Research & Commentary Results

Syria faces long-standing economic problems that have been greatly exacerbated by its nine-year-long war. The cost of rebuilding the country will be enormous. But before there can be any discussion of sanctions relief or economic assistance, key political and economic reforms must be implemented. First and foremost among these is the devolution of power to the most local level of governance.

What is the future of legitimacy in Yemen? The question of what would happen if President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi were to die has been an unspoken concern for the past several years. It is important to address the question of legitimacy after Hadi because the constitutional rules on how to transfer his authority to a successor and how to avoid a presidential vacuum are impractical given the ongoing conflict.

Saying that Moscow is having a change of heart at this very moment, let alone is willing to publicly broadcast this to Damascus, may be a bit premature.

On April 30, roughly a week after the Southern Transitional Council (STC) declared self-administration in Aden, a military confrontation broke out on the remote Yemeni island of Socotra between members of the STC and government forces. After just a few days, the situation was diffused when the island’s governor and the STC asked the Saudis to intervene. Although an agreement was reached quickly, it is likely to be fragile because the causes of the conflict are not entirely local. The island of Socotra is simply too important to multiple international players that are not willing to let it easily slip outside their sphere of influence.

A few hours before Ramadan’s pre-fasting suhoor meal on April 25, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a UAE-sponsored regional secessionist movement, abruptly announced self-administration in Yemen’s South and a state of emergency.

In recent weeks, a flurry of commentary from prominent voices and publications in Russia has seen a wave of criticism directed at Syria’s Assad regime. Accusations have been leveled against the regime of corruption, warlordism, and incompetence, as well as an obsession with achieving unrealistic military objectives at the expense of dwindling resources, reconstruction, and political and economic reforms.

In a series of videos posted on Facebook this week, Rami Makhlouf called out the upper echelons of Syria’s political establishment, of which he had been an integral part for over two decades. By making his feud public Makhlouf has created an unprecedented rift within loyalist ranks, transforming his dispute with Syria’s ruling elite from one that was tightly controlled and behind closed doors to an out in the open, nationwide row the likes of which haven’t been seen since Hafez al-Assad’s standoff with his brother Rifaat in 1984.

Officials in Damascus say reconstruction plans for what was once Syria’s largest Palestinian refugee community will pave the way for the return of large numbers of displaced residents “as soon as possible.” But with plans beset by delays and vague statements from those same officials, the available evidence suggests otherwise.

The fact that Makhlouf chose to go public heightens the stakes at play at the top of the regime and within the Alawite clan, arguably more than ever.

Despite the Houthis’ rejection of the Saudi-led coalition’s two-week unilateral cease-fire, on April 24 the coalition’s Joint Forces Command announced an extension throughout the holy month of Ramadan.

The arrival of COVID-19 into Iraq and the resulting reduction in frontline deployed forces has widened the scope for ISIS operations.

The uncertain political circumstances this time around make these efforts worth watching.

With its territory under increasing pressure, its finances dwindling, and manpower more challenged than ever, HTS’s ability to balance its extremism with controlled uses of pragmatism is under strain. Internally, its leadership is bitterly divided over decisions of the past, present, and future and externally, its rivals and enemies all appear to be conspiring against it. In an attempt to protect internal cohesion, HTS has become determinedly self-assertive in recent weeks, pursuing unpopular policies such as trading with the regime and lashing out at those brave enough to express their dissatisfaction. In response to HTS aggressions, a wider array of opposition voices — both moderate and Islamist — are declaring loudly that HTS now represents a threat to their revolution.

Russia acts as a “key if quiet player” in southern Yemen, where its approach has been based on strategic neutrality. The goal has been to position Moscow as a greater stakeholder in mediation between the various Yemeni parties and outside players. Moscow has engaged the Southern Transitional Council, the UN-recognized Yemeni government led by President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, the Houthi rebels, as well as the three main regional powers intervening in Yemen — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran.

On April 25, the Southern Transitional Council declared self-administration and claimed authority over state institutions in the interim capital of Aden. The declaration demonstrates the region’s volatility, the limited reach of Yemen’s government, and the difficulty of imposing a solution to the problem of secessionism. It is also sparking political competition for Saudi patronage, and all of this poses a major diplomatic challenge for the Saudis.