Research & Commentary Results

The digitization of business in the Middle East has enormous implications for the future of regional economies, as well as for education, employment, and beyond. The way this digital transition shapes the region will be influenced by the degree to which policymakers consider this shift in its context and with an eye toward the future, as the opening session of the MEI Cyber Program’s recent conference explored.

Today marks almost three months of a global shutdown to curb the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Middle East and North Africa region faces a double whammy from the resulting economic fallout and the sharp decline in oil prices this spring. While Egypt is rightly focused on its short-term response to the crisis, it should take advantage of the international and regional shock caused by the pandemic to change its growth model for the longer term and implement much-needed structural reforms on a variety of fronts.

While the regime and its allies have cast the current crisis as the result of Western sanctions, Syria’s economic troubles are largely due to the regime’s “Assad or we burn the country” policies.

The lockdown conditions have meant that demand for the services of informal market laborers has declined, leaving them with no means of making a living and no form of insurance or savings to fall back on.

As MbS approaches three years as Saudi Arabia’s crown prince and, in the eyes of many, the de facto ruler of the kingdom, he remains an enigmatic figure on the world stage.

Turkish support for the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) in the Libyan civil war has added a new dimension to relations between Turkey and Gulf countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. But what impact have the growing geopolitical divides and diplomatic disagreements had on Turkish-Emirati and Turkish-Saudi economic relations?

With an economy already on the brink of collapse and a shocking devaluation of the Syrian pound — hitting 3,175 pounds to the dollar earlier this month — the COVID-19 pandemic has come at an exceptionally dangerous time in Syria.

By letting people vent in the streets, Hezbollah seeks to shift the blame away from its inability to offer the help its constituency expects of it.

The administration hopes additional economic pressure will compel Damascus to take a series of political gestures, including releasing political prisoners and establishing an accountability process for the atrocities its forces committed.

The framers of the 2020-21 budget were confronted with a long list of conflicting objectives.

Mainly at issue for the country is the difficult choice of whether to prioritize saving lives or saving the economy for a Pakistan that can ill afford to ignore either.

When Bashar’s father Hafez al-Assad started his regime, the Makhloufs became key allies. This alliance deepened with Bashar’s rise to power, and the Makhloufs became increasingly entrenched in the system until they became its economic pillar. The house of Assad was the political arm of the regime while the house of Makhlouf was the economic and financial arm. But then it all fell apart.

Charities are useful fronts for all sorts of activities in Syria, but above all perhaps, they are vehicles of control. The Assads have long understood that the biggest danger to their rule comes from within, from a civil society that rejects their governance — never more so than today.

Of all the challenges to the OPEC+ effort, Iraq remains the biggest and most daunting.

Since 2017, Iran has seen several waves of protests rooted in political, social, and, most importantly, economic grievances. In light of COVID and the post-pandemic fallout, there is every indication that unrest will continue to grow, and even accelerate. Until now, the regime’s coercive apparatus has had both the capacity and the willingness of its members to successfully suppress anti-regime unrest. But has COVID-19 changed this balance? What impact, if any, has the pandemic had on the regime’s security capacity?