be overlooked.
The subject of Western sanctions on Syria is a divisive one among analysts and policymakers interested in ending the misery of the country’s citizens. The division comes at a time when, more than ever, the country needs a comprehensive policy that ends the agony of most Syrians. This study assesses the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed on the regime of Bashar al-Assad by conducting a comprehensive review of their history, evaluating shortcomings in the current setup, and recommending ways to move forward.
EU institutions and individual member states remain committed to the peaceful settlement of the Syrian conflict, but after 10 years the question of what to do next seems most pressing. Will the EU be a passive bystander, idly watching the actions of other international players like Russia, China, Iran, or Saudi Arabia, or will it take on a more active role? And what would such a role look like?
As a Lebanese actor ideologically tied to Iran, Hezbollah has multiple allegiances and objectives that do not always align symmetrically. Hezbollah’s regional activities are a reflection of the group’s increasingly close alignment with Iran, rather than the interests of the Lebanese state or citizenry. Today, Hezbollah’s regional adventurism is most pronounced in its expeditionary forces deployed in Syria and elsewhere in the region, but no less important are the group’s advanced training regimen for other Shi’a militias aligned with Iran, its expansive illicit financing activities across the region, and its procurement, intelligence, cyber, and disinformation activities. Together, these underscore the scale and scope of the group’s all-in approach to transforming from one of several Lebanese militias into a regional player acting at Iran’s behest.