Preventing the next crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations
There was little daylight between Washington and Jerusalem during the four years of Donald Trump’s presidency. The new U.S. administration under President Joe Biden appears poised — based on staffing decisions and declared policies — to revert to a U.S. policy in the Middle East that more closely resembles that of Obama. Meanwhile, Netanyahu, who fought bitterly and publicly against Obama’s policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iran nuclear issue, remains at the helm in Israel. The stage may be set for a sequel of the acrimonious relationship between Jerusalem and Washington.
On January 14, 2021, outgoing Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted about Palestinian refugees, proclaiming “(less than) 200,000 Arabs displaced in 1948 are still alive and most others are not refugees by any rational criteria.” A month earlier, on December 11, a group of 22 Republican members of Congress sent a letter to President Trump requesting that he instruct the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration to declassify a report on the approximate number of Palestinian refugees, with the intention of redefining and disenfranchising millions of Palestinian refugees of their refugee status. The intent behind the request is made evident by the letter, which states, “The issue of the so-called Palestinian ‘right of return’ of 5.3 million refugees to Israel as part of any ‘peace deal’ is an unrealistic demand, and we do not believe it accurately reflects the number of actual Palestinian refugees
For years pundits have argued that Palestinian elections cannot take place in the occupied territories until there is reconciliation between the warring factions of Fatah and Hamas. The conflict between them led to the creation of two parallel governments, with Fatah controlling the West Bank and Hamas in charge of Gaza. This situation produced parallel laws and, most importantly, parallel security forces. While these differences remain unresolved, elections, which were once considered impossible without reconciliation, are now being used to achieve reconciliation. On January 11, a Palestinian presidential decree announced legislative elections for May 22 to be followed by presidential elections on July 31.
MEI’s Paul Salem and Ross Harrison join host Alistair Taylor to discuss what the Biden Administration can do to reduce regional tensions and proxy conflicts in the Middle East.
The Challenge of Foreign Fighters: Repatriating and Prosecuting ISIS Detainees
From the U.S. and the U.K. to Iraq and Syria, the way countries are handling the repatriation and prosecution of accused ISIS members echoes the policies that drove their citizens to seek a utopian Islamic State in the first place. Not only are the policies that pushed people to start joining the group in 2013 continuing, but in many cases they have increased in both scale and scope. While the current repatriation and prosecution policies are arguably counterproductive, they may also be fueling future terrorist activity and support for radical anti-government groups. To reduce the chances of such negative consequences, foreign governments must switch gears and adopt an entirely different approach before it is too late.
With the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco signing normalisation agreements with Israel last year, the road to Israel’s integration into Centcom was paved.
The Biden administration and the Middle East: Regional perspectives on the first 200 days
As the Biden administration takes office, it faces a host of challenges, both at home and abroad. Where does the Middle East fit into all of this and what should the new administration prioritize in its first 200 days? In the second part of a two-part series, we asked experts and scholars from across the region to weigh in with their thoughts.
Protesting against techno: How a concert revealed the state of Palestinian society
Until December 26, 2020, techno music was not a common topic of conversation in Palestine. That changed when Sama Abdulhadi, a famous techno DJ, gave a concert at Maqam Nabi Musa that provoked a backlash from religious conservatives. Abdulhadi, who is a Palestinian living abroad, decided to return to her homeland to perform three concerts that would be streamed on Beatport, a website specializing in techno music. She reached an agreement with the Ministry of Tourism to perform at Maqam Nabi Musa for a crowd of about 30.
A Shift Among the Shi'a: Will a Marj'a Emerge from the Arabian Peninsula?
This paper looks at the political implications of the relationship between Shi’a in the Gulf states and Iranian marj‘as, the historical background to these ties, and Gulf states’ concerns surrounding the outflow to Iran of religious taxes. In some Gulf countries, these issues are tied to concerns about the loyalty of Shi’a to the nation. The authors argue that the emergence of a marj‘a who would be based in one of the Gulf states could quell these concerns.The authors identify potential marj‘as from the region and steps that Gulf states must take so that their Shi’a citizens will shift their allegiance from foreign-based marj‘as to domestically based ones.
How can China mediate between Israel and Pakistan?
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan recently revealed that several countries are pressuring Islamabad to follow in the footsteps of the Gulf states by recognizing the state of Israel. Khan, however, expressed opposition to this idea, at least until there is a political settlement that meets Palestinian demands. While full normalization between Israel and Pakistan may still be out of reach, China could mediate between these two countries which have never established a diplomatic relationship.
The Fakhrizadeh assassination: A major failure for Iranian intelligence
The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the most important figure in Iran’s nuclear program, in late November 2020 is a major failure for Iran’s intelligence services. Despite all the secrecy and the emphasis on protecting Fakhrizadeh, however, he was still assassinated in the Absard area, about 70 km from Tehran, on Nov. 27. Why was he killed despite such a high level of protection, and what effect will his death have on the Iranian regime’s intelligence and security structures?
