Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, vital to the global supply of both oil and liquefied natural gas. The issue of freedom of navigation in the strait has long been a source of tension, but until recently any attempt by Iran to physically close it looked highly implausible, unless it resulted from either a major embargo or total blockade of Iranian ports by the West, or a large-scale military confrontation. However, the events of the past three years showed Iran can still ensure a major disruption of the flow of energy without a formal blockade and without an increased risk of military confrontation with the West. Iran has a variety of means at its disposal, especially through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps naval forces, and the Iranians make no secret of their desire to be recognized as the dominant military power in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.
Integrated air and missile defense will make America’s partners in the Persian Gulf safer and bolster America’s policy against Iran. It’s past time to make IAMD a priority.
The Department of Defense’s new overarching principle, U.S. strategic competition, will likely replace great power competition in the next National Defense Strategy, set to be released in 2022. In the latest installment of the Defense Rapid Reaction series, experts from MEI’s Defense & Security Program weigh in with their thoughts on what strategic competition means for the U.S. and how it should go about implementing it in practice.
In recent years, Israel has waged a campaign against the military buildup of its enemies, mainly Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. This ongoing effort is called “the campaign between the wars,” or the Mabam Campaign. Several events in recent weeks have given rise to questions about the effectiveness of this campaign, however, and have underscored the need to rethink its future.
The rapid collapse of the U.S.-supported Afghan government after the withdrawal of U.S. troops raised a number of questions about America’s credibility and reputation in the eyes of its allies, especially those who had participated in and contributed to the 20-year war. Analysts and commentators have focused on how NATO member states or the European Union now perceive the U.S., but it is also important to consider the perspective of non-state groups or individuals who served or could serve as local partners for the U.S. government and military.
Conflicts are enormously destructive. They destroy lives and property, uproot communities, and reduce the economic potential for all involved. This devastation often has an unaccounted cost, both in terms of the obvious direct destruction of lives and assets, as well as the indirect costs that weigh on economies, often for years to come. This is true of all conflicts, and has certainly been true, and visible, during Russia’s unjustified and illegal invasions of its neighbors, Georgia and Ukraine.
Supporting anti-Taliban fighters will spark a return to civil war, antagonize Pakistan, and draw the United States back into a conflict it sought to put behind it.
After 40 years, Syria once again has dual military rule, where the president and his brother are the highest authorities. In the early 1980s, Rifaat al-Assad, the brother of Hafez al-Assad, was the commander of the Defense Companies and the strong man in Syria in the military, security, and even civilian spheres, while Hafez was in a coma. Today, we see this scenario echoed with the control of Maher al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s brother, over the Fourth Division, which has become an elite military unit due to strong Iranian support and its control over various territories of the country.
بعد أربعين عاما، تتجدد ثناية الحكم العسكري في سوريا بين الرئيس وشقيقه، ففي مطلع الثمانينات كان رفعت الأسد (شقيق حافظ الأسد)، قائد سرايا الدفاع الرجل القوي في سوريا على المستوى العسكري والأمني بل حتى على المستوى المدني، بينما كان حافظ الأسد يشكو من الغيبوبة – آنذاك-.
While much of the discourse surrounding the Iron Dome controversy is mired in hysterics and hyperbole, some have put forward a more rational case for providing additional funding for it. One of the standard arguments advanced in recent days is that Iron Dome is crucial not only for saving Israeli lives but is equally important (perhaps even more so) for saving Palestinian lives. This claim has been echoed by numerous American and Israeli analysts and even Members of Congress, and seems to have been accepted by a number of journalists as well. But is it actually true?
For Iran, Washington’s Afghanistan fiasco has been touted as confirmation that U.S. policy in the Islamic world is doomed to fail. The immediate geopolitical and ideological gains, however, could be overshadowed by the potential challenges that a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan may pose for Iran’s security and regional interests in the long run.
China’s recent multi-sectoral engagements in Turkey suggest that the Black Sea region’s significance is on the rise in Beijing, and under President Erdoğan, Turkey has consistently sought its favor and investment.
Though aware of the weaknesses of the former Afghan government, none of the Central Asian governments seemed prepared for the rapidity and decisiveness of the Taliban victory. Not unreasonably, Central Asians fear that it will spur the growth of regional terrorism and extremism, either through direct Taliban sponsorship or inspiration. The five Central Asian states backed the anti-Taliban opposition in the 1990s and then the U.S.-led NATO military campaign in Afghanistan after 2001. Presently, the Central Asian governments are eschewing policies that could antagonize the new regime while looking for indications whether the Taliban have genuinely turned over a new leaf and renounced international terrorism. If they have, then some Central Asian countries seem open to economic and perhaps other cooperation. If not, Central Asians will likely rely on Russia for enhanced security support.
It took the Taliban just three and a half months to undermine a 20-year international effort to build a competent Afghan military. The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) collapsed once it was clear the U.S. was pulling out ground troops and ceasing air support operations after two decades of training and sustainment that cost the American taxpayer approximately $83 billion. When required to stand alone, against a Taliban force, the ANA failed unequivocally. Building the ANA as a mirror image of the U.S. military was strategically and operationally flawed. If they are designed to fight like the U.S. but cannot fight in the absence of U.S. forces, they are ineffective. What lessons should we learn from this and how could our approach be different in the future?