Research & Commentary Results

Iranian military advisers and pro-Iran foreign proxy groups are present from Yemen and Iraq to Syria and Lebanon. Tens of thousands of armed men operating across the Middle East look to Tehran for guidance and patronage. This sort of sway has made Iran into a regional power broker — at least in the Arab world. But Tehran’s deep ideological and financial investments in Arab states have come at the expense of neglecting Iranian interests closer to home. 

Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China seeks to play a larger role in the Black Sea region. China has been wooing littoral states in hopes of securing new markets for its goods and investing in infrastructure projects. But some worry that there is more to Chinese actions in the region than meets the eye. The worry is that China will increase its political and diplomatic clout in a region that is considered vital for Russian interests and create tension between Moscow and Washington. Despite the uneasiness in the West about China’s increasing presence in the Black Sea, there is not enough focus on the issue in the scholarly debates in Western capitals. The MEI’s Frontier Europe Initiative aims to contribute to the debate on the role of China in the Black Sea. We hope the articles in this report will help to address several important unaddressed questions.

Pompeo’s visit to the small post-Soviet democracy Georgia reflects U.S. efforts to reassure Georgia of its support as a strategic partner. As possibilities for Western engagement in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus are increasingly diminished by Russia’s rising force projection, the visit is an opportunity to consolidate President Donald Trump’s regional focus on great power competition with China and Russia.

As part of these two countries’ defense and security cooperation, the US provides financial support to the Georgian military, support for Georgia’s territorial defense and sovereignty, and, ultimately, for Georgia’s procurement of US defensive weapons. This triple combination ensures Georgia’s military strength and demonstrates America’s unwavering support for Georgia’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. However, a lack of medium- to long-term US political and military commitment to Georgia’s security could put Georgia in jeopardy.

Though the war in Afghanistan largely went unmentioned in the U.S. presidential race, the incoming Joe Biden administration must make a major decision in the coming weeks and months on whether to follow through on the U.S. commitment to withdraw all troops from the country by the end of April 2021.

‘Passportization’ has been a longstanding policy of Russia as it seeks to maintain control over former Soviet countries. The policy is a functional ideological mechanism that has served as a complementary argument to Russia’s military interventions in the Black Sea region and influence in domestic affairs of post-Soviet countries. In recent years, the consequences of passportization have been felt in the Baltic States, as well as break-away territories of the Republic of Moldova and Georgia. It also preceded the annexation of Crimea and anticipated the breakaway of Eastern Ukraine.

With the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) set to start operations in November 2020, the Black Sea once again lives up to its reputation as being of strategic interest to European energy security. As the final component of the European Union’s Southern Gas Corridor, TAP allows gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field to be pumped to Georgia and onward to Turkey, Greece, and Albania.

The Georgian Dream government managed the pandemic too well not to ensure a landslide. Georgia’s 2020 free and fair elections secure the country’s position as a regional beacon of democracy. Such well-deserved democratic progress shines bright in the context of democratic backsliding across Central and Eastern Europe. Georgia’s ruling party will face two major challenges over the next four years: first, a proportional electoral system which will institutionally strengthen the opposition, and second, the most difficult economic recovery it has seen in a decade of power.

Ukrainians are pondering what their recent local elections mean for the future of their nation. While results varied across different regions, it’s clear most of the population has grown ambivalent and cynical about the political process, with their country is battered by economic hardship, invasion by Russia, a thus-far disappointing record of performance by the current President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, and now the disastrous effects of COVID-19.

Kavkaz 2020, the latest in Russia’s series of major military exercises, demonstrated its burgeoning military capabilities on its southern flank. Several lessons for both the region and outside observers can be drawn from the exercise, but when juxtaposed with the subsequent flare-up of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, they emphasise not just Russia’s strengths but also its limitations.

While the geopolitical importance of the Black Sea is indisputable, more attention is needed to its separate actors. Ukraine, having had the largest territory of coastline in the Black Sea before the illegal annexation of Crimea, is ideally positioned to play a central role in the future of the region.

TurkStream, the much discussed gas pipeline across the Black Sea, is now a reality. In January, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Vladimir Putin presided over the launch ceremony in Istanbul. Gas shipped over the so-called “Western route” is now pumped into the Turkish grid through TurkStream rather than via Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria as before.

Deadly fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh has continued unabated for over a month. This so-called “frozen conflict” on Russia’s periphery was never truly frozen. Unresolved grievances on both sides festered for almost three decades, and smaller skirmishes periodically erupted. But this time the fighting emerged as the largest and deadliest flare-up and even spilled into neighboring Iran. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s support for Azerbaijan played a decisive role in raising the scale and turning the tide in favor of Azerbaijan. Turkish involvement raises questions about Moscow’s role and expectations, and the broader Russia-Turkey relationship.

Since May 2019, a series of Syrian loyalist offensives backed by the Russian air force has gradually encroached upon the country’s northwestern Idlib Province, home to the last major pocket of opposition-held territory. As the chief rebel group in control of Idlib, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has employed dozens of suicide car bombs as part of its continued defense of the area. Formally known as suicide vehicle-born improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs), these weapons have been a cornerstone of the group’s — and by extension, the entire opposition’s — military strategy since early stages of the war, when rebel forces began capturing and holding territory. In an attempt to further understand this strategy and how it has evolved over time, this case study seeks to compare and contrast HTS’s past and current use of SVBIEDs, with a heavy focus on the latter. It will also examine HTS’s evolving SVBIED design, paying particular attention to technical innovations such as environment-specific paint schemes, drone support teams, tablets with target coordinates, and live camera feeds, as well as upgraded main charges.

The renewed military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia threatens geopolitical stability in the wider Black Sea-Caspian region, and has the potential to evolve into greater regional escalation. The scale of military operations, and range of heavy military equipment involved, is increasing risks for major energy and transportation infrastructure, which connect Caspian oil and natural gas fields in Azerbaijan to major energy markets in Turkey, the Mediterranean, and different parts of Europe.