Afghanistan's fall to the Taliban and the future of Al-Qaeda
Charles Lister on what Afghanistan’s fall to the Taliban means for the future of al-Qaeda.
Charles Lister on what Afghanistan’s fall to the Taliban means for the future of al-Qaeda.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
The Cipher Brief: Did you ever envision that the U.S. would pull out so quickly or completely leaving the Afghan military on its own without U.S. air support?
General Votel: I did not anticipate this during my time – but once the President sets a hard departure date – then a fast withdrawal is inevitable. No Commander wants to accept unnecessary risk with troops on the ground when you are up against a clearly articulated departure date.
“You’re all going to die,” the diminutive, senior U.S. intelligence official observed in matter-of-fact fashion to her stunned Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) hosts. Her rather blunt appraisal was uncharacteristic of the engagement to which the senior Pakistani officials had grown accustomed and cut to the chase: the consequences of decades of Pakistan’s support to the Taliban, violent Kashmiri liberation groups, radical madrassas, and extremist local political groups were coming home to roost.
As Kabul falls to the Taliban, it’s safe to say that this is without a doubt the most significant day for al-Qaeda since 9/11. After two decades of relentless counterterrorism pressure from the United States and allies, al-Qaeda’s central leadership was in dire straits just weeks ago.
Weeks before the official U.S. military withdrawal, Afghanistan is unraveling rapidly as the Taliban continue their swift military advance. They now control more than two-thirds of the country and half of the provincial capitals. With the government’s hold on Kabul in doubt, the Biden administration has dispatched troops to evacuate U.S. citizens from the country. We asked experts and scholars from across MEI to weigh in with their thoughts on the situation and what it means for the country, the wider region, and key international players.
The Afghan government appears to be in a state of precipitous collapse. At least a dozen provincial capitals have fallen to the Taliban in a week. The Taliban now control around 66% of the country.
The debate about whether Afghanistan was worth thousands of U.S. lives and a trillion U.S. taxpayer dollars should have occurred before those lives were lost and the money was spent. The decision to pull out our remaining 2,500 troops was made after all of that was done. That minimal number of troops preserved everything we fought for in the last two decades. We had significantly reduced the risk to our forces and the expense to the U.S. taxpayer.
Irregular warfare (IW) is increasingly common in the 21st century and the U.S. must learn from its successful experiences with it and apply those lessons to great power competition. For the past two decades the CIA and Army Special Forces have demonstrated how to leverage interagency relationships and apply complementary capabilities to achieve successful IW outcomes. The CIA/Army Special Forces partnership in Northern Iraq during the invasion of Iraq demonstrates the value of this interagency team and provides lessons and a model for the conduct of IW in the future.
في 8 أغسطس/آب، سلَّم وزير الخارجية العراقي فؤاد حسين، عبر نظيره السعودي، دعوة من رئيس الوزراء مصطفى الكاظمي إلى العاهل السعودي الملك سلمان بن عبد العزيز آل سعود لحضور “قمة” لدول جوار العراق على مستوى القادة، والتي ستُعقد في نهاية هذا الشهر. في اليوم نفسه، وجَّه دعوة أخرى إلى الرئيس التركي رجب طيب أردوغان. لا شك أن الفكرة طموحة والصورة الأولى التي تتبادر إلى الذهن هي الاحتمال غير المرجح أن يجلس الملك سلمان والرئيس الإيراني الجديد المتشدد إبراهيم رئيسي، على جانبي الطاولة نفسها في بغداد.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
There were two parts to the Iraqi prime minister’s request to President Biden on July 26 in their meeting at the White House: end Washington’s combat mission in Iraq but maintain U.S. military assistance there. The first part was aimed mostly at Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s domestic audience; the roughly 2,500 U.S. troops in Iraq are there primarily to advise and assist the Iraqi army. But the second part deserves a bit of thought.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
the years leading up to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban had strained relations with Iran. Tensions between the two sides escalated to the point that the Iranian government and the Quds Force actually assisted American forces during the 2001 U.S.-led invasion.
Tehran’s policy toward the Afghan Taliban has created new clashes within Iranian government circles. These clashes recently escalated as influential hard-line media and associates of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) made public efforts to portray the Taliban in a positive light.