The Danger of (Mis)perceptions After the Iran Deal
Read full article at the Washington Post.
Read full article at the Washington Post.
This article was first published on the Huffington Post.
The Middle East Dialogue on New Political and Security Dynamics Shaping the Arab Region met in Beirut May 30-31 to consider the situation in Syria, which has deteriorated further since the last meeting of the Dialogue in Berlin last December. Violence has risen, government-controlled territory has been lost to both opposition and extremist forces, Syrians are suffering and the Syrian government is reaching the limits of its military and civilian capabilities.
This article was first published on Peacefare.net.
Here are some criticisms of the Iran deal that contain at least a kernel of truth; they are worth addressing for the sake of clarifying some of the arguments pro and con.
“What’s going to happen to the Syrian refugees?” This was the question I asked of everyone I met during a recent trip to Lebanon and Turkey to research Syrian displacement. Without exception, those I asked—government and UN officials, academics, business and NGO representatives, Syrian diaspora groups, and Syrian refugees—responded with the same answer: “I don’t know” (or sometimes “‘God only knows”). When pressed, almost everyone said that the war in Syria would continue for the foreseeable future and that more people would likely leave or try to leave.
Probably the most important group fighting the Syrian regime now is Ahrar al-Sham (Free Men of the Levant), a Salafi group fighting mainly in the north but also in central and southern Syria. Contrary to Western reports suggesting that the al-Qa‘ida-linked Nusra Front led the battle to capture the northwestern Syrian provincial capital of Idlib last March, Ahrar had more fighters in the battle—a fact demonstrated by its predominance in the subsequent military oversight council established for Idlib.
The Iran nuclear deal has only one big surprise: it is consistent with the April 2 “parameters” that preceded it and contains no surprises. No one caved. Nothing got walked back.
MEI interviewed Senior Fellow Alex Vatanka about the historic nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 that was reached on July 14, 2015, and how it may impact regional dynamics and the long-term relationship between Iran and the West.
What has been the reaction to the nuclear deal?
In the last few weeks, the Syrian Druze have been a focal point in significant fighting on the ground. If their role in the fighting continues, or even if it changes, the Druze will likely have a profound impact on the trajectory of the Syrian conflict.
Read the full article on the Washington Post‘s Monkey Cage blog.
For decades, most refugee crises followed a pattern: A war erupted, usually in a poor country, and beleaguered civilians staggered across the nearest border. The United Nations organized a response, rich nations footed the bill, and aid groups sent in workers to tend to the needy. Even in extreme cases, such as the mass exodus from Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion in the 1980s, the crisis was largely confined to the country at war and a few immediate neighbors.
Despite the barrel bombs and chlorine gas, despite the threat from extremists—both religious and political—and despite the punishing dearth of resources, Syrian civil society continues to provide and protect. Though relatively little is written about it, Syrian civil society is remarkably active.
After more than four years of war, former U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford sees a fragmented country emerging, with six or more fluid and shifting zones of control:
**An Alawi/Hezbollah-controlled area along the Lebanese border and the Mediterranean coast, backed by Iran and Russia;
On June 22, members of the Druse minority in the Israeli town of Hurfeish threw rocks at an ambulance believed to be transporting wounded Syrian Jabhat al-Nusra rebels to medical care in Israel. The following day, a similar incident in the occupied Golan Heights resulted in the killing of one wounded rebel, also of Nusra.
Three months ago CIA Director John Brennan told a Congressional panel that the administration fears the fall of the Assad government in Damascus, as it could lead to “Islamist extremists, including the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, and al-Qa‘ida elements within Syria to seize power from a collapsed regime.” I heard similar fears during a Congressional hearing I attended June 17.