Of all the challenges to the OPEC+ effort, Iraq remains the biggest and most daunting.
It has been more than a year since the fall of Baghouz. Eleven Malaysians have returned from Syria under the Malaysian government’s offer, conditional upon compliance with checks and enforcement, and a one-month rehabilitation program. Since then, the authorities are optimistic that more will be able to return. However, the anticipation of more returnees raises questions about Malaysia’s readiness to receive incoming batches of Malaysia Islamic State (IS) fighters. Given Malaysia’s lack of experience dealing with battle-hardened terrorists and questions about the efficacy of existing deradicalization efforts, can these structures tackle issues that Malaysia has never faced?
There was no other way to end the political logjam in conflict-ridden Afghanistan than to make current President Ashraf Ghani and the outgoing Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah agree to share power. The deal announced on May 17 has been widely welcomed by the international community because the political tensions between the two rivals were viewed as one of the major hurdles to the advancement of an intra-Afghan reconciliation process. The political jockeying in Kabul is far from the only impediment to reconciliation though and there are deeper obstacles to the peace process.
The big question is, what is Baghdad expected to concede in return for Trump’s investment?
A perceived lessening of the U.S. security umbrella would leave the Saudis far more vulnerable regionally and could force additional policy adjustments.
With its territory under increasing pressure, its finances dwindling, and manpower more challenged than ever, HTS’s ability to balance its extremism with controlled uses of pragmatism is under strain. Internally, its leadership is bitterly divided over decisions of the past, present, and future and externally, its rivals and enemies all appear to be conspiring against it. In an attempt to protect internal cohesion, HTS has become determinedly self-assertive in recent weeks, pursuing unpopular policies such as trading with the regime and lashing out at those brave enough to express their dissatisfaction. In response to HTS aggressions, a wider array of opposition voices — both moderate and Islamist — are declaring loudly that HTS now represents a threat to their revolution.
President Vladimir Putin’s plans to change Russia’s Constitution and stay in power beyond 2024 have been hampered by COVID-19 and the oil price crash.
When the American-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) captured the village of al-Baghouz in late
March 2019, ISIS’s self-proclaimed “caliphate” came to an end. The largest multinational military
coalition in modern history spent four-and-a-half years methodically rolling back ISIS’s control of an
expanse of territory the size of Britain, stretching across Syria and Iraq.
The April 12 OPEC+ deal to cut oil production that ended the disastrous five-week Saudi Arabia-Russia price war is a short-term fix for the global industry, but will not resolve the larger problem of over-production. The price war heightened animosity between Riyadh and Moscow and calls into question whether the OPEC+ partnership will ever be the same again.
President Recip Tayyip Erdogan has sought to dramatically reorient Turkey’s role and relationships in the region. Gradually at first but then abruptly, he has pivoted from the Republic’s historical status as a key member of the transatlantic alliance towards new partnerships – including Russia. Erdogan has consistently aimed for freedom in executing his foreign policy agenda, of which energy concerns are pivotal. It remains to be seen whether this hard-sought autonomy will be limited or expanded by Turkey’s domestic energy needs and its prime position as a hydrocarbon transit state.
Immediately after the Syrian regime and its allies captured central Syria in late 2017, ISIS began waging an effective and deadly insurgency in the area. It first targeted urban centers along the western Euphrates before shifting focus in spring 2018 to the transport lines and mountains running along the M20 from Khunayfis to Shoula. These wide-ranging operations have killed a minimum of 860 pro-regime fighters of all ranks, units, and types. This report tracks self-reported regime losses in the region, as indicated on loyalist Facebook pages, community pages, and unit pages, from Nov. 10, 2017 through March 31, 2020.
Despite his support, al-Kadhimi’s path to obtain confirmation of his cabinet from the Council of Representatives is riddled with challenges.
The ingredients that fueled ISIS’s explosive expansion in Syria in 2013-14 are not only still present today, they are worse.
The new cuts will likely not do much to shore up oil prices.
Saudi Arabia’s recent decision to call for an urgent OPEC+ meeting was driven by a simple logic. In spite of its obvious advantages over other oil producers, the kingdom is still taking serious risks as it pursues an oil price war.