The main takeaway from the Saudi Aramco IPO in December 2019 is that the Saudi leadership is willing to fully support private investors.
Egypt’s burgeoning population is one of the biggest threats to its future.
The eastern Mediterranean has become an increasingly important focus for Turkey’s foreign and security policy, but the interlocking of new issues like energy politics and sovereignty rights with old problems like Cyprus has created significant challenges for Ankara.
The April 2019 Israeli elections between incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his competitor Benny Gantz were fraught with tension even before external entities got involved. But when Israel’s internal security service, Shin Bet, revealed that suspected Iranian cyber actors had accessed Gantz’s mobile phone, there was yet another issue to contend with, albeit one not specific only to Israeli elections: interference.
The green movement has been slow to catch on in Egypt, but the January announcement by the Egyptian government that it is finalizing plans to launch the country’s first green bonds could provide the financial incentives to further promote sustainable development. “Sustainability” is one of the fastest growing sectors globally, estimated to reach as much as $12 trillion annually by 2030.
Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, many analysts have examined the role played by a handful of key outside actors, such as Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Yet China has received comparatively little attention in most discussions about the Syrian crisis. A deeper look at Sino-Syrian relations and Beijing’s policies vis-à-vis Syria is long overdue as this bilateral relationship is set to become increasingly important to both China’s ambitious foreign policy as well as the Syrian government’s vision for reconstruction and redevelopment.
Faced with the threat of further sanctions, a volatile situation in neighboring Lebanon, and a brutally tough winter, the only thing currently rising from the embers of war-torn Syria is the value of the dollar against the struggling Syrian pound. This marks the beginning of a dangerous new phase in the Syrian conflict as the government, fresh from its eight-year-long war for survival, tries to fend off an economic collapse from within.
The protest movement in Iraq is now entering its fourth month. The protests raging across most of the south of the country have remained non-sectarian in their tone and message, and the movement is steadfast in its rejection of the political order, and all members of the political elite.
Reuters reported on Jan. 30 that the FBI has been investigating Israeli spyware firm NSO Group since 2017. The revelation comes after Sen. Chris Murphy and UN Special Rapporteur Agnes Callamard called on the U.S. to investigate the apparent hacking of Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos’s phone by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In its statement, the UN identified NSO Group as a likely source of the malware.
Jordan is bracing for protracted cyber insecurity. Since 2010, the Hashemite Kingdom has rolled out a raft of policies to manage digital vulnerabilities. In keeping with its proactive approach to cybersecurity, Amman is taking additional measures to inoculate the kingdom against digital ailments, including, most recently, the adoption of the 2019 Cybersecurity Law.
By any objective standard, the Lebanese protest movement has failed. This is not necessarily an indictment against it. Rather, it’s a reality one cannot and should not ignore. The responsible thing to do now is to try to understand why it has fallen flat, despite more than 100 days of demonstrations in various regions of the country including the capital, Beirut.
First, a word of solace. In the annals of history, the Lebanese are in good company as most uprisings and revolutions failed to attain their goals. And even when they did, success either didn’t last long or was completely reversed due to counterrevolutions and other spoilers, both foreign and domestic.
Over the past several weeks geopolitical experts have been talking a lot about what the surprise U.S. drone attack on Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani, head of the IRGC – Quds Force, on Jan. 3 means for the Middle East and relations between the major powers. What has received considerably less attention, however, is what Soleimani’s killing means for the South Caucasus, a region whose small size belies its strategic importance.
Egypt has realized a significant number of changes in healthcare, education, and economic reform policy over the past decade. It is also increasingly looking toward policy for development that emphasizes cohesive problem solving, in line with its Vision 2030 strategy, which highlights the need for positive knock-on effects from investments in human development
However unsurmountable geopolitical crises may seem today, it will be domestic protests that determine the social and economic landscape in the Middle East in the coming years.
As neighboring regions, the South Caucasus and the Middle East are inextricably intertwined — so much so that the former is sometimes even considered part of the Greater Middle East. While geographical proximity is the strongest driver of interconnectivity between the two regions, geopolitics, business ties, and energy interests also link countries from the South Caucasus and the Middle East and form the basis for important bilateral and regional relationships.