Research & Commentary Results

US support for the Black Sea and the Middle East has been through several phases in recent years, with President Donald Trump’s generals having the biggest impact on policy change. While there has been increased engagement in the region, much more is needed from the US – as well as NATO and the EU – to ensure Black Sea security.

The Islamic Republic’s unconventional alliance network reaches far and wide, and its workings have only intensified since the killing of Gen. Qassem Soleimani in early January 2020. The systematic effort to consolidate these alliances, indicated by the swift appointment of Gen. Esmail Qaani and his new deputy Gen. Mohammad Hosseinzadeh Hejazi to lead the Quds Force, is about much more than just retaliation and revenge against the United States. It is also, and perhaps more importantly, a calibrated response to the Trump administration’s reckless and escalatory changes to the established “rules of engagement” between Washington and Tehran.

Blurring the lines between the physical world and the online one, the Iranian group known as the “Nakhsa Warriors” remains cloaked in mystery. Their identity and status are unclear. Are they a military force that carries out operations, an online group of like-minded individuals that share content, part of an Iranian disinformation campaign — or perhaps something else altogether?

On March 26, 2015, the former Saudi ambassador to the U.S., Adel al-Jubeir, announced the beginning of a Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen to curtail Iran’s influence in the country, reinstate the regime of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi in Sanaa, and deter the Iranian-backed Houthi threat. Five years on, however, the objectives of Operation Decisive Storm are far from realized, and the situation on the ground is as volatile as ever.

MEI’s Paul Salem, Khaled Elgindy, and Fatima Abo Alasrar join host Alistair Taylor to discuss the coronavirus pandemic’s impact on the Middle East as nations scramble to contain the spread of COVID-19 and the massive humanitarian and economic toll it could take on already vulnerable populations.

In retaliation for an airstrike that killed 33 Turkish soldiers at the end of February, Ankara launched “Operation Spring Shield” (OSS) against the Syrian regime and the pro-Iranian militias supporting it. Despite being unable to rely on its fleet of F-16s due to Russia’s control of the Syrian airspace over Idlib, Turkey managed to successfully wipe out a large portion of Assad’s army in the area within just a couple of days by making innovative use of drones.

By keeping the focus on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the U.S., and covering up Iran’s failure in dealing with the pandemic, the Houthis are trying to absolve themselves and their patrons of responsibility.

Democrats ought to build a moral firewall around Syria policy, establishing a framework for understanding the Syrian conflict and debating policy options.

From Morocco to Afghanistan, the scholars and experts at MEI take a closer look at how the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic is affecting the Middle East.

Just a week after Houthi rebels took control of al-Hazm, the capital of al-Jawf Province, on March 1, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths paid an unprecedented, one-day visit to the Houthis’ likely next target, oil-and-gas-rich Marib, reiterating the urgent need for de-escalation.

This was an inauspicious start for a plan that from the outset was riddled with holes.

In changing the balance of power on the ground and forcing hostilities to a stalemate, Turkey’s military intervention in Idlib had produced its desired effect. On March 5, Vladimir Putin and Erdogan sat together for six hours and announced to the world a comprehensive cease-fire and the establishment of a secure corridor spanning six kilometers on the north and south sides of the M4 highway.

As Syria’s war reaches its ninth anniversary, Russian and U.S. soldiers are increasingly finding themselves face to face — quite literally — in the country’s northeast. A spate of confrontations over the last two months has opened questions about the fate of Syria’s north in the coming year.

After Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan hammered out a deal with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on March 5 to bring an end to the fighting in Idlib in northwestern Syria, he said he was hopeful that the two countries could extend their cooperation to Libya.

Minority communities in south-west Syria have shrunk to a fraction of their pre-2011 size, and the regime’s repressive policies perpetuate a cycle of violence and chaos that prevents their safe return. The regime’s strategy of transforming minority communities into sources of militia fighters has not only led to the deaths of thousands of young Alawite and Shi’a men, but also created sectarian tensions between formerly interconnected communities in south-west Syria. So long as the regime’s policy in the south-west is characterized by violence, the safe and dignified return of displaced Syrians will not be possible. This paper studies current and former minority communities in south-west Syria, the security and economic challenges these groups face, and the manner by which the regime exploits and weaponizes these vulnerable Syrians.