The U.S. administration is tacitly contributing to growing acceptance and re-normalization of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the 21st century’s most notorious war criminal, putting in jeopardy the continuation of our counter-terrorism mission in Syria. Assad is toasting his survival on the ashes of his victims — but within the small community of optimistic actors in Syria, ISIS is sitting pretty comfortably too.
Decarbonization and Political Transformation in Iraq: The Impact on Politics, Society and Regional Relations
What happens when a petrostate loses its oil rents? While the oil market continues to go through boom-and-bust cycles, cases such as Iraq provide evidence of how the rapid loss of oil revenues—traumatic decarbonization—may affect the politics and stability of these petrostates. In Iraq, multiple shocks to oil revenues from 2014 through 2020 fundamentally altered the organization and concentration of political power in Iraq with destabilizing and democratic consequences.
The IRGC’s enmity toward Israel is an aberration in Iranian history
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is at its core an ideological army, not a national one, and its notorious enmity toward Israel is an aberration in Iranian history. But many Israelis to this day think Iran could be a natural partner as long as the country gave up its pursuit of ideologically driven regional dominance, disavow calls for the destruction of Israel, and were instead to again allow the regular army, the Artesh, to pursue Iranian national interests.
U.S. Security Cooperation Deserves A Fair Evaluation
Security cooperation has been a critical pillar of U.S. statecraft for decades. However, the enterprise has gotten a bad reputation since the beginning of the 21st century because of the costly misadventures in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. But perhaps the problem is that we are not evaluating it the right way.
As fighting in Sudan rages, Russia’s primary goal is to ensure authoritarian rule
Although Russia has vested interests in the Burhan-Hemedti conflict, it is unlikely to actively pursue a blanket destabilization strategy in Sudan. Instead, it is likely to balance close ties with both warring parties and continue actively opposing a democratic transition in Sudan.
It is clear that the era of US hegemony in the Gulf, and the Middle East more broadly, is over. What is less certain is what security system will replace it and whether it will better serve regional security and US interests.
The Gulf is becoming a more crowded geopolitical space than ever, with external powers such as China, Russia and India increasing their involvement in the region to safeguard their economic interests, while local powers, most notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, are rising and pursuing a more independent foreign policy course.
President Theodore Roosevelt said, “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.”1 Roosevelt used the image of the big stick to popularize his philosophy, but he offered a subtler interpretation in other venues. It represented a quiet threat that would only rarely need to be used if accompanied by steady diplomacy.
Saudi Arabia has made it clear that it wants a defense pact with the United States in return for normalizing ties with Israel. However, that isn’t a price Washington is able or willing to accept, for both political and strategic reasons. But the conversation about improved U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation shouldn’t stop here. There’s plenty of room for achieving that objective without having to upgrade the relationship to a full-fledged alliance.
China and the Saudi-Iran rapprochement: Implications for Yemen
The conclusion of the China-brokered Saudi-Iranian détente on March 10, which aims to thaw long-standing enmity and manage competition between the two regional arch rivals, has multi-layered implications for Yemen.
The long Ukraine war: It’s time to transition to a more rational military assistance paradigm
Ukraine’s partners, led by the United States and spread over the globe, have increasingly responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion of February 2022 with a dizzying array of financial, humanitarian, and military assistance. Unfortunately, the way in which the U.S. and Ukraine’s other partners have provided military assistance over the last year — that is, by delivering a wide range of equipment, ammunition, and training — significantly undermines the longer-term objective of developing a sustainable system via which Ukraine can generate combat power in the coming years to overcome Russian aggression.
More than a year on from the beginning of the Ukraine war in February 2022, there is no more business as usual for Russia-Iran relations. While bilateral ties are still characterized by an intense focus on security and defense, the two sides are opening multiple new areas of cooperation as well. But what has motivated Moscow and Tehran to invest in strengthening their bilateral relations given all the potential risks and costs? Could conflicts of interest and competition put a crack in this burgeoning relationship? And what can the West do about it?
The credibility of American deterrence in the Middle East
I don’t think enough attention has been paid to US Central Command Commander Gen. Michael Kurilla’s public testimony on 23 March, in which he said that Iran-backed militias have attacked American troops in Syria 78 times since January 2021.
A day after Kurilla spoke, local fighters allied with Tehran’s Revolutionary Guards launched another attack with drones, killing a US contractor and wounding six other American service members.
Israel and Azerbaijan: Trusted friends and reliable partners
Israeli-Azerbaijani relations are based on two main pillars: patient and cordial political relations as well as defense cooperation and arms sales. While the former reached a more intensive level this year, with the opening of an Azerbaijani embassy in Tel Aviv in late March, the latter pillar of the relationship was well developed long before, as Israel became Azerbaijan’s largest weapons supplier.
