Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
The renewal of the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear program does not undermine Israeli national security per se but rather a longstanding tenet of Israel’s strategic thinking: that it must be able to fully eradicate any challenge to its military superiority deep inside enemy territory.
Officials in the Islamic Republic of Iran have been warning about an emerging demographic “tsunami” as local and international forecasts suggest the country could have one of the five largest elderly populations by 2050. Nearly 11% of Iranians are now over 60 years old, and this figure could significantly increase going forward.
The announcements in mid-August that both the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait will be returning their ambassadors to Tehran after six years provided the latest indication that the diplomatic ice has started to break in the Gulf region.
The embattled Syrian regime’s need to preserve Russian military and political support has compelled Damascus to adopt the Kremlin line in its foreign policy positions toward the former Soviet space.
The United States and its Gulf Arab partners need a new security arrangement that effectively shares the burden of defending against Iranian hostility and goes beyond deterrence.
In June, Iran and Venezuela signed a 20-year road map on cooperation. As much as Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi has wanted to differentiate himself from his predecessor, his Venezuela policy has so far closely resembled that of Hassan Rouhani during the latter’s second term.
There is currently an ongoing conversation in Europe around how to hold the Iranian government accountable for its crimes. While efforts to bring justice to the regime’s victims continue, the road ahead will be difficult and as the recent Swedish and Belgian cases make clear, sometimes it will be one step forward and one step back.
The Iranian government has invested heavily in trying to sway public attitudes to embrace closer relations with Russia; but a plurality of Iranians would like to see balanced ties with all nations and for Tehran to pursue a mature, pragmatic overseas agenda.
In July 1987, Iran lost the opportunity to end the Iran-Iraq war as part of a U.N. deal by imposing two preconditions, one of which was impossible to meet. In 2022, Iran is likely to lose another opportunity, this time to return to the 2015 nuclear deal, once again by imposing two preconditions, one of which is also impossible to meet.
Despite Russia and Iran’s apparently tightening relationship, Russian Ambassador Levan Dzhagaryan has come under withering criticism in Tehran, becoming a reminder of the interventionist and imperialist policies that Russia had practiced toward its southern neighbor over the past two and a half centuries.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
When he declared his presidential candidacy in May 2021, Ebrahim Raisi was already recognized as a favorite of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. A month later, Raisi was handed the job on a silver platter of an election that was carefully engineered by Khamenei. Voter turnout hit a historical low, making clear that Iranian voters saw the sham for what it was. From the get-go, then, Raisi’s primary concern was not Iranian public opinion but Khamenei’s continued patronage.
Iranian-Turkish trade and economic cooperation has been the all-important platform on which otherwise often tense bilateral relations could survive. With trade and economic ties now weakening, their geopolitical rivalry could sharply re-intensify.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.