Regional escalations complicate stalled negotiations between Israel and Hamas
A version of this article first appeared as part of an Expert Views special feature on the new rules of the game in the Iranian-Israeli conflict.
A version of this article first appeared as part of an Expert Views special feature on the new rules of the game in the Iranian-Israeli conflict.
The month of April saw a series of unprecedented escalations in the long-simmering Iranian-Israeli conflict, with both countries launching missile and drone attacks against the other’s territory for the first time in history.
In the wake of these strikes, what will be the impact on the regional security and political environment going forward, what is needed to stabilize the new rules of the game, and how can US diplomacy help to facilitate that process? MEI has asked its experts to weigh in.
On April 21, the US House of Representatives passed the long-awaited aid package for Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan. The legislation contained another long-sought-after measure: authority for the US government to tighten restrictions on Iran’s oil exports. But in truth, aggressive US action remains unlikely and there are powerful operational, strategic, and political barriers preventing the US from shutting down Iran’s oil trade or hindering it in a material way.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
The Biden administration set forth five main objectives in reaction to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack against Israel and ensuing war in the Gaza Strip. Six months into the Israel-Hamas war, the Biden administration has not achieved enough progress toward these goals, although it has avoided some of the worst-case scenarios. Success is hampered in part by tensions stemming from the fact that some of the tactics and policy approaches are at odds with each other.
A version of this article was originally published on the Substack “Thinking Middle East.”
The Iranian strike against Israel was a first of its kind. Its mere occurrence sets a precedent that will have a long-term impact and require Israel to weigh new considerations when planning future military operations against Iranian assets.
Though Tehran continues to engage the government in Kabul in a pragmatic fashion, Iran and the Taliban are not traditional friends or allies; they share an uneasy relationship. There is a sectarian angle to their differences and a long-standing dispute over water resources. Yet Iran has sought to normalize relations due to broader geopolitical considerations, security concerns, and perceived economic opportunities.
For the last few months, people around the world have been closely following the ongoing brutality of the war in Gaza. Pictures of Palestinians fleeing south and looking for relatives under the rubble, videos of children searching for food and water — these and more have been circulating on social media and news networks every day since October 7.
As the war in Gaza approaches its seventh month, the settler movement has been raging its own separate war against none other than the Israeli military itself. While Israeli society is still healing from the devastation of Oct. 7 and tens of thousands of Israelis are displaced from their homes near the Gaza Strip and the northern border, the settlers have launched campaigns against the Head of the Central Command, advocated for resettling Gaza, and escalated tensions with the Israeli military.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Iran is a key stakeholder in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tehran does not have a deciding vote on the outcome of the current war in Gaza, but it does have plenty of capacity to shape the future course of the conflict. Iran is, after all, among the top backers of Hamas, both in terms of diplomatic support and as a supplier of military materiel and knowhow.
Six months since the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel and subsequent outbreak of war in Gaza, the deadly and devastating conflict looks no closer to concluding. Is it still possible to achieve a sustainable cessation of hostilities and restart the conflict-resolution process? To get there, what are the incentives and disincentives that could be constructed for the two main combatants, Israel and Hamas?
The Second War for Palestine has continued longer than any Israel-Palestinian conflict since Israel’s establishment. Neither Gamal Abdel Nasser’s army nor Hafez al-Assad’s tanks fought as long as the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades still battling in Gaza.