Tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan are high right now but both sides will very likely soon step down. Neither Tehran nor Baku can afford to let recent events lead to a full-fledged crisis or a military showdown between the two Shi’a Muslim-majority countries. On the surface, this latest spat is about Azerbaijan’s resentment toward Iran for providing an economic lifeline through trade and transit options to its landlocked arch nemesis, Armenia. In reality, the split that underpins the ongoing Iranian-Azerbaijani tensions is more about fundamental foreign policy choices that Tehran and Baku have each made and are unlikely to reverse.
Avoiding water bankruptcy in the drought-troubled Southwest: What the US and Iran can learn from each other
It was another hot, dry year in the western U.S., with almost the entire region in drought. Vital reservoirs have fallen to dangerous lows. More than 7,000 miles away, Iran is grappling with water problems that are similar to the U.S. Southwest’s but more severe.
Moscow may be disillusioned with the new officials in Tehran
The new government of Iran, under President Ebrahim Raisi, still looks like a black box. It isn’t yet clear what policy the new officials in Tehran want to pursue in the nuclear negotiations — or even if they will negotiate at all. Hossein Amirabdollahian, Iran’s new foreign minister, shed some light on this darkness and said that “consultations are underway within the new Iranian government on how to continue the Vienna nuclear talks.” It appears the “consultations” have reached a meaningful point and the replacement of key positions has begun in the foreign policy apparatus. As a first move, Ali Bagheri Kani, a conservative close to former top nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, replaced Abbas Araghchi, the political deputy foreign minister. The emerging new team in Tehran looks strange not only to the U.S. and Europe, but also to Russia.
Iran came one step closer to becoming a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) last week with the approval of its bid, 15 years after it first applied. The accession process is expected to take up to two years to complete.
The politics and geopolitics of the Afghan refugee crisis
For the second time in the past two decades, a large number of Afghans find themselves escaping chaos. Twenty years ago, it was the American invasion of Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 that caused a large wave of refugees. More recently, the hasty American withdrawal from the country and the ensuing Taliban takeover have created another wave of refugees.
Iulia Sabina-Joja and Alex Vatanka join the program to discuss Iranian foreign policy and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Amid growing concerns about the regional repercussions of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the SCO met for its 20th anniversary summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on September 16th and 17th. Regional security cooperation and Iranian accession were at the top of the agenda, with Iran formally joining the organization as a full member on September 17th.
Iran and the Taliban after the US fiasco in Afghanistan
For Iran, Washington’s Afghanistan fiasco has been touted as confirmation that U.S. policy in the Islamic world is doomed to fail. The immediate geopolitical and ideological gains, however, could be overshadowed by the potential challenges that a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan may pose for Iran’s security and regional interests in the long run.
ديجافو مرة أخرى في أفغانستان: التفاوض مع طالبان لإنقاذ المواقع التراثية
بينما يشاهد العالم استيلاء طالبان على أفغانستان وما أعقب ذلك من أحداث متلاحقة، يبدو الأمر وكأنه “ديجافو” أو تكرار لمعاناة أبناء هذه الأمة. ومع عودة طالبان إلى وادي باميان، وهو أحد مواقع التراث العالمي لليونسكو الذي أجاز فيه الملا عمر تدمير تمثالين من القرن السادس لبوذا قبل 20 عامًا، ندرك أننا شاهدنا هذا الفيلم من قبل ونعرف كيف تكون نهايته.
The Afghan refugee crisis: What does it mean for Iran?
The images of desperate Afghan citizens trying to leave their country, beyond highlighting a massive human tragedy, may become a symbol of the so-called war on terror. Many of those Afghans already understand the feeling of abandoning their homes, because their families experienced it. They know what happens when foreign armies withdraw from their country and the tragedies that can ensue. The difference this time, however, was the deadline — only a few weeks.
Afghanistan must address existential and structural challenges before tapping natural resource wealth
Right now, Afghanistan is on the cusp of an economic collapse, not some Chinese investment bonanza. Its immediate challenges are existential. And until economic, political, and security conditions stabilize, and legal and regulatory frameworks for investments are in place, Afghanistan’s connectivity and mineral wealth dreams will remain just that.
Though aware of the weaknesses of the former Afghan government, none of the Central Asian governments seemed prepared for the rapidity and decisiveness of the Taliban victory. Not unreasonably, Central Asians fear that it will spur the growth of regional terrorism and extremism, either through direct Taliban sponsorship or inspiration. The five Central Asian states backed the anti-Taliban opposition in the 1990s and then the U.S.-led NATO military campaign in Afghanistan after 2001. Presently, the Central Asian governments are eschewing policies that could antagonize the new regime while looking for indications whether the Taliban have genuinely turned over a new leaf and renounced international terrorism. If they have, then some Central Asian countries seem open to economic and perhaps other cooperation. If not, Central Asians will likely rely on Russia for enhanced security support.
Ebrahim Raisi, the eighth president of Iran, has taken over at a time when the Islamic Republic is facing a series of major potential crises. Over the next several decades, these crises could have consequences that will not only affect Iran itself, but may reverberate across the region as well. This article will address the 13 crises facing Raisi’s government and Iranian society more broadly.
Beholden to Khamenei and the IRGC, Raisi will stick to the hardline script
In the June 2021 elections, the Iranian presidency was handed to Ebrahim Raisi on a silver platter. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made sure the election process was engineered, down to the smallest detail, for a shoo-in Raisi victory. For Raisi, this is something of a double-edged sword. At a minimum, it means policy continuity in Tehran, including in the realm of hybrid military-economic affairs. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) will not only continue to have a free hand to shape Iran’s military and regional agenda, but it will also return to center-stage as far as economic planning is concerned. The same thing happened during the government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; he too gave the IRGC an free hand — a decision that he later came to regret. Raisi has no choice though. His political fortunes rest on continued support from Khamenei and the IRGC. Don’t expect him to unveil any trailblazing policies anytime soon.
