Research & Commentary Results

Since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, malign foreign influence within EU countries has been the subject of considerable scrutiny. What lessons can be learned from comparing EU and NATO members Romania and Bulgaria with partner countries Moldova and Georgia?

The Black Sea is a very important region for NATO, and has not received the attention it deserves; a separate focused NATO strategy and support for countries in the Black Sea would send a message that the Alliance takes the region seriously.

Turkey’s blossoming relationship with Russia has not only raised eyebrows in Washington and Western European capitals, it has also caused a great deal of discomfort in countries like Georgia that have borne the brunt of Russian aggression. A few recent scattered signals from Ankara, however, might comfort Turkey’s northeastern neighbor.

Over the past several weeks geopolitical experts have been talking a lot about what the surprise U.S. drone attack on Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani, head of the IRGC – Quds Force, on Jan. 3 means for the Middle East and relations between the major powers. What has received considerably less attention, however, is what Soleimani’s killing means for the South Caucasus, a region whose small size belies its strategic importance.

As neighboring regions, the South Caucasus and the Middle East are inextricably intertwined — so much so that the former is sometimes even considered part of the Greater Middle East. While geographical proximity is the strongest driver of interconnectivity between the two regions, geopolitics, business ties, and energy interests also link countries from the South Caucasus and the Middle East and form the basis for important bilateral and regional relationships.

On Jan. 8, Turkey inaugurated the TurkStream natural gas pipeline from Russia, seemingly deepening Ankara’s ties with Moscow. However, a fuller analysis of Turkey’s current energy policies and consumption trends indicate a dramatic shift westward, away from Russia and Iran.

Since regaining its independence nearly three decades ago, European aspirations have been a central part of Georgia’s political agenda and identity. But the reality is more complicated and Georgia is, in a meaningful sense, part of both greater Europe and the greater Middle East.

Having raised eyebrows among many European officials with rhetoric targeting Syrian and other Middle Eastern/North African refugees in Hungary, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán sees the return of Syrian refugees to their home country as serving vital Hungarian and European interests. As Hungary continues to align closely with Russia while deepening its ties with Turkey and other non-Western governments, Budapest’s foreign policy is eroding an EU consensus.

Given their territorial proximity, the regional actors of the Middle East have always had an interest in Georgia and the South Caucasus as a window to Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to Georgia’s isolation, and in the years since the country has gradually started reclaiming its historical role as a cultural and economic crossroads between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

Turkey has completed the next-to-last piece of the 2,000-mile Southern Gas Corridor, a three-pipeline network that will send gas from Azerbaijan’s huge Shah Deniz field via Georgia and Turkey to Western Europe.

It was such a big deal that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia presided at the ribbon-cutting on Nov. 30. They were celebrating the completion of the pipeline that is the middle link in the Southern Gas Corridor: the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which traverses Turkey.

The geopolitical map of Europe and neighboring regions has changed profoundly in recent years. Yet the countries “in between” are still very much stuck in the middle, either because their internal situation remains complex or because of external interference, from disinformation warfare to more straightforward armed aggression.

For years, politics and conflicts in the Middle East have spilled over into many other regions of the world. Refugee crises, terrorism, and political instability in the Middle East have impacted foreign and domestic policy and politics in North America and Europe, but the Caucasus is much closer and, therefore, a particularly important case for policymakers in Washington and Brussels.

Following the sharp decline in oil prices in recent years, Central Asian and South Caucasus countries accelerated their efforts to diversify their economies away from oil and gas.They also began looking for additional investors. The wealthy states of the Persian Gulf were a natural fit, as they had the financial resources and were also interested in diversifying their economies away from petroleum. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have led the overseas investment charge.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been a powerful driver of the development of existing and new Eurasian rail routes. A web of competing and complementary rail lines has begun to form across the Eurasian landmass. Railway cargo service between China and Europe has fast become a compelling “middle option” — cheaper than air and faster than sea.

Brenda Shaffer (Georgetown University), Anna Borshchevskaya (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), and Alex Vatanka (MEI) join host Alistair Taylor to discuss how the dynamics between Russia and Iran are playing out in the Caucasus, and what it means for the countries of the region.