Monday Briefing: The Tishreen anniversary, a muted affair in the run-up to Iraq’s elections
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
يجتمع الرؤساء الروسي والتركي والإيراني يوم الأربعاء 29 سبتمبر/أيلول في مدينة سوتشي الروسية لمناقشة الوضع في سوريا. وكما كان الحال في الاجتماعات السابقة، من المرجح أن يتصدر الوضع في شمال غرب سوريا جدول الأعمال. على الرغم من أن منطقة إدلب الكبرى ظلت من الناحية التقنية خاضعة لوقف إطلاق النار الذي اتفقت عليه روسيا وتركيا في مارس/آذار 2020، إلا أن الطائرات الروسية والمدفعية السورية ارتكبت انتهاكات قاتلة ومتكررة منذ ذلك الحين.
بعد غزو العراق في ٢٠٠٣، تحولت الأنظار إلى السيد علي السيستاني في النجف بوصفه نقطة محورية ليس فقط على مستوى العراق، بل في عموم المنطقة. اليوم، يبلغ السيستاني ٩١ عامًا مما يجعل مسألة خلافته أمرًا يشغل المتابعين، ليس فقط على مستوى الساحة الشيعية، ولكن على مستوى منطقة الشرق الأوسط بشكل عام. وعليه، تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى تسليط الضوء على مستقبل المرجعية الشيعية على أساس التغيير المرتقب القادم بعد السيستاني.
For Shi’a Muslims, the highest-ranking religious authorities are known as marj’as, who serve as a reference point for emulation for laypeople (marj’a al-taqlīd). The position of the marj’a, known as the marj’aiyyah, has the exclusive right to issue religious rulings (fatwas). Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Sistani in Najaf has become a focal point not only for Shi’a in Iraq, but for the entire region. Sistani is now 91 years old and the question of succession is a central one — one that concerns not only Shi’a Muslims, but the wider Middle East as well. This paper aims to shed light on the future of the religious authority in the Shi’a world based on the unavoidable change after Sistani.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
After 40 years, Syria once again has dual military rule, where the president and his brother are the highest authorities. In the early 1980s, Rifaat al-Assad, the brother of Hafez al-Assad, was the commander of the Defense Companies and the strong man in Syria in the military, security, and even civilian spheres, while Hafez was in a coma. Today, we see this scenario echoed with the control of Maher al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s brother, over the Fourth Division, which has become an elite military unit due to strong Iranian support and its control over various territories of the country.
بعد أربعين عاما، تتجدد ثناية الحكم العسكري في سوريا بين الرئيس وشقيقه، ففي مطلع الثمانينات كان رفعت الأسد (شقيق حافظ الأسد)، قائد سرايا الدفاع الرجل القوي في سوريا على المستوى العسكري والأمني بل حتى على المستوى المدني، بينما كان حافظ الأسد يشكو من الغيبوبة – آنذاك-.
It took the Taliban just three and a half months to undermine a 20-year international effort to build a competent Afghan military. The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) collapsed once it was clear the U.S. was pulling out ground troops and ceasing air support operations after two decades of training and sustainment that cost the American taxpayer approximately $83 billion. When required to stand alone, against a Taliban force, the ANA failed unequivocally. Building the ANA as a mirror image of the U.S. military was strategically and operationally flawed. If they are designed to fight like the U.S. but cannot fight in the absence of U.S. forces, they are ineffective. What lessons should we learn from this and how could our approach be different in the future?
Ross Harrison, Paul Salem, and Randa Slim join host Alistair Taylor to reflect on 9/11’s impact on US policy in the Middle East over the past 20 years and how its legacy has been viewed by the region.
On July 24, Beirut and Baghdad signed a governmental framework agreement under which Iraq pledged 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil to Lebanon over a full year.
These developments come against the backdrop of multiple U.S. hints that Washington is potentially willing to circumvent sanctioning the participating parties under the Caesar Act.
The central media apparatus of the Islamic State group is mis-reporting on the activities of its cells in central Syria. Rather than exaggerating their capabilities, something that it is conventionally assumed to be doing all the time, its Central Media Diwan appears either to be deliberately under-playing them, or, less likely, to be unaware of their full extent, possibly due to communication issues.
Mick Mulroy and Ken Tovo join host Alistair Taylor to discuss their recent paper on how US intelligence and military operatives effectively collaborated with local Kurdish partners in Northern Iraq in the early 2000s, why it was a successful partnership, and what lessons it may provide for future operations. The paper, “Irregular Warfare: A Case Study in CIA and US Army Special Forces Operations in Northern Iraq, 2002-03,” is available now on MEI’s website.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
At the dawn of the Biden era of American foreign policy, a more mature, realistic Saudi foreign policy is emerging to match the shifting signals from Washington. In some measure, the Saudis are readopting elements that traditionally characterized their policy preferences before the meteoric rise of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), the kingdom’s de facto ruler.