The spread of the virus, unease about a cease-fire, peace talks, and the American withdrawal leave the Afghan people gripped with a heightened sense of uncertainty.
Nearly two years have passed since the Syrian regime declared its reclaimed control over Daraa governorate in southern Syria in July 2018.
Iran is currently facing an incredibly unlucky alignment of pressure sources that are interrelated and will force the regime to engage in risky or experimental behavior, most likely in 2020. The COVID-19 epidemic simply exacerbates the combined challenges of a regime squeezed by an international sanctions network and a restive population reaching a breaking point with economic hardship. A continued acceptance of the status quo is untenable; thus, the regime will likely begin to undertake various initiatives in the coming months, more likely military than diplomatic in nature, that could force the United States to ease the isolation of the country.
As part of Beijing’s broader strategy of seeking out new markets and cultivating strategic partnerships with countries beyond its backyard, China has been seeking to expand its economic and political ties with Black Sea states. While Beijing’s involvement in the region is still at a nascent stage, it has already prompted fears that its economic engagement masks a political agenda that could hurt Western interests.
The current COVID-19 pandemic has had an unprecedented global impact. In many ways, everyone has been affected by this collective crisis, and everyone is at risk. However, both the virus and its aftermath discriminate strongly against women and girls.
The conflict between Turkey and the anti-Turkey bloc is hurting everyone’s energy interests, making an investment in the region costlier for energy companies. Without compromises on all sides, everyone stands to lose.
MEI’s Gonul Tol and Jonathan Winer join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the state of the conflict in Libya, where the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) forces supported by Turkey have made significant gains in recent weeks over Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) forces, which are backed by Russia, the UAE, Egypt, and France.
The satellite images published on May 26 by AFRICOM appear to confirm reports that Russian MiG-29 jet fighters had flown to Libya. In fact, the MiG-29s travelled to Libya via Russia’s Hemeimeem air base in Syria, and as this latest episode makes clear, Hemeimeem plays a central role in Russia’s growing involvement in both the Mediterranean and Africa.
Far from his native Tehran in bucolic West Vancouver, Parviz Tanavoli, the 83-year-old “father of modern Iranian sculpture,” contemplates the fate of his homeland. “My heart breaks when I see what is happening in Iran now,” says the renowned artist, who divides his time between a life of relative obscurity on Canada’s Pacific coast, and Tehran, where he is referred to simply as “Master Tanavoli.”
Absent major military escalation by his foreign patrons, Khalifa Hifter has now lost the war he initiated against Libya’s internationally recognized government in Tripoli. The question remains, however, of how to end Libya’s proxy war and restart the necessary political process to bring about sustained peace.
As the May 26 AFRICOM statement makes clear, Russia’s strategy is fraught with the risk of new sanctions and its geopolitical maneuvers may not come for free.
In Khamenei’s mind, the total neutralization of the ‘moderate’ camp is the best legacy he can leave behind.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia used its dominant position as a natural gas supplier to wield outsized influence in the region. But recent changes in the natural gas market have eroded that dominance. Under increasingly globalized and interconnected natural gas markets, Russia has been losing its ability to use its dominance as a gas supplier to influence the region geopolitically and economically.
The Turks are signaling that they intend to hold to maximalist claims vis-à-vis their intended maritime influence.
It has been more than a year since the fall of Baghouz. Eleven Malaysians have returned from Syria under the Malaysian government’s offer, conditional upon compliance with checks and enforcement, and a one-month rehabilitation program. Since then, the authorities are optimistic that more will be able to return. However, the anticipation of more returnees raises questions about Malaysia’s readiness to receive incoming batches of Malaysia Islamic State (IS) fighters. Given Malaysia’s lack of experience dealing with battle-hardened terrorists and questions about the efficacy of existing deradicalization efforts, can these structures tackle issues that Malaysia has never faced?