After years of strain, both U.S. and Saudi leaders have now stated that they want stronger relations. But a treaty alliance with Saudi Arabia is neither politically realistic nor strategically wise for the United States.
On this week’s episode Alistair Taylor, MEI’s editor-in-chief, is joined by Mick Mulroy and Eric Oehlerich, Senior Fellows with MEI’s Defense & Security Program and the Co-founders of the Lobo Institute and End Child Soldiering, to discuss efforts to stop the recruitment and use of children in combat and rehabilitate former child soldiers. The use of child soliders is a widespread global problem that has a disproportionate impact on the broader Middle East, especially in Yemen, Syria, Sudan, and Somalia.
US retrenchment in the Middle East was inevitable given America’s new global priorities, which centre on the Indo-Pacific and Europe. But this historic transition has brought with it strategic uncertainty and confusion, not just for Washington but also for US regional partners.
To effectively navigate this new contested environment in the Middle East, and more specifically, to address the issue of China’s encroachment into that vital part of the world, Washington needs policy clarity and shrewd management of its relations with its regional partners.
Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine helped influence the updated European Maritime Security Strategy’s approach to the Black and Mediterranean seas, with implicit and explicit references to the war dispersed throughout the document. The updated EUMSS showcases the wide array of security issues present in the region, including seaborne UXOs, human and drug trafficking, and threats to critical infrastructure. But security in the Black and Mediterranean seas will require greater cooperation with non-EU countries.
Until recently, the EU has favored a piecemeal approach toward the Northwestern Indian Ocean, the Gulf, and the Red Sea, despite their close interdependence and inter-connectedness in the security, political, and economic realms. But the EU is now signaling a growing desire to steer its naval policy toward a more holistic and organic process, creating an opportunity for Brussels to become a more relevant security actor in the waters off the Arabian Peninsula.
The U.S. administration is tacitly contributing to growing acceptance and re-normalization of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the 21st century’s most notorious war criminal, putting in jeopardy the continuation of our counter-terrorism mission in Syria. Assad is toasting his survival on the ashes of his victims — but within the small community of optimistic actors in Syria, ISIS is sitting pretty comfortably too.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is at its core an ideological army, not a national one, and its notorious enmity toward Israel is an aberration in Iranian history. But many Israelis to this day think Iran could be a natural partner as long as the country gave up its pursuit of ideologically driven regional dominance, disavow calls for the destruction of Israel, and were instead to again allow the regular army, the Artesh, to pursue Iranian national interests.
Security cooperation has been a critical pillar of U.S. statecraft for decades. However, the enterprise has gotten a bad reputation since the beginning of the 21st century because of the costly misadventures in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. But perhaps the problem is that we are not evaluating it the right way.
Although Russia has vested interests in the Burhan-Hemedti conflict, it is unlikely to actively pursue a blanket destabilization strategy in Sudan. Instead, it is likely to balance close ties with both warring parties and continue actively opposing a democratic transition in Sudan.
It is clear that the era of US hegemony in the Gulf, and the Middle East more broadly, is over. What is less certain is what security system will replace it and whether it will better serve regional security and US interests.
The Gulf is becoming a more crowded geopolitical space than ever, with external powers such as China, Russia and India increasing their involvement in the region to safeguard their economic interests, while local powers, most notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, are rising and pursuing a more independent foreign policy course.
President Theodore Roosevelt said, “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.”1 Roosevelt used the image of the big stick to popularize his philosophy, but he offered a subtler interpretation in other venues. It represented a quiet threat that would only rarely need to be used if accompanied by steady diplomacy.
Saudi Arabia has made it clear that it wants a defense pact with the United States in return for normalizing ties with Israel. However, that isn’t a price Washington is able or willing to accept, for both political and strategic reasons. But the conversation about improved U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation shouldn’t stop here. There’s plenty of room for achieving that objective without having to upgrade the relationship to a full-fledged alliance.
The conclusion of the China-brokered Saudi-Iranian détente on March 10, which aims to thaw long-standing enmity and manage competition between the two regional arch rivals, has multi-layered implications for Yemen.
Ukraine’s partners, led by the United States and spread over the globe, have increasingly responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion of February 2022 with a dizzying array of financial, humanitarian, and military assistance. Unfortunately, the way in which the U.S. and Ukraine’s other partners have provided military assistance over the last year — that is, by delivering a wide range of equipment, ammunition, and training — significantly undermines the longer-term objective of developing a sustainable system via which Ukraine can generate combat power in the coming years to overcome Russian aggression.
More than a year on from the beginning of the Ukraine war in February 2022, there is no more business as usual for Russia-Iran relations. While bilateral ties are still characterized by an intense focus on security and defense, the two sides are opening multiple new areas of cooperation as well. But what has motivated Moscow and Tehran to invest in strengthening their bilateral relations given all the potential risks and costs? Could conflicts of interest and competition put a crack in this burgeoning relationship? And what can the West do about it?