A closer look at the ISIS attack on Syria’s al-Sina Prison
On Jan. 20, 2021, groups affiliated with ISIS attacked al-Sina Prison in the southern part of the city of al-Hasakah, in Syria’s far northeast. The attack, which lasted for nearly nine days, ended with the killing of dozens of ISIS fighters and detainees inside the prison, in addition to approximately 140 members of the SDF and its prison guards.
Charles Lister and Mick Mulroy discuss the dramatic Feb. 3rd U.S. special operations raid that killed ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, the group’s late January attack on the al-Sina prison, and ISIS’s broader trajectory in both Syria and Iraq.
في 24 يناير/كانون الأول، أصدرت القيادة المركزية الأمريكية (CENTCOM) بيانًا أكدت فيه أن “القوات الأمريكية في قاعدة الظفرة الجوية، بالقرب من أبو ظبي في دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة، اعترضت صاروخيين متجهين للداخل بالاستعانة بعدة صواريخ باتريوت اعتراضية بالتزامن مع جهود القوات المسلحة الإماراتية في الساعات الأولى من صباح 24 يناير 2022. نجحت الجهود المشتركة في منع كلا الصاروخين من إصابة القاعدة.
The UAE paves way for Syria’s return to the Arab fold, but plenty of hurdles remain
The UAE has made bold strides to normalize relations with embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, opening itself up to criticism as many countries remain reluctant to reconcile with Damascus. Despite this measured reintegration of Assad into the Arab fold, many serious complications and challenges lie ahead. The most important of these is the lack of support from a hesitant Saudi Arabia, which would impede the crucial next step of Syria’s restoration to full membership in the Arab League before its upcoming summit.
The attack on al-Sina Prison points to a broader ISIS resurgence
Intense fighting between the SDF and ISIS continued for the fifth day in Syria’s northeastern city of al-Hasakeh on Monday, following ISIS’s biggest attack in Syria and Iraq in three years. In the evening of Jan. 20, as many as 200 ISIS militants, many wearing suicide belts, launched a coordinated multi-axis assault on al-Sina Prison, shortly after detonating two car bombs parked along the exterior walls of its northern wing. In the chaos that ensued, SDF vehicles were seized and used to break through secure walls, clearing the way for hundreds of ISIS detainees to escape.
How involved was Iran in the Houthi attack on the UAE?
Three days have passed since the Houthi attack on the UAE, yet there’s still a lot we don’t know about what really happened. Here’s what we do know: The Houthis officially stated that they were the ones who struck Abu Dhabi, and unlike in September 2019 when they made the same claim, this time they might not be lying. Yet this is not enough to help us answer what in my opinion is the ultimate question: to what extent were the Iranians involved in this attack?
يوم 17 يناير/كانون الثاني، نفذ الحوثيون هجومًا آخر استهدف منشأة نفطية إماراتية في أبوظبي، ما أدى إلى مقتل ثلاثة وافدين، وإلحاق أضرار بالبنية التحتية. ظاهريًا، يبدو أنهم يذكَّرون الإماراتيين بمدى ضعفهم وإمكانية الإضرار بهم إذا استمرت الهجمات ضد مصالح الحوثيين في اليمن. وبحسب ما ورد، كانت وسائل الهجوم عبارة عن طائرات مسيرة، وهي أداة بسيطة غير متماثلة متاحة للكثيرين واستخدمها الحوثيون على نطاق واسع في جميع أنحاء المنطقة. لسوء الحظ فإن القصة هنا قد أصبحت مألوفة للغاية وتتطلب استجابة متسقة الآن. ففي نهاية المطاف، من المرجح أن يتم نسخ وتكرار ما أصبح روتينيًا في الخليج في مواقع أخرى.
As the Houthis expand their regional aggression, will the US double down on a failing strategy?
While a negotiated agreement by the parties to deescalate militarily and return to the negotiating table would be the preferred outcome, there’s little or no reason to believe that the Houthis, who have responded to their losses in Shabwa by escalating their attacks, are yet interested in talking. Rather, by issuing pleas for de-escalation, the international community risks sending the Houthis yet another message that their intransigence, which is the root cause of the humanitarian crisis afflicting Yemenis, will be rewarded by new pressure on the Saudi-led coalition to limit its response to Houthi aggression. In this regard, the Biden administration, with its international partners, risks repeating the failed strategy of 2021.
On Jan. 10, the governor of Shabwa announced its liberation from the Iran-backed Houthis. This victory followed a seemingly successful Houthi military campaign over the past couple of years to expand their influence around the city of Marib, weaken the internationally-backed government of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and solidify their grasp on strategic northern areas. However, while significant, the victory in Shabwa is unlikely to be replicated in the rest of the country, given the very specific political and regional dynamics that helped to bring it about. Moreover, the Houthis’ drone attack on Abu Dhabi on Jan. 17 presents a further challenge to the advance of pro-UAE forces into Marib.
Three signs of impending famine in Syria absent immediate action
The pace of military action in Syria has plateaued. With the assumption of a frozen conflict comes the attendant assumption that humanitarian conditions are also likely to be stable. This could not be further from the truth. Humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate, driven by three factors, and urgent action is now needed to avoid a famine.
Afghanistan’s economy is collapsing. The Taliban’s forceful seizure of power led to a curtailment of almost all foreign aid, a devastating development for a nation overwhelmingly dependent on international assistance. Widespread drought, pervasive corruption, the perennially inadequate use of the country’s human capital, and a population largely unvaccinated against COVID-19 have exacerbated this longstanding problem of foreign financial dependence.
