Beirut will rise again from the ashes, like it always has. But the real rebuilding that must occur is not physical in nature. It is political. Nothing will truly change in Lebanon unless the country’s corrupt and incompetent leaders, who have been in power for decades, are unseated.
After months of under-reported cases and relaxed lockdown measures, the rapidly spreading COVID-19 pandemic has gripped government-held areas. A worrying rise in daily deaths and infections, especially in Damascus, has left Syria facing what could be its biggest challenge yet.
Tunisia seems to have avoided the worst of the first phase of the global coronavirus crisis. And yet whatever the final tally of the pandemic might be, its consequences will only add to a host of existing problems that have beset the North African country in recent years, including political instability, a stalled economy, security threats, and financial woes.
The coronavirus pandemic that originated in China could not have come at a worse moment for the UAE. Indeed, before its outbreak, relations between the UAE and China were in an excellent place. Underpinned by growing economic exchange, the bilateral partnership holds the promise of turning into a geo-economic and geopolitical one. For Beijing, the UAE is first and foremost a critical hub for re-export to the wider region and ultimately, it is in the domain of maritime trade and around China’s BRI that the partnership has its greatest potential.
Oman’s new ruler, Sultan Haitham, only has a short timeframe in which to aggressively diversify the country’s economy and reduce its dependency on hydrocarbon exports. This already difficult task is further complicated by the twin challenges of the global coronavirus pandemic and low oil prices, both of which limit the government’s fiscal room for maneuver. One obvious sector that Oman should consider expanding rapidly is its tourism industry.
So far, Saudi Arabia’s push for OPEC+ restraint appears to be working. If projections of a gradual demand recovery in 2020 are accurate, the Saudis should be able to reaffirm their centrality as market stabilizers.
HTS launched multiple raids on SBS, forcing its factions to close their military bases and banning the formation of any new factions or operations rooms. In doing so, it has killed two birds with one stone: demarcating new redlines for its rivals and demonstrating its usefulness to its Turkish “partner” and the international community in their war on terrorism.
The nationwide protests that erupted in October 2019 shifted the political landscape and paradigm of Iraqi political participation: Led by motivated Iraqi youth in their teens and twenties with no previous civic experience, they signal a rejection of the post-2003 sectarian patronage system, known as muhassasa, that has failed to deliver security, economic development, or basic services. The protest movement’s spontaneity and authenticity are its core strength; no public figure or party directed the waves of protests across central and southern Iraq.
Over the past decade, the two main pillars of Lebanon’s stability have been the country’s army and its banking sector. Today one of those pillars — the banking sector — has all but fallen and Lebanon is standing on one leg: its army.
Lebanon is on the brink of collapse due to its domestic economic and political crises, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Another failed state in the Middle East would negatively impact strategic U.S. interests in the region. Lebanon requires a thorough reorientation towards stability and renewed socio-economic sustainability which entails fundamental domestic reforms and targeted international support led by the U.S.
Multiple signs point to a crisis of confidence in Afghanistan. Ever since the publication of a sensational report alleging that a Russian military intelligence unit secretly offered bounties to the Taliban to kill American soldiers, there has been an intense debate about the possibility of peace in Afghanistan following the U.S. exit.
As in other countries, not all announced investments come to fruition. But the ratio in Syria is particularly staggering. Of the 118 projects approved by the Syrian Investment Agency in 2018, only 46 percent have taken any serious steps toward implementation as of early 2020.
After the fall of ISIS in 2019, many relatives of fighters who were detained or killed, including 10,000 families of foreign fighters, were housed in camps like Roj and al-Hol in territory controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces. Like any closed society, the foreigners’ annex in al-Hol has its own dynamic and life there is much more complicated than is often portrayed.
The double whammy of the economic fallout of COVID-19 and a lack of sufficient support from international donors is putting enormous pressure on PM Hamdok’s government.
Today’s landscape is dramatically different from that to which we awoke on Sept. 11, 2001. It’s a complex mix of foreign and domestic forces influenced by economic and social conditions that breed extremism which ebbs and flows across physical and cyber space often defined by great power competition. While terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS have innovated and adapted, U.S. counterterrorism strategy has remained unchanged, fighting yesterday’s war while neglecting present day threats as well as those over the near horizon. America is long overdue to update its counterterrorism strategy and, perhaps more importantly, how we measure success.