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The Israeli incursion into Gaza and the ensuing diplomatic efforts to end the violence have revealed Turkey’s waning influence in the region.  

The Turkish government has been promoting itself as a potential mediator between Israel and Hamas.  The latter’s rejection of an Egyptian ceasefire in mid-July bolstered Turkey’s hopes of playing a key role, as did its inclusion in this past weekend’s Paris summit hosted by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry.

The Turks and Europe, by Gaston Gaillard, 1921

With the Syrian civil war raging and the ISIS offensive in northern Iraq creating a fresh crisis, Turkey now effectively has two failed states on its southern border and is dealing with new security, political, and economic challenges. Gonul Tol, director of MEI’s Turkish Center, explains how Turkey is responding to this predicament.

On the north side of Istanbul’s Golden Horn, the Mavi Marmara sits in quiet isolation. In May 2010, the Turkish vessel was carrying aid for the besieged Gaza Strip when Israel forcibly intercepted it in international waters. Nine activists were killed in the raid, and a tenth succumbed to his injuries last month.

The maritime crisis set off several years of polarized relations between Israel and Turkey that both countries believe are now on the mend. These improving ties may produce humanitarian and economic benefits for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a Sunni militant group controlling territory spanning the border between the two country’s northern regions, made a rapid advance toward Baghdad this week, seizing control of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, and Tikrit, and attacking the refinery town of Baiji. Forces from Iraqi Kurdistan have since moved to secure Kirkuk as the Iraqi central government’s military has fled in disarray. Robert Ford, former U.S.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan secured his eighth big win in 14 years when his ruling AK Party won over 45 percent of the vote in local elections on March 30. After facing down corruption charges, mass protests, and accusations of authoritarianism, Erdogan may feel emboldened to run for president in Turkey’s first direct presidential election in August.

Libya’s road to democracy is shaky at best. Security is deteriorating, with targeted killings, criminal attacks, and bombings on the rise and clashes between rival armed groups—some apparently with government legitimacy and others not—growing more frequent. While these negative trends put tremendous pressure on the transition, Libya’s political process, albeit fickle, manages to keep moving. The efforts at institution building in Libya present a nuanced landscape: for every step forward in one aspect, there are steps backward in others.

After a decade of working to subordinate Turkey’s military establishment so that it cannot influence the trajectory of Turkish politics, closing the channels of the military’s economic influence has been part of this process. Despite early expectations, the AKP has not forged a more democratic and liberal Turkey, but there is no denying the critical importance of its successful effort to institutionalize civilian control of the armed forces.

From the standpoint of Turkish civil-military experts, the concern has never been whether Turkey should civilianize but rather what civilianization would lead to when it was finally achieved. Following the 2013 Gezi protests and the government’s harsh response to the protesters, Turkey’s success in the civilianization of its politics is quickly snowballing into uncertainty.

This article first appeared on The National Interest.

The fall of the Qaddafi regime and the loss of the state monopoly on violence gave way to a duopoly of power in Libya whereby rudimentary “national” forces—under the control of the National Transitional Council (NTC) from March 2011 to August 2012—were established in competition with the non-state “Revolutionary Brigades,” which had borne the brunt of the military struggle against Qaddafi’s forces. Since then, the Revolutionary Brigades have increasingly sought to assert themselves in the political arena.

Introduction

The political crisis in Ukraine and subsequent annexation of Crimea by Russia have sent reverberations throughout the Middle East, where Western and Russian influences continue to weave a complex geopolitical web. MEI interviewed four of its scholars to produce this detailed account of the challenges the conflict poses to the region’s political, security, and economic conditions.

Libyan popular and political support for engaging the international community offers the United States and Western partners an opportunity to help stabilize a North African energy producer and encourage orderly political change. Conversely, a failure to act could have costly, long-term regional and international security consequences. Domestic political limitations to direct U.S. government engagement, along with other issues that compete for attention and resources, are constraints on a more active policy. Moreover, Libyans themselves would not tolerate a dominating U.S. role.

In 2011, many observers predicted that relations between Libya and Egypt would become closer after both countries underwent similar revolutions followed by attempts at democratic transition. But three years later, the realization of this prediction appears unlikely. Political realities and ideological differences have led to a relationship that is contentious at best.