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This Opinion was first delivered as a speech at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson Institute on February 7, 2012
Bashar al-Assad and his top regime cronies appear to be operating under a deeply flawed assumption: the relatively broad-based opposition it now faces is similar to the narrower Muslim Brotherhood challenge it defeated back in 1982 by killing more than 10,000 Syrians in Hama. Much the same way it did 30 years ago, the regime keeps pounding away at the resistance. But unlike the Hama massacre, a few severe blows will not put an end to this latest uprising. Instead, Assad’s brutish tactics will only escalate the bloodshed and resistance.
This Opinion first appeared in TheAtlantic.com on February 8, 2012
This Opinion was first published on CNN.com on February 6, 2012
The double veto cast by Russia and China at the United Nations Security Council on Saturday represents a clarifying moment in the Syrian uprisings.
At the 2012 Munich Security Conference, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted, "We don't know what the endgame will be until we start the game." Well, fasten your seatbelt — the game over Syria has started.
International response has been growing to the violent crackdowns in Syria, yet the government remains mostly unresponsive. Radwan Ziadeh, Ausama Monajed, Amb. Theodore Kattouf, and Andrew Tabler discuss the domestic and regional implications of the ongoing political unrest and violence in Syria.
Iran has two independent naval forces: the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN), whose existence predates Iran’s 1979 Revolution, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), which evolved separately in midst of the Iran-Iraq war (1985).
One of the most enduring epithets for Hamas, right up there with “terrorist,” is “proxy.” If you Google “Hamas Iran proxy,” you get 1,750,000 hits. The idea that the relationship between Sunni Hamas, the Gaza affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Shia Iran was merely a marriage of convenience and not a true love match is rejected by those who forget that most enduring maxim of Middle East politics: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” And implicit in that maxim are two more words: “for now.”