Iran’s threats could strengthen Azerbaijan-Israel relations
Iran-Azerbaijan relations have been going through a rough patch recently; both sides have genuine concerns that they want addressed.
Iran-Azerbaijan relations have been going through a rough patch recently; both sides have genuine concerns that they want addressed.
Jordan is going full speed ahead in normalizing relations with the Syrian regime, 10 years after it suspended political and economic ties with its northern neighbor in the wake of the eruption of the Syrian uprising. On Oct. 3, and in the first public contact between Abdullah and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since 2011, Amman announced that the king had received a call from Assad. Talks focused on bilateral relations and ways to strengthen cooperation. The king stressed Jordan’s support for efforts to back Syrian territorial integrity, sovereignty, and unity. Jordan had allowed the Syrian embassy to remain open in Amman and kept a skeleton staff at its embassy in Damascus.
Naftali Bennett found his way to the Israeli prime minister’s office, even though his party won only six out of 120 seats in the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) in the March 2021 elections. He replaced the country’s long-time prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who held the position for a combined total of 12 years and set the tone for Israeli policy, especially in the region. With the new government, formed in June, recently passing the 100-day mark, it is time to ask whether the change in the prime minister’s office has resulted in a real change in Israel’s regional policy.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
يجتمع الرؤساء الروسي والتركي والإيراني يوم الأربعاء 29 سبتمبر/أيلول في مدينة سوتشي الروسية لمناقشة الوضع في سوريا. وكما كان الحال في الاجتماعات السابقة، من المرجح أن يتصدر الوضع في شمال غرب سوريا جدول الأعمال. على الرغم من أن منطقة إدلب الكبرى ظلت من الناحية التقنية خاضعة لوقف إطلاق النار الذي اتفقت عليه روسيا وتركيا في مارس/آذار 2020، إلا أن الطائرات الروسية والمدفعية السورية ارتكبت انتهاكات قاتلة ومتكررة منذ ذلك الحين.
Read MEI’s weekly briefing featuring expert analysis of key regional developments for the week ahead.
الجدل المستمر (والمبالغ فيه إلى حد كبير) حول قرار أعضاء الكونغرس التقدميين بإعاقة إدراج مليار دولار في التمويل الإضافي لنظام الدفاع الصاروخي الإسرائيلي المسمى بالقبة الحديدية، إلى جانب الـ 3.8 مليار دولار من المساعدات العسكرية الأمريكية التي تتلقاها إسرائيل بالفعل، كشف عن تصدعات في داخل الحزب الديمقراطي وكذلك عن مدى إمكانية إجراء نقاش حقيقي حول القضايا المتعلقة بإسرائيل/فلسطين في واشنطن.
After 40 years, Syria once again has dual military rule, where the president and his brother are the highest authorities. In the early 1980s, Rifaat al-Assad, the brother of Hafez al-Assad, was the commander of the Defense Companies and the strong man in Syria in the military, security, and even civilian spheres, while Hafez was in a coma. Today, we see this scenario echoed with the control of Maher al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s brother, over the Fourth Division, which has become an elite military unit due to strong Iranian support and its control over various territories of the country.
بعد أربعين عاما، تتجدد ثناية الحكم العسكري في سوريا بين الرئيس وشقيقه، ففي مطلع الثمانينات كان رفعت الأسد (شقيق حافظ الأسد)، قائد سرايا الدفاع الرجل القوي في سوريا على المستوى العسكري والأمني بل حتى على المستوى المدني، بينما كان حافظ الأسد يشكو من الغيبوبة – آنذاك-.
While much of the discourse surrounding the Iron Dome controversy is mired in hysterics and hyperbole, some have put forward a more rational case for providing additional funding for it. One of the standard arguments advanced in recent days is that Iron Dome is crucial not only for saving Israeli lives but is equally important (perhaps even more so) for saving Palestinian lives. This claim has been echoed by numerous American and Israeli analysts and even Members of Congress, and seems to have been accepted by a number of journalists as well. But is it actually true?
The viability of Eastern Mediterranean natural gas resources has long been a source of debate for reasons including cost considerations, market demand, and regional geopolitical tensions. The past couple of years have further complicated the debate, introducing new questions about the role of these resources in supporting post-pandemic economic recovery or helping more advanced markets achieve net-zero policies by replacing coal and other fuel sources (a particularly relevant topic of debate given Europe and Asia are key export targets for East Med gas).
It took the Taliban just three and a half months to undermine a 20-year international effort to build a competent Afghan military. The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) collapsed once it was clear the U.S. was pulling out ground troops and ceasing air support operations after two decades of training and sustainment that cost the American taxpayer approximately $83 billion. When required to stand alone, against a Taliban force, the ANA failed unequivocally. Building the ANA as a mirror image of the U.S. military was strategically and operationally flawed. If they are designed to fight like the U.S. but cannot fight in the absence of U.S. forces, they are ineffective. What lessons should we learn from this and how could our approach be different in the future?
As we mark 20 years since the 9/11 terror attacks and the subsequent U.S. interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other protracted elements of the ill-fated and ill-conceived “war on terror,” it is easy to overlook other disastrous legacies of U.S. policy in the post-9/11 era. This is particularly true in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where Washington’s response to 9/11 effectively marked the beginning of the long, tortured death of the Middle East Peace Process, and with it hopes for a two-state solution.
These developments come against the backdrop of multiple U.S. hints that Washington is potentially willing to circumvent sanctioning the participating parties under the Caesar Act.
The central media apparatus of the Islamic State group is mis-reporting on the activities of its cells in central Syria. Rather than exaggerating their capabilities, something that it is conventionally assumed to be doing all the time, its Central Media Diwan appears either to be deliberately under-playing them, or, less likely, to be unaware of their full extent, possibly due to communication issues.