Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Nine days after the Hamas attack inside Israel, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is massing troops for a large-scale ground incursion into Gaza. For now, the outlines and endgame of Israel’s military action are not entirely clear. Meanwhile, escalation is rising along the Israel-Lebanon border and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is crisscrossing the Middle East communicating both deterrence and diplomacy.
The scale and brutality of Hamas’s grisly attack on Israel last Saturday has understandably triggered a massive outpouring of sympathy and solidarity with Israel. And yet, there has been no similar outpouring of sympathy for Palestinians, who are now also dying in disturbingly large numbers.
Hamas’ murderous raid on Oct. 7, resulting in the deaths of more than 1,300 Israelis, mostly civilians, may well turn out to be a consequential inflection point, having unleashed political and popular forces that could lead in a positive or, just as likely, extremely negative direction.
Expert regional analysis by MEI scholars and contributors.
In the latest installment of the Defense Rapid Reaction series, experts from MEI’s Defense & Security Program provide their views on the Oct. 7 Hamas surprise attack on Israel and what it might mean for Israelis and Palestinians, the wider region, and U.S. policy.
After a year of unprecedented events, Israel’s political and constitutional turmoil came to a head on Sept. 12, when the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a critical case that will determine the future of the Netanyahu government’s judicial overhaul. The arguments concern the so-called Reasonableness Amendment, passed by Israel’s parliament in late July; this amendment to the country’s Basic Laws would partially strip the Supreme Court of its authority to review governmental acts.
This report provides an interim assessment of the Biden administration’s overall Middle East strategy and examines the strategic opportunities and risks for U.S. policy in the broader region.
As Israel faces a relentless, unprecedentedly severe political crisis at home, in the regional theater Iran has amplified its anti-Israeli activities, undermining the efforts Israel undertook during 2020-22 to build up a common security front with neighboring Arab states against Tehran as well as to intensify various military operations against Iranian interests.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
When Netanyahu takes the stage in this year’s UNGA, much fewer Israelis will see him as their country’s diplomatic savior. Rather, he will be met with unprecedented demonstrations in the streets of New York, showcasing once again the extent to which Israelis are concerned about the damage the current far-right government is causing to their country’s democracy and standing in the world.
When the Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi, visits New York for the opening of the UNGA this week, he will try to project a sense of confidence and argue that the Iranian regime is purportedly committed to building ties with its neighborhood by promoting and referring to its membership in various regional dialogue forums. Yet their existence has historically not moderated Iranian behavior.
As the original Abraham Accords signatories — Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain — observe the third anniversary of their September 2020 agreement, there is a sufficient basis to evaluate whether the Abraham Accords are real, hype, or something in-between. Much like the case a year ago, the results so far remain mixed.
Thirty years on since its historic signing, the Oslo Accords framework continues to define virtually all aspects of Israeli-Palestinian relations as well as America’s and the broader international community’s approach to the peace process. Yet Oslo’s extraordinary longevity stands not as a testament to its utility but to its unmitigated and ongoing failure.
The normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel is looking increasingly likely, even if it does not take place in the immediate future. For Israel, normalizing relations with as many Arab states as possible — especially if it does not have to give up much in exchange — has always been a strategic goal. For the new Saudi Arabia, those ambitious goals strongly suggest opening up to the Israeli economy.