2018 year in review: Conflicts, Khashoggi, and “maximum pressure”
Eleven MEI scholars run down the major policy developments in the Middle East in 2018.
Eleven MEI scholars run down the major policy developments in the Middle East in 2018.
A secret letter recently obtained through an inside source sheds light on ISIS’s efforts to persuade an al-Qaeda affiliate to jump ship, abandon its allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahri, and join Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s ranks.
In this week’s Monday Briefing, MEI experts discuss recent and upcoming events including Russian air strikes in Aleppo, the elections in Bahrain, the growing international interest in Egypt’s offshore energy finds, and the appointment of a new Afghan team of negotiators for peace talks.
The Tiger Forces is a Syrian Air Intelligence-affiliated militia fighting for the Syrian government and backed by Russia. While often described as the Syrian government’s elite fighting force, this research portrays a starkly different picture. The Tiger Forces are the largest single fighting force on the Syrian battlefield, with approximately 24 groups comprised of some 4,000 offensive infantry units as well as a dedicated artillery regiment and armor unit of unknown size. Beyond these fighters are thousands of additional so-called flex units, affiliated militiamen who remain largely garrisoned in their hometowns along the north Hama and Homs borders until called on to join offensives as needed.
A close look at the competing claims, actors, and movements for authority within the Syrian civil war reveals three distinct periods of political and religious influence: that of Syrian scholars, who were the first to inject religious language into the revolution; that of Salafi scholars predominantly from the Gulf; and lastly, that of jihadi organizations like ISIS and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, who were active on the ground.
After nearly two decades of war in Afghanistan ISKP has become a resilient force that sets the standard of Salafi jihadism in Afghanistan.
The assassinations are likely to undermine voter turnout in Afghanistan’s south and deepen divisions within the Afghan government about the prospect of peace with the Taliban.
Summary
Originally styled as a small detachment of volunteers and refugees mobilized to defend the shrine of Sayyeda Zeinab outside Damascus, the Fatemiyoun formation’s size and presence across Syria has slowly expanded throughout the war. At home, the IRGC began cultivating a narrative of Afghan “resistance” to transnational Sunni jihadism. Joining the Syrian jihad was increasingly promoted as a path to legal and social recognition within the Islamic Republic at a time when thousands of desperate young Hazaras were setting out to emigrate to Europe.
The jihadist threat is not new to the Maghreb. However, the fallout of the 2011 Arab uprisings has fundamentally altered the political and security environment of North African countries. While states such as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia witnessed an increase in deaths from jihadist attacks, others like Algeria and Morocco experienced a reduced impact.
This paper examines ISIS’s actions, publications, and communications to determine its insurgency strategies and long-term organizational outlook, emphasizing sources that have been largely overlooked by forces fighting the group.
Seven years after Syria’s civil uprising broke out, the war isn’t over, but it is entering a new phase. MEI Senior Fellow Robert Ford, the last U.S. ambassador to Syria, and Charles Lister, director of MEI’s Countering Violent Transnational Movements project, join host Paul Salem to discuss the state of play and how things may develop in the months ahead.
In this week’s Monday Briefing, MEI experts Gonul Tol, Robert S. Ford, Randa Slim, and Marvin G. Weinbaum provide analysis on Turkey’s currency crisis, talks in Ankara over the future of Idlib, Abadi’s chances of clinging to the premiership, and the Taliban’s capture of Ghazni.

Regional conflict and internal chaos have allowed militant jihadi groups to rise and flourish in Yemen. This paper analyzes two of the most prominent such groups, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State in Yemen (ISY), by scrutinizing the factors that led to their respective ascents and examining the challenges and pressures that have caused their respective declines.
India’s strategic choices in South Asia have prompted it to interfere in the domestic affairs of some of its neighbors. As a result, India has become a part of domestic politics of most of its neighboring states where anti-India sentiment is often used to bolster the nationalist credentials of various political formations. Importantly, such sentiments have been leveraged by Jihadist groups — especially those operating in Pakistan and Bangladesh — to shore up support for themselves.
Sectarian-based conflicts — or at any rate, spasms of intercommunal violence characterized as such — are certainly not new. Nor is Iraq or, for that matter, the Middle East as a whole, the only locus of conflict depicted as being sectarian in nature, as the disturbing events in Burma/Myanmar, as well as in the Central African Repubic (CAR) and Nigeria clearly illustrate. With increasing frequency, media accounts of the civil war in Syria describe it in sectarian terms and report that the violence there has inflamed “sectarian tension” throughout the Gulf and beyond.