مخاوف خامنئي على مستقبل رجال الدين الإيرانيين (الجزء الثاني)
هذا هو الجزء الثاني من سلسلة مكونة من ثلاثة أجزاء
في السنوات الأخيرة، نُشِرت العديد من التحليلات حول النفوذ المتزايد للحرس الثوري الإسلامي داخل النظام الإيراني. لا شك أنه في العقدين الماضيين، ازدادت قوة الحرس الثوري في المجالات السياسية والاقتصادية والأمنية بشكل كبير، ومع تزايد عدد الشخصيات العسكرية أو العسكرية السابقة في إدارة الرئيس الإيراني الجديد، إبراهيم رئيسي، لا يتوقع سوى أن يتجه نفوذ الحرس الثوري نحو مزيد من التوسع.
Khamenei’s concerns over the future of the Iranian clergy (Part 3)
When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, died at the age of 89, he and the regime he established enjoyed the support of most of the country’s high-ranking clerics. His successor, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, aged 82, faces a very different situation, however. Most senior clerics apparently do not support him, and the “deviation” of the new generation of clerics has caused growing concerns within the regime.
A stranger among us: Iran's tightening grip on religious minorities
For thousands of years, Iran has stood out as a culture that prized diversity and a place where religious minorities have flourished as independent communities. The Islamic Republic now seeks to change that, however, by implanting its own leaders inside different faith groups to protect and advance its interests.
Khamenei’s concerns over the future of the Iranian clergy (Part 2)
In recent years, numerous analyses have been published on the increasing influence of the IRGC within the Iranian regime. Nevertheless, the rise in the power of the military should not overshadow the fact that in the Islamic Republic, not only the paramount position of supreme leader, but also many other key roles are held exclusively by clerics. Moreover, many of these clerics, including the highest-ranking ones, must be appointed by the supreme leader. This system was designed to ensure the loyalty of key officials, but over time has given rise to growing concerns over the reliability of the next generation of clerics and the transfer of power.
Dust in the Cloud: The Future of Data Governance in the GCC
As the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) work to transform from hydrocarbons-driven to data-driven economies, they will need to make significant and well-planned invest-ments in digital infrastructure, particularly when it comes to the complex issue of data govern-ance. They must take the lead in establishing regulatory and legal frameworks aligned with international standards in terms of data gathering, processing, and storing procedures. This report highlights the existing laws and regulations that govern data protection in the GCC while addressing their potential and limitations, along with the similarities and differences between the GCC’s legislative frameworks and the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, and the impact of the GCC’s current data protection laws on individuals, the private sector, regulators, and governments.
Ahead of the seventh round of the Iran nuclear negotiations that ended on Dec. 3 in Vienna, many observers interpreted Ebrahim Raisi’s election to the presidency and his recent rhetoric as representing a distinct shift in Iran’s nuclear strategy. Indeed, in November, Raisi’s government’s official newspaper Iran explained that Tehran’s strategy in Vienna has changed, and that it has embraced a new approach looking to compel the West to agree with Iran’s terms for a “good deal.” Yet there is more continuity than change in Iranian decision-making on the nuclear file than meets the eye, and Raisi’s election by itself has not represented a fundamental rearrangement.
Energy Prospects in the Gulf: The Oil Price Ascent, in Brief
While oil prices have rebounded before soaring since the depths of collapse in the spring of 2020 — with Brent crude prices skyrocketing from $19 per barrel in April 2020 to a three-year high of $86 per barrel in October 2021 — the prospects for a sustained high oil price for Gulf producers is unlikely.
Iranians are disillusioned with Biden’s soft approach to the Islamic Republic
If the Biden administration makes concessions to appease the Islamic Republic of Iran as part of the recently resumed Vienna nuclear talks, it will be a historic mistake. The Islamic Republic is facing a deep legitimacy crisis of its own making, as a series of disastrous decisions have hardened the people’s views against the regime. These days, anyone who is seen to be throwing the Islamic Republic a lifeline will be wildly unpopular among Iranians.
منذ البداية، عرَّفت جمهورية إيران الإسلامية نفسها على أنها دولة دينية يتمتع فيها رجال الدين بمكانة مميزة. ومع ذلك، لم تتمكن السلطات قط من إخفاء مخاوفها المستمرة بشأن ما تعتبره فجوة متنامية بين أفكار العديد من رجال الدين الإيرانيين ووجهات نظر المرشد الأعلى لإيران.
Khamenei’s concerns over the future of the Iranian clergy (Part 1)
The Islamic Republic of Iran, from the very beginning, has defined itself as a religious state, in which the clergy enjoy a privileged status. Nevertheless, the authorities have never managed to hide their fears over what they see as a growing gap between the ideas of many Iranian clerics and the views of Iran’s supreme leader.
