Research & Commentary Results

The UK’s impending exit from the EU will present a new chapter for British interests in and posture toward the region. If the UK is to find a trade-off for loss of diplomatic and economic heft, it will need to re-prioritize its engagement efforts. Policy continuity toward Morocco and Tunisia appears inevitable; Algeria, in contrast, promises great opportunity for an evolving relationship.

Strong U.S. leadership could still make a difference to counter the threats arising from the ongoing proxy war, but the Trump White House appears mainly to have other things on its mind.

Militarily, the most concerning issue remains the fate of Idlib, where at least three million people remain crammed in a killing-zone that encompasses just 3.5 percent of Syria’s territory

The consequences of what happens in Idlib could come to define the future of Syria — a country already destined for many more years of instability and suffering.

Having raised eyebrows among many European officials with rhetoric targeting Syrian and other Middle Eastern/North African refugees in Hungary, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán sees the return of Syrian refugees to their home country as serving vital Hungarian and European interests. As Hungary continues to align closely with Russia while deepening its ties with Turkey and other non-Western governments, Budapest’s foreign policy is eroding an EU consensus.

In our annual year in review episode, MEI experts Paul Salem, Gonul Tol, Charles Lister, Alex Vatanka, Marvin Weinbaum, and Mirette Mabrouk sit with host Alistair Taylor to discuss the key events across the region in 2019, what surprised them, and where things stand as we head into 2020.

After several years of behind-the-scenes efforts, the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act will be signed into law in Washington. It is an extraordinarily expansive and aggressive piece of legislation, allowing for a significant expansion of sanctions against Syrian regime figures and bodies, including the Central Bank and multiple sectors of the state economy. More significantly, the “Caesar Bill” will place an expectation on the U.S. government to sanction any individual or organization anywhere in the world who provides any form of financial support to the Syrian regime that furthers its ability to repress its people.

The question as 2019 ends is whether foreign forces supporting the conflict will rethink their commitment to military victory and instead work to secure political solutions through compromise.

Assad appeared increasingly secure — and confident — in his presidential palace, but also remained a deeply isolated global pariah.

On Nov. 27 the GNA signed an MoU with Turkey seeking to create a shared maritime boundary in the Mediterranean Sea between southwestern Turkey and northeastern Libya. In an overt quid pro quo, this maritime agreement was signed along with a separate MoU to expand security and military cooperation. Thus, it seems clear that Turkey was only able to persuade the GNA to agree to the maritime deal in exchange for increased security support for the GNA-aligned forces fighting the self-styled LNA in Tripoli.

Syrian activists Sarah Hunaidi, Rafif Jouejati, and Jomana Qaddour join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the involvement and role of women in civil society and efforts to shape the country’s political future.

This week marks the second round of constitutional committee negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland convened by UN Special Envoy to Syria Geir Pedersen. The committee is convened under the auspices of UNSCR 2254, which requires the drafting of a new constitution among many other important obligations. The fact that only one of those requirements is being pursued seriously by the international community is — understandably — beyond frustrating for Syrians. Attempting to solve the Syrian conflict by addressing only one of so many outstanding issues is not only a mistake, but will also do little to bring any lasting peace to this war-torn country.

Russia’s ability to control the pace and scope of developments in Syria has been a moving target ever since its intervention four years ago. At varying times, Moscow has found itself both firmly in the driver’s seat and a helpless bystander — the latter most vividly illustrated by events such as the regular Israeli airstrikes on Russia’s Iranian and Syrian regime allies.

In mid-October, five years after it was expelled from most of eastern Syria as ISIS swept in, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) returned to much of the northeast as part of a deal between the Syrian Democratic Forces and Damascus struck just days after Turkey launched an offensive against the region. By examining the distribution and make-up of units sent to the northeast we can better understand the strength of the SAA in the region and the current state of its broader deployments across the country.