Research & Commentary Results

In October, the United Nations embargo on arms sales to Iran is scheduled to expire.  This was a deadline specified in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal concluded by the Obama Administration.  The Trump administration stridently opposes the lifting of this restriction and is lobbying within the UN Security Council to have the embargo extended indefinitely. 

Until recently, Russia’s dominance in the natural gas markets southwest of its borders appeared unassailable. These days, that is less and less the case. Largely unnoticed yet dramatic changes are taking place in Turkey – Moscow’s top gas customer outside of Germany. 

On July 12, the Armenian and the Azerbaijani armed forces started a border skirmish. Fighting went on for several days, leaving at least 16 dead in its wake. Remarkably enough, the two sides are facing off outside the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, the usual flashpoint. This time around the flare-up took place well to the north, where Armenia’s Tavush region meets Azerbaijan’s Tovuz district. It is little wonder then that the crisis caught Turkey’s attention.

On July 12, military clashes broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan, quickly escalating into the single deadliest incident since the “four-day war” of April 2016. While violent outbreaks between the two sides are common, they usually occur on the Line of Contact around Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding territories. This time, however, fighting erupted along the internationally recognized Armenia-Azerbaijan border, far away from the actual conflict zone. With heavy use of artillery, drones, cyberattacks and disinformation – causing at least 17 combined casualties, including a well-known Azerbaijani army general – the violence risked spiraling into a major war.

For many policymakers the Black Sea is a secondary consideration when it comes to transatlantic security. A lack of resources by NATO members meant that initiatives taken to bolster territorial defense were limited geographically after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. At the time, Baltics were seen as the most pressing priority. Instead of bolstering NATO’s frontline from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the alliance instead focused most of its energy and resources on northeastern Europe.

There are two countries in Europe which have been at war with one other for three decades. Last week Armenia and Azerbaijan were fighting again. At least fifteen soldiers, including an Azerbaijani general and one civilian, were killed in clashes across their northern border between the towns of Tavush and Tovuz. After a brief lull, firing from heavy weapons resumed on July 16.

Where most of the international community sees R2P as a mechanism for protecting human rights when a state cannot or will not ensure them, Russia’s take on the same concept focuses on the protection of national sovereignty at any cost. However, Moscow’s commitment to the notion of sovereignty has been selectively applied to the states of the Middle East and the Black Sea.

Name any category of weapons system and then check which countries are working on a design of that kind of weapon and one will make an interesting discovery: the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have more different types and designs of that weapon in development than the rest of the world’s arms producers combined.

Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent states of the Caspian and Russia are still deeply intertwined in each other’s economies, security, and cultures. Moscow has continued to wield considerable military, political, and economic influence in the region.

The Black Sea sits at an important economic and civilizational crossroads on the Eurasian landmass. The region contains oil and gas resources, key energy pipelines, shipping lanes, and fiber-optic cables. For Russia, the Black Sea is of particular importance for economic and geostrategic reasons.

Romanian and Bulgarian interests have diverged on many occasions throughout history, but their outlooks have recently become more aligned. For one thing, both countries have fostered a competitive dynamic to exploit their advantageous position near the Black Sea, or to join the EU and the Schengen Area. Their narratives regarding China are also similar.

As part of Beijing’s broader strategy of seeking out new markets and cultivating strategic partnerships with countries beyond its backyard, China has been seeking to expand its economic and political ties with Black Sea states. While Beijing’s involvement in the region is still at a nascent stage, it has already prompted fears that its economic engagement masks a political agenda that could hurt Western interests.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia used its dominant position as a natural gas supplier to wield outsized influence in the region. But recent changes in the natural gas market have eroded that dominance. Under increasingly globalized and interconnected natural gas markets, Russia has been losing its ability to use its dominance as a gas supplier to influence the region geopolitically and economically.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently urged that the current health crisis should not become a security crisis. To stay secure in the years to come, the Alliance must become more resilient and ready to meet the challenges of a post-COVID environment. This is especially true for the most vulnerable part of the Alliance – its Central and Eastern European (former Communist) member countries.

Arguably the time is now ripe to begin accumulating such nuances in regard to Turkey. The difficulties of dealing with Turkey and President Recep Erdogan are incontestable and well-known. Nevertheless, Turkey’s geopolitical significance is equally indisputable and far-reaching.  Many of the major issues in European security – migration, Libya’s civil war, confronting Syria’s civil war (the equivalent in our time of the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s), stabilizing the Balkans, defending the Black Sea, European energy security, and in particular accessing the energy in the Eastern Mediterranean – would benefit from the restoration of a true and ongoing strategic dialogue with Turkey. Indeed, neither we nor Turkey can make progress on them without such a dialogue.