Research & Commentary Results

The biggest development this past week in the Middle East policy of Trump’s second administration was the initiation of talks between the United States and Iran. This small sign of hope for diplomatic progress comes at a time when the administration continues to implement an assertive and unpredictable economic unilateralism that has roiled global markets and reduced trust and confidence between the United States and most close international partners. Brian Katulis unpacks three things to watch closely as Trump’s Iran policy evolves and his broader national security approach unfolds.

For much of the past two decades, ISIS has enjoyed favorable conditions in Syria, but since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, dynamics have changed. With Assad’s departure, ISIS lost its long-standing and vitally important safe haven in Syria’s central desert and its most significant driver for recruitment. The results — so far — have been dramatic.

President Donald Trump is focused on realizing two transformative breakthroughs that his predecessors failed to accomplish: an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, centered on a tripartite US-Saudi-Israeli deal, and an agreement between the US and Iran. Both would be historic achievements. So far, however, progress in each case has proven difficult and plodding.

The leaked Signal chat among top US administration officials discussing military strikes against the Houthis laid bare the central problems with Trump 2.0’s nascent national security approach: a strong inclination to prioritize tactics and propaganda in statecraft without a clear and practical strategic framework to deal with the biggest challenges in the world and in the Middle East.

Iran is accumulating enough near-weapons-grade enriched uranium to build a nuclear weapon within weeks or months, not years. President Donald Trump, having withdrawn the United States in 2018 from the nuclear deal that would have postponed that possibility, is now appealing for negotiations with Tehran. But in the Middle East, the nuclear question does not concern only Iran.

The work of the Syria Strategy Project and the considerable policy recommendations found in this report present a realistic and holistic vision for Syria’s recovery and reintegration into the international system.

Syria’s national dialogue, held in Damascus at the end of February, was intended to chart the country’s future, one that would have been unthinkable just three months earlier. However, the process and outcomes of the dialogue were flawed, left critical questions unanswered, and raised new concerns.

Some analysts try to explain Trump’s Middle East rhetoric as an effort to provoke a new type of conversation and to break the mold. But one unconventional source that helps explain Trump’s tactics is pro wrestling, in which the actions are understood to be illusory but still prompt a response from all sides.

This massive distraction of the Trump administration’s Gaza non-plan and the even more serious move of dismantling America’s ability to shape and influence events abroad together carry three risks for the Middle East.

President Trump’s Gaza ploy is really aimed at the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia most directly, to rebuild Gaza and cozy up to Israel.

Either maintaining Russia’s military bases in Syria or finding an alternative outpost in the Mediterranean will prove extremely difficult for Moscow. And part of the problem with pursuing the latter option, particularly if in Libya, is that it would require a full-on transformation of Russia’s military presence model — from more traditional bases designed to establish deterrence by showing the flag in the region to building up a military and logistical operation inside a security “gray zone.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a potentially disastrous showdown within the next month that could shake his hold on power, unless he manages to deter the strongly held positions of the foreign and domestic politicians and political forces on which he is dependent.

The election of President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam is a political breakthrough in Lebanon and a harbinger of what could happen in a country long dismissed as unsalvageable. Beirut’s new leadership reflects the aspiration of a majority of the Lebanese people to live in a functioning state free from the dual drivers of its failure: political violence and pervasive corruption. Those leaders must now deliver on their commitment to establish a state committed and accountable to its people and rise to meet the responsibility that comes with holding the promise of a nation’s future.

It is becoming apparent that negotiations between the new leadership in Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) face significant obstacles due to disagreements over military structure and administrative demands. These issues reflect the difficulty of reaching a mutual understanding between the two parties. As these challenges persist, there is growing talk of a potential military escalation in eastern Syria, amid residents’ fears and international mediation efforts to contain the crisis and achieve progress in the negotiations.

A very different Middle East will greet President-elect Trump this month compared to the region he experienced during his first term. However, there are opportunities to advance American interests for a more stable and less conflictual Middle East, which might not require the kind of intense US commitment we have seen over the last quarter-century.