Research & Commentary Results

In late July, Russian officials met with Yemen’s Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik and representatives of the Houthi Supreme Political Council to discuss the resolution of the Yemeni civil war. These meetings underscored Russia’s ability to balance favorable relations with Yemen’s internationally recognized government and the Houthis: Moscow supported Abdulmalik’s vision for a political solution to the Yemeni civil war and concurred five days later with Houthi criticisms of U.S. military deployments to the Persian Gulf.

Elizabeth Tsurkov has courageously put forward what she calls a progressive case for staying in Syria. I would regard myself as progressive but I’m not convinced, even if I would have supported many of her arguments in the past. In arguing for an indefinite presence in Syria, Tsurkov relies on the notion that staying gives the U.S. influence over Ankara and Moscow, serves as a counter to Tehran, and pressures the Assad regime, possibly even creating “internal fissures in its senior ranks” and causing “the Assad regime to institute reforms that would benefit all Syrians.” Those fissures and reforms have been desired for the past eight years but have not yet appeared. It would be easier to argue that withdrawal is more likely to cause them, and to pressure Ankara and Moscow into countering Tehran.

The long-awaited summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan raised more questions than it answered. Nevertheless, the message emerging from the meeting has major implications for regional stability and the Afghan peace process. 

OPEC+ nations have ended speculation about whether they would continue oil production cuts by agreeing to a nine-month extension. Led by the global petroleum powers Saudi Arabia and Russia, the group agreed on July 2 to extend the current level of cuts until the second quarter of 2020.

When it was signed four years ago, the Iran nuclear deal was widely perceived as a diplomatic triumph, a move that would help reintegrate Iran into the global economy and restore its relations with the West. Things haven’t quite turned out that way, however.

U.S. crude oil and energy product exports surged to an all-time high in the third week of June, making the country a net exporter of oil and products for the third time since November 2018. This change lends credence to American officials’ presumption that amid growing U.S.-Iran tensions in the Persian Gulf, Washington is less compelled to police oil transit routes in the region, especially the Strait of Hormuz, than it was during the 1980s. However, while the U.S. is less reliant on oil imports than in the past, it still remains dependent on Gulf producers, albeit in different ways.

Violence has been flaring up at an alarming rate in the southern Syrian province of Daraa, amid dozens of unclaimed attacks by gunmen. Over the last three months, assassinations, checkpoint attacks, fires, and sporadic clashes have wreaked havoc in the area and signaled a potential return of conflict. 

In this week’s Monday Briefing, MEI experts Alex Vatanka, Gonul Tol, Gerald Feierstein, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Rauf Mammadov, and Robert S. Ford provide analysis on recent and upcoming events including Iran’s announcement that it has exceeded its enriched uranium limit, Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400s missile defense system over American objections, an Emirati announcement that it will downsize military involvement in Yemen, the resumption of intra-Afghan peace talks, Russia’s continuing embrace of OPEC+ oil production cuts, and the emergence of potential threats to Tunisia’s democracy.

The Trump administration’s economic workshop in Bahrain produced some noteworthy moments that reflected recent changes in Israeli-Gulf relations, but it fell well short of its original declared intent. Neither Israeli nor Palestinian officials attended, and it did not conclude with any tangible steps to advance the peace process.

Competition for security and energy is at the center of recent developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. Countries from Egypt to Turkey are moving to secure, exploit, and market their (not always fair) share of the game-changing offshore natural gas reserves. Russia, China, and Iran are securing port facilities, and in the case of Russia, drilling rights, in Lebanon and Syria. 

In late May, Saudi Aramco signed an agreement to buy 5 million tons per annum of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from San Diego-based Sempra Energy’s planned LNG terminal in Port Arthur, Texas. The deal exemplifies Saudi Aramco’s determination to boost the share of LNG and petrochemicals in its portfolio before its long-awaited public offering in 2021.

Sometime in June the UN Security Council will vote to approve another six-month renewal of the mandate of the 1000-strong UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) deployed in the Golan Heights. For more than four decades, the UN Security Council has unanimously renewed the mission’s mandate to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria, but this will be the first time it has come up for a vote since President Donald Trump signed a proclamation recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the area of the Golan Heights on March 25th.

MEI’s Randa Slim and Paul Salem join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the Institute’s conflict resolution program and how Track II diplomacy—or unofficial meetings between adversarial groups—has supplemented state-to-state diplomacy and become a transformative experience for many of its participants.

Conditions in Iraq since the defeat of ISIS’s territorial “caliphate” justify both optimism and concern at the same time. One issue where there has been much hand wringing but few practical suggestions for what to do is that of the popular mobilization forces (PMF). As the main campaign against ISIS drew to a close, many of the PMF’s leaders sought to translate their fighters’ battlefield sacrifices into political and economic gains.

The Trump administration is preparing to present the “Deal of the Century,” proposing an outline for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Very little is known about the plan so far. However, it is important to discuss the context and the conditions under which it has been formulated, and to highlight some basic elements that are required for a third party to promote a peace plan — which are absent in this case.